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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE A 
- r 
STATE OF IDAHO *< -*-d&kz-- <yo -&#- 
DON HALVERSON, 
Plaintiff / Appellant, 
and 
CHARLOTTE HALVERSON 
Plaintiff 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official 
capacities and in their individual capacities; DAN 
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his 
individual capacity, 
Defendants / Respondents. 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Latah 
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
.............................................. 
DON HALVORSON 
PRO SE 
i RONALD J. LANDECK 
1 
t TTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
this day of 
STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK 
By 
Deputy 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 36825-2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TKE COUNTY OF LATAH 
COURT MINUTES 
Presiding Judge 
CARL B. KERRICK 
Reporter 
NANCY TOWLER 
Date MAY 27,2008 
Time: 9:20 A.M. 
DON & CHARLOTTE EMLVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), 
1 
Plaintiffs, 1 Docket No. CV-2008-180 
VS. APPEARANCES : 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) DON HALVORSON 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF 1 For, Plaintiff 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH ) 
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT ) RONALD LANDECK 
ORLAND ARNEGERG, RICHARD ) For, Defendant 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their ) 
Official Capacites, and in their Individual ) 
Capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, 1 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
SUBJECT OF PR0CEEDINGS:MTN FOR DECLARATORY JUDGhIENT 67-8003 
BE IT KNOTxJN, TI%AT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS TWBE HAD, TO-biIT: 
DC# 2340 
000 1 Don and Charlotte Halvorson present. 
Ronald Landsck on telephone. 
0025 Mr. Hal~~orson presents argument to Court re: motion for declaratory jud-gnent of 
I.C. 67-8003. 
212 Mr. Landeck presents argument to Court re: motion for declaratory jud,ment of I.C. 
67-8003. 
1 Page of - 3 Pages 
CV-2008-180 lZALVORSON VS. NORTH LATAFE CO. HWY 
345 Mr. Halverson presents rebuttal argument. 
500 Mr. Landeck presents hrther argument. 
536 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
567 Mr. Halvorson addresses Court further. 
640 Mr. Landeck requests scheduling conference. 
660 Cour-t will send out notice of a scheduling conference after the written decisions are 
issued in this case. 
677 Mr. Halvorson questions Court re: sending out notice just to Mr. Landeck or all 
parties. 
704 Court indicates copies should only be sent to Mr. Landeck as he is representing all 
parties. 
(720)Recess 9:40 a.m. 
Deputy Clerk 
7 
Ad Page of 2 Pages 
presiding Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
1 
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife) 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) CASE NO. CV 2008-001 80 
v. 
) OPINION AND OKDER ON PLAINTIFFS' 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) MOTION FOR DECLARATORY 
DISTMCT; BOARD OF ) JUDGMENT OF I.C. tj 40-203A AND 
COMnflSSIONERS FOR THE NORTI-I ) PLAINTIFFS' &!IOTION FOR 
LATAH COUNTY WIGHTYAY DISTRICT, ) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNDER 
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD 1 I.C. 5 67-8003(3) 
HANSEN, SHEFMAN CLYDE, in their ) 
official capacities, and their individual 1 
capacities; DAN PA=, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, 1 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court, in tm70 separate proceedings, on the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 40-203A and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment 
Under I.C. fj 67-8003(3). The Court hsard oral argument on the first motioil on May 13: 2008, 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 1 
FOR DECL-1RATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. S; 40-203X 
AhJ3 PLXIXTlFFS' MOTION FOX DECLARATOXY 
77-,-n K 7 , T  - ,vn-,-, T ,- - / 7 A n n -  . \  
and the Court heard oral argument on the second motion on May 27,2008. The Plaintiffs 
proceededpro se i n  the matters. The Defendants were represented by Ronald Landeck, of the 
firm Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham. The Court, having heard argument and being fully 
advised in these matters, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiffs, Dan and Charlotte Halvorson, own property in Latah County, and a portion 
of this property is traversed by a road known as Camps Canyon Road. See Complaint, at 2. 
Camps Canyon Road is under the jurisdiction of the North Latah County Highway District 
(hereafter "Highway District").The Plaintiffs filed the Complaint ill this matter on March 3, 
2008. The Complaint alleges, among other things, that the previous owners of the property in 
question, the Swaisons, entered into an agreement with the Highway District in the fall of 1996. 
The agreement allowed the Highway District to extend tlie roadbed of Camps Canyon Road to 
the northeast and to straighten several curves, in order to meet the goal of improving, widening 
and straightening Camps Canyon Road. Conzplaint, at 3. The Plaintiffs purchased the property 
in question from the Swansons in December, 1996. Complaint, at 2. The Plaintiffs were aware 
of the agreement to improve Camps Canyon Road at the time of the purchase. Conzplaint, at 3. 
The Plaintiffs argue that there was no intendcd or implied gift of the land northeast of the 
road bed of Camps Canyon Road. Complaint, at 4. The Plaintiffs argue that the "1996 alteration 
changed (a) the location of the right of waflhighway, CCR, (b) tlie width of the right of 
.i.vayJrhighway, CCR, and (c) the nature or type of the right of wayihighway, CCR." Conzplaint, at 
5. The Plaintiffs further argue that any "increase in width or use, or change in location or nature 
In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs refer to Camps Canyon Road as CCR. Further, the Plaintiffs use the abbreviation, 
CFPR. in reference to constitutionally protected property rights. 
OPJNION AhD ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 2 
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. gIO-203A 0252 
.4hD PL 4INTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY 
(type) of the public right-of-way/public higllway" where Camps Canyon Road traverses the 
Plaintiffs property may be a deprivation of the Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected property 
rights. Complaint, at 7. The Plaintiffs are seeking damages as a result of the alleged unlawful 
taking of their property due to the alterations made to Camps Canyon Road. 
Currently before the Court are two motions for declaratory judgment: the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. f j  40-203A and the Plaintifb7 Motion for Declaratory 
Judgment Under I.C. § 67-8003(3). In the first, the Plaintiffs are seeking an order which would 
require the Highway District to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or public right- 
of-way, specifically Camps Canyon Road, pursuant to I.C. § 40-203A. In the second, the 
Plaintiffs are asking this Court to make a determination regarding the validity of the 
governmental action with regard to the modifications of Camps Canyon Road, pursuant to I.C. fj 
67-5003(3). 
ANALYSTS 
As stated above, the Plaintiffs are seeking resolution of certain matters from the pending 
civil action by way of declaratory judgment. As to both motions for declaratory judgment, the 
Higfiway Department argues that such determination is not appropriate in light of the underlying 
civil action which addresses the issues currently before the Court. 
I.C. $ 10- 120 1 authorizes the Court to issue a declaratory judgment, M-hich has the force 
and effect of a final judgment or d e ~ r e e . ~  ~ n y  person with interest under a deed, will, written or 
I.C. $ 10-1201 states: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall ha\ e power to declare rights, status, and oxher 
legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No zction or proceeding shall be open 
to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed fcr. The declaration may be 
OPINION A h B  ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' IvTOTION 3 
FOR DECLARATORY JlJDGMENT OF 1,C. 5 SO-203A 
AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECL-~LRATOXY 
OL53 
oral contract, or whose rights are affected by statute may seek a declaratory judgment to 
detennine questions of construction or validity. I.C. 5 10- 1202.' "The Declaratory Judgment 
Act authorizes courts to declare rights, status, and other legal relations." Farmers Ins. Exchange 
v. Tucker, 142 Iddio 191, 193-94, 125 P.3d 1069-70; see also I.C. 5 10-1201. "Where the 
proceeding involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined 
as in other actions." Id. at 194, 125 P.3d at 1070; see also I.C. 5 10-1209. 
At the outset, the Court recognizes the Plaintiffs are not precluded from seeking 
declaratory judgnent at the same time they are proceeding in a civil action. According to 
I.R.C.P. 57, "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for 
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." 
The determination whether a trial court should grant or dismiss a petition for declaratory 
relief where there is a pending action involving the same issue was first addressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Scott v. ~ ~ r i c u l t k a l  Prodztcts. Corp, k c . ,  102 Idaho 147, 627 P.2d 326 
(1981). The Scott Court relied on guidance from the federal courts on this question. Id. at 149, 
Several federal courts have held that where another suit is pending it is 
proper for a court to refuse to entertain a request for declaratory relief, or 
alternatively stay the request until the pending action is adjudicated, if the pending 
action involves identically the same issues as those raised by the declaratory 
either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effcct of a 
final jud-pent, or decree. 
3 I.C. 5 10-1203 states: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, witten contract or other writings constituting a contract or any 
oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or fkanchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal 
relations thereunder. 
4 
"However, since Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the procedures for obtaining 
declaratory relief, is virtually identical to Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal case law is of 
assistance in determining whether the trial court's dismissal here anlountxl to error." Id. 
OPINION Ah33 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' ,MOTION 4 
FOR DECLARATORY JLIDG_VENT OF I.C. t; 40-203A 
A>ID PI AINTIFFS' MOTION FGR DECLAR.IZT0R.Y 
judgment action. . . . The rationale advanced is that because of convenience, 
efficiency and expediency, it is necessary to insist that the parties to the 
declaratory judgment action assert their claim in the pending action so as to avoid 
the evils inherent in a multiplicity of actions. . . . The rule is subject to one 
important caveat: the pending action must necessarily settle those issues raised in 
the declaratory judgment action. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). It is with this background in mind that the Court addresses each 
of the Plaintiffs' motions for declaratory relief. 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 40-230A seeks an advisory 
opinion. 
The Plaintiffs' first motion for declaratory judowent regarding whether the Highway 
District must hold a validation hearing seeks an advisory opinion from the Court regarding the 
duties of the Highway District and whether the Highway District must be required to hold public 
proceedings in order to validate Camps Canyon Road as a public highway. Idaho's Declaratoly 
Judgment Act does not permit the Court to issue an advisory opinion. Guidance on this issue is 
provided inNoh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002). 
Idalio has adopted the federal justiciability requirement. Harris at 5 16, 
68 1 P.2d 988. Federal justiciability is constitutionally based. Congress may not 
circumvent it. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Alurton, 405 U.S. 727,732 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. . 
1361, 1365 n. 3, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 n. 3 (1971). 
Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. I11 federal courts to render 
advisory opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 3 1 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 
246, or to entertain "friendlyt suits, U~zited Statt?s v. Joh;rzson, 3 19 U.S. 302, 63 
S.Ct. 1075, 87 L.Ed. 1413, or to resolve "political questions," Luther v. Burden, 7 
How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 58 1, because suits of this character are inconsistent m-ith the 
judicial function under Art. 111. 
I.C. $ 40-203A sets fo13h the procedures for initiating public proceedings to validate a 
highway or public right-of-way. The statute permits any resident or property holder within the 
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county or highway district to initiate the proceedings or the commissioners may validate such 
proceedings on their own resolution. Specifically: 
Any resident or property holder w-ithin a county or highway district system, 
including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the federal 
government, may petition the board of county of highway district commissioliers 
. . . to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or public right-of-way, . . . 
provided that the petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as determined by the 
commissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings, or the commissioners may 
initiate validation proceedings on their OWTI resolution . . . . 
The Plaintiffs pose questions which would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion. 
For example, "Although there may be better paths (Due Process) to resolution, is I.C. $40-203a 
[sic] a manner under which the nature (type), width, location, and use of a right of waylhighway 
may be questioned and resolved?" Plaint@ ' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of l: C. f 40- 
Further, through motion for declaratory judgment, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to 
require the Highway District to hold validation proceedings. The Plaintiffs argue that the fee 
requirement of I.C. 8 40-203A(1) is a violation of due process, and argue that the Highway 
District should be co~npelled to initiate proceedings on their own resolution. Tlie Court, 
however, can find no authority through ~vhich it can mandate the Highway District to act at the 
Plaintiffs request, nor is the Court convinced that the fee requirement of the statute is 
unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. $' 
LEO-203a is denied. 
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2. The PIaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 3 67-8003(3) is best 
resolved through the underlying civil action. 
The Plaintiffs' second motion for declaratory judgment is pursuant to I.C. $ 67-8003(3) of 
the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act. This motion realleges claims made in the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint; specifically, negligence, trespass, takings, and damages claims. The Defendants 
argue that the particular relief sought pursuant to the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act requires a 
"regulatory taking," or final decision. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs have presented no 
facts which support the argument that a final decision has been made. Plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, argue that the Highway District made a final determination when it recommended to them 
that they should hire counsel, or in the alternative, that by failing to make a determination, the 
Highway District has acted in a manner that allows for review. 
It is not necessary for the Court to make a determination whether a final determination 
was made by the Highway District because the issues presented by the Plaintiffs; negligence, 
trespass, takings, and damages claims, are appropriately addressed in the underlying civil action. 
Before making a determination of declaratory judgment, the Court would need to hold an 
evidentiary hearing in order to resolve factual issues in question. For purposes of judicial 
economy, and for reasons of convenience, sfficiency, and expediency, it is not beneficial to hold 
separate evidentiary hearings for purposes of declaratory judgment. See Scott, 102 Idaho at 149, 
627 P.2d at 328. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Jud,gnent Under I.C. fj 67- 
8003(3) is denied, and determination of the claims presented will be appropriately considered 
through the underlying civil matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pending bzfore this Coui-t are the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 
40-203a and Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003(3). The first 
motion requires the Court to issue an advisory opinion, which is not an appropriate role of the 
judiciary. Further, both n~otions for declaratory judgment are appropriately addressed through 
the underlying civil action. For reasons of judicial economy, both niotions for declaratory 
judgment are denied. 
ORDER 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 40-203A is hereby DENTED. 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) is hereby 
DEhTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this q h a y  of June 2008. 
CARL B..KERRICK - District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION Ai.W ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF 1.C. 6 40-203A AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT R I.C. 5 67-5003(3) was mailed, postage prepaid, by 
the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, of June, 2008, on: 
Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick ID 83 53 7 
Ronald Landeck 
LANnECK WESTBERG JUDGE & GRAHAM 
P 0 Box 9344 
Moscow ID 83843 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE.: SECOND SUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), 
1 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. CV-08-00180 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
SCHEDULING CONFEl?J3NCE 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF 1 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH ) 
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT,) 
ORLAND -BERG, RICHARD 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their ) 
official capacities, and their individual 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, ) 
Defendants. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Friday, the 8~ day of August, 2008, at the hour of 
10:00 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Caul-thouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Scheduling Conference in the above- 
entitled matter with the COURT initiating the call. 
DATED this 9% day of July, 2008. 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
SCE-FEDIIZING CONFEREXCE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a tlue copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR 
TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING 
CONFERE.NCE was mailed, postage 
prepaid, by the signed at 
Lewiston, Idaho, this 
2008, on: 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson 
1 290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, ID 83537 
(208)289-5602 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, lD 83843 
(208)883- 1505 
PATTY 0 .  WEEKS, Cle 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
S CEiE13LILRiTG COhFEiCENCE 
Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537 
(208) 289-5602 
Plaintiff, Pro se 
IN  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) 
Plaintiffs 1 
VS. ) 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) Case No. CV 2008-180 
Commissioners for the North Lata h County ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION AND BRIEF TO 
Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard ) RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official ) ORDER ON PL(41NTIFFSr MOTION FOR 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 40-2033 AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
Individual Capacity ) FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Defendants ) UNDER I.C. 5 67-8003 ( 3 )  
Plaintiffs come before the court under I.R.C.P. Rule 11 (a) (2) (B) with 
Motion/Petition And Brief To Reconsider Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. g 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003 (3). 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONI'BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPbTION AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION F O 2  DEGtA-ZATORU JUDGh4ENT OF I.C. 10-203a AND 
PL14NTIFFS3 h?OTION FOR DE-CL-4RTOR.Y "GDGh4ENT bXDER I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) 
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Plaintiffs MotionIBrief To Reconsider is filed to petition Court to decree Plaintiffs 
rights to Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law under two circumstances (1) 
Plaintiffs request of Commissioners to initiate validation proceedings on their own 
resolution under I.C. 5 40-203a and (2) Plaintiffs submittal of Requests For Takings 
Analysis under IRTA. These formal requests for hearing and examination of the 
evidence have been denied by Commissioners' refusal to initiate validation proceedings 
on their own resolution and their refusal to respond to the Requests for Takings 
Analysis. These matters, as well as (3) Plaintiffs' request for Court to decree that under 
I.C. 67-8003 (3), as applied, Plaintiffs have a colorable claim to the land considered in 
this matter and this claim contains a constitutionally protected property right, are the 
requests for the determination of Plaintiffsf rights, as matters of law, and are filed under 
the civil case CV 2008-180. 
These justiciable controversies arise under and are parts of the civil case CV 
2008-180, and fulfill guidance as is found in Aloh I/: Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 
1217 (2000). These controversies are ripe and have standing. Plaintiffs seek no advice 
in hypothetical matters, as all matters have occurred, have injured Plaintiffs directly and 
as individuals and are in controversy and are resolvable by Court decree (see Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and see Defendants' Answer), and as such these controversies are real and 
concrete matters. I n  the matter of judicial economy Plaintiffs request Court to 
determine these matters now as matters of law, and now offer the following arguments 
and in response to Court's Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment Of I.C. 5 40-2031 And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 
5 67-8003 (3). The determination of these controversies Is appropriate to pretrial 
motion practice and fulfills Court's goal of judicial economy. 
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I. Court's Background falls short of the causative and procedural histories 
of the Complaint. 
11. The Court declares matters not petitioned for and avoids declaring the 
matter Ptaintiffs did petition for. 
111. The grounds for dismissal of the cited cases in Court's Opinion and 
Order do not support the dismissal in the present case. 
IV. The Court's determination that Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment Of I.C. !j 40-203a is seeking an "advisory opinion" is in error and is not 
supported by the guidance provided in the cited case. 
V. I n  the alternative, Defendants are required to have provided due 
process under their quasi-judicial capacity. 
VI. Court fails to follow its own citation: Further, in the chance that the 
court denies these Motions and Reconsiderations again, Plaintiffs request the denial be 
without prejudice. Scott v, Agricu/t~/ra/Products Cor~,, Inc., 102 Idaho 147, "Where 
declaratory judgment action was dismissed because of another action pending, district 
court should have specified that dismissal was without prejudice. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rules 41(b), 57; Fed Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 57, 28 U.S.C.A." 
I. Court's Backgrounddoes not adequately describe the events of the 
Compia,itf or the procedural history leading to Plaintiffs requesting t h e  
Commissioners initiate validation proceedings on their own resollutisn and 
filing Requests For Reguiatory Takings Analysis 
Plaintiffs did not provide Court with any historical background of the 
circumstances underlying the Comp/aint as the Motions for Declaratory Judgment were 
made as requests of  the determination of Plaintiffs rights under the law, I.C. 5 40-203a, 
IRTA and I.C. 3 67-8003 (3), and no determination of facts were deemed necessary. 
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Since the Court intends Background (see Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. fj 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003 (3) at 21, it is incumbent on Plaintiffs to insure such 
Backgroundis accurately portrayed. 
The Court's Backgroundof the changes to CCR in 1996 as derived by the Court 
from Plaintiffs' Complaint is accurate as far as it goes. The background of the events 
that Plaintiffs seek remedy of, however, turns on the more recent events than the 
Court's Background. The events, on which the Complaint lies and the time at which 
Plaintiffs became aware of these events, began on arid the weekend before the 
4/12/2006 meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners (see Complaint at 10-25, beginning at 
P.). The weekend before the 4/12/06 meeting, Plaintiffs discovered that the Wagners 
had constructed a driveway access across Plaintiffs' property. 
Don Halvorson attended the NLCHD meeting (4/12/06) to inform Defendants 
that the Defendants were operating out of their right of way and had no authority to 
issue the permit and widen CCR, as these actions were an improper interference with 
Plaintiffs' property rights. 
At the 4/12/06 meeting Defendants denied the 1996 events the Court includes in 
its Backgroundand Defendants also made other claims of "prescriptive right" and 
prescriptive right of way, adversely affecting rights 06 Plaintiffs to own, peacefully enjoy 
their land, to restrict others from their land, and to have a clear and marketable title to 
their land at SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM. 
On 4/12/06 Plaintiffs first became aware of the following claims by Defendants, 
as Defendants denied and claimed the following. 
(a) Defendants denied the events and alterations to CCR in 1996 (including, but 
not limited to straightening of the curves, movement of the roadbed, and widening of 
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the roadbed). Defendant Arneberg emphatically stated that CCR had not moved in his 
tenure in office or under his watch. 
(b) Defendants claimed "prescriptive rightrr to issue a driveway access permit to 
the Wagners trespassing onto Plaintiffs land, as Defendants Arneberg and Payne 
claimed the driveway access was within the 50 foot prescriptive right of way; 
(c) Defendants claimed "prescriptive rightrf to widen CCR to the northeast by 
approximately 6 inches by about 50 feet. 
(d) Defendants claimed "prescriptive rightrf to damage Plaintiffsf fence by pushing 
a wind fallen tree into Plaintiffs fence (Defendants claimed Plaintiffs' fence was inside of 
"their" right of way, and 
(e) Defendants claimed a fifty foot and/or 25 feet from centerline prescriptive 
right of way in the vicinity of the 3i-/-acre parcel (in particular 25 feet from centerline 
to the northeast). 
Plaintiffs argued at the 4/12/2006 (See Complaint starting at 10, P.) meeting 
that: 
(1) Defendants claims of prescriptive right of way did not justify any of 
Defendants claims of "prescriptive right"; that is, the Defendants have no right to take 
land from Plaintiffs and/or damage Plaintiffsf property. The proper government 
interference with Plaintiffs property rights is through eminent domain and due process, 
and no right exists for Defendants to confiscate land for the Wagner driveway access 
permit or for widening of CCR. Further, taking of land for the Wagner driveway access 
permit is also prohibited, as it is not for a public use. Damage of Plaintiffs property 
(fence) is prohibited under any kind of right of way. Plaintiffsr fence is protected by 
statute and requires prior notice and hearing in any request for removal, and 
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(2) no prescriptive right of way exists northeast of CCR in the vicinity of the 3s/- 
acre parcel after the events of the 1996 alterations to CCR, and 
(3) without waiver of Plaintiffs' allegation that no prescriptive right of way exists 
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel after the events of the 1996 alterations to CCR, if 
a prescriptive right of way exists in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, the right of way 
width does not extend to 25 feet from centerline to the northeast encumbering 
Plaintiffs' property (the width would be limited to the usage of the road bed and its 
supporting structures after the completion of the 1996 alterations). 
Plaintiffsr allege that Defendants were biased and treated Plaintiffsr complaints 
arbitrarily and with indifference at the 4/12/06 meeting (See Comphintat 14, P. 5)). 
Plaintiffs also allege Defendants voided the record of any or all that was said at the 
rneetinq by any of Defendants (See Coqdaintat 14, P. 5; see Exhibit # 2 at l), and 
failed to qive any valid reasons for their actionslinactions, in particular to the (1) 
issuance of a permit for a trespass, (2) not revoking the permit after fair warning was 
given and the knowledge that Plaintiffs would call for a survey, and (3) for their claim of 
prescription to the northeast side of CCR (See CompIainf starting at I O ,  P.). 
Since 4/12/2006 Plaintiffs have sincerely tried to resolve the matters now before 
the Court (See Complaint starting at 17, Q. 8) beginning with a survey and clarification 
of the limits and legal establishment of the CCR right of way by the examination of all 
the pertinent and/or pertaining evidence (See CumpIahtstarting at 18, Q. 8) f., and 
also Exhibit # 2 a t  2). Plaintiffs have colorable claim to the land affected by the 
changes in the right of way made by the Defendants since 2005 and Defendantsr claims 
(as first noticed as of 4/12/06) of prescription, including "prescriptive rightri as legal 
justification of damages to their fence, unlawful issuance of the first Wagner driveway 
access permit and failure to revoke it, claims of prescription to the northeast of CCR in 
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the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, and the taking of land for the widening of CCR in 
2005 and 2006 (See Comp/aintat 7, E.). Plaintiffs have proceeded with the assumption 
that any actionlinaction the Defendants take, under the color of law, whether statutorily 
correct or not, which have the effect of interference with Plaintiffs' rights require the 
protections of due process (in the present case, as land is protected property under the 
5th ~mendment of the U.S. Constitution, Plaintiffs' property rights are afforded 
protection of the 1 4 ~ ~  mendment as well (See Comp/aintstarting at 16, Q.). Further 
protection is found under the Idaho State Constitution Article I 5 13 & 5 14, amongst 
other Idaho and Federal statutes. These protections of Due Process (procedural and 
substantive) and Equal Treatment Under the Law are demanded by the Constitution 
and failure to provide such procedures is as much an unlawful act as the unlawful acts 
of trespass, taking of private property, negligence, etc. 
I n  the summer of 2006, after the survey showed that Defendants were wrong in 
issuing the permit and, without notice, Defendants defiantly further widened CCR 
another 4 feet by 50 feet in the area of Plaintiffs corral across from the 3+/- acre 
parcel, encroaching on and damaging Plaintiffs' fence in deliberate indifference to 
PIaintiffs fair warning that Defendants were operating out of their authorized right of 
way (given on 4/12/06). 
Plaintiffs sought and finally obtained time on Commissioners Agenda. On 
3/21/2007 Plaintiffs presented evidence of survey done by Plaintiffs to abate the 
trespass of the Wagner first driveway access to CCR. (When the stakes of the survey 
were driven Plaintiffs told Wagners that P!aintiffs would cooperate in the deeding to the 
NLCHD an easement in order to resolve the trespass if Bob Wagner would present the 
proposal to the NLCHD. Bob Wagner stated to Plaintiffs that the NLCHD had turned 
down the proposal and voluntarily abated the driveway, obtained a second permit and 
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built a new driveway by excavating the entire hillside.) Evidence was submitted to the 
Defendants at the 3/21/07 meeting (see Exhibit # 2, at 2 and Exhibit # 3), including 
but not limited to the following: 
(1) Rimrock Consultants' Survey which showed change in location of the 
intersection of CCR with the east and west property lines of >50 feet to the north 
compared to what is recorded in the deed description. This survey shows that the 
geosara~hic location CCR has chanqed as compared to the ancient records 
(Plaintiffs' and Wagners' deed descriptions) and Plaintiffs alleged that this movement 
nesates the Zesal establishment of GCR presclri~tive risht of way without 
further records or evidence from the MLGHD; 
(2) The confirmed trespass, unlawful issue of, and refusal to revoke the first 
Wagner driveway access permit confirmed the Defendants no lonqer could 
accurately determine the location s f  CGR due to numerous alterations 
(Defendants either knew the correct location of the CCR right of way (in such 
knowledge, they admit to preparing false testimony to try to force through the first 
Wagner driveway access permit) or they didn't know (in such knowledge, they admit 
that they do not know the correct focatisn of CCR due to the numerous 
alterations of CCR). (See Comp/ainf starting at 22, Q. 8) f. xiii. (c)), and; 
(3) Plaintiffs presented evidence and testimony of the events of the 1996 
alteration of CCR which included, but is not limited to the conversation Dan Payne hzd 
with Ed Swanson, the cutting down of trees, the straightening of curves at the east and 
west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel, the lowering of the roadbed at both the east and 
west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel, the movement of the roadbed to the northeast, and 
the supporting evidence that Eli Harris btjught the 3+/- acre parcel from Per and Anna 
Johanson for a driveway access to his farm(see Exhibit # 3) in 1911. 
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At the 3/21/07 meeting, Plaintiffs requested Commissioners initiate 
validation proceedinqs under 1-63, 6 40-203a by their own resolution (see 
Exhibit # 3, a t  1). These three points of evidence and allegations complete the triad 
of permissive prerequisites found in I.C. 3 40-203a (see Exhibit # 3,staifing at 2). 
Defendants took no action, treated Plaintiffs' evidence with deliberate 
indifference, arbitrarily stated all matters were within Defendants "prescriptive right" 
(without stating the authority by which they claim such "prescriptive right") and gave 
Plaintiffs no meaningful response (written and/or final decision), and in so doing 
provided no verbatim transcribable record of the meeting. The hearing Plaintiffs sought 
was negated by Defendants actions/inactions. 
Defendants subsequently offered to honor Plaintiffs application for validation of 
CCR if Plaintiffs would apply and submit a $750 fee (see Exhibit # 2, starting at 5). 
Plaintiffs told Defendants that the questions Plaintiffs wanted answered 
(defining and clarifying the limits of the CCR right of way) and the confusion the 
Defendants had about the limits of the CCR right of way could only be answered if the 
Commissioners initiated validation proceedings under their own resolution and that 
Plaintiffs had no reason to question whether CCR was Public or not (see Exhibit 8 2, 
starting a t  5) 
Defendants told Plaintiffs there were two choices (1) Pay the $750 fee and apply 
for validation or (2) get a lawyer(see Exhibit # 2, at 8). Although the Complaintis more 
extensive than this present controversy and that these controversies are a part of the 
case (CVZOD8-180), more background and/or history can be later added as needed. 
If. Court misstates altegations of Piaintiffs' Gomp/a/itf. PlaintiRs' 
rights to due process and obligation to exhaust agency remedies are negated 
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by Defendants actions and failures to act and create a justiciable controversy 
under a civil case. 
'This motion realleges claims made in Plaintiffs' Complaint; specifically, 
negligence, trespass, takings, and damages claims." (See Opinion And Order On 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. fj  40-203a And Plaintiffsr Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. fj  67-8003 (3) at 7.) 
Court leaves out the reason why Plaintiffs are in Court to begin with-the fact 
that none of Plaintiffs complaints have been met with Due Process. Plaintiffs arrive in 
Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and only plead negligence, trespass, takings, and damages 
claims in the alternative, (see Complaint, beginning at 16, Q.). These matters of 
trespass, takings, and damages claims are actionable in and of themselves, yet without 
the Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law, these matters are actionable 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due Process and Equal treatment Under the Law are required, 
notwithstanding the results of the trespass, takings, and damages claims. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 reads, "Every pzrson who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any ridits, privileees, or immunities secured bv the Constitution and 
lams, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injuncti-rre relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief Tvas unavailable." 
Plaintiffs bring forth in their Complaint, allegations that Defendants, under the 
color of law, have deprived Plaintiffs of their Constitutional Rights (sth and 1 4 ~ ~  
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution), in particular Plaintiffs' rights to own, to 
peacefully enjoy their land, to be able to restrict others from their land, and to have a 
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clear and marketable title to their land (see Complaint, at 7, E, and at 9, L., M., N.), 
without Due Process, and without Equal Treatment Under the Law. 
I n  Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. 5 40-203a and Plaintiffsf 
Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3), Plaintiffs seek declaratory 
decree from Court to determine Plaintiffs' rights of Due Process under these two Idaho 
Statutes. Without waiver of their right to Predeprivation notice and hearing, Plaintiffs 
allege that they sought post deprivation due process under these two Idaho statutes 
and were denied these rights, as well as their right and obligation to seek exhaustion of 
agency remedies (see Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffsf Complaint). 
Plaintiffs request Court to grant decree that Plaintiffs have rights of Due Process 
under both or either statute, and to make available declaratory relief and as such as to 
require Defendants to show cause why Defendants denied Plaintiffs Due Process under: 
( I )  I.C. 5 40-203a (6) "the commissioners shall proceed to determine just 
compensation ..."(j ust compensation requires Due Process as a prerequisite); and 
(2) I.C. 5 67-8001 '...local governments to evaluate whether proposed 
regulatory or administrative actions may result in a taking of private property 
without due process of law." 
by Defendants' actions/inactions of: 
( I )  not initiating validation proceedings under their own resolution after 
Plaintiffs had reasonably shown Defendants or that it was reasonably obvious 
that the location of CCR could not be accorrate/y determhed by Defendants due 
to the alterations of the road (Defendants had issued and refused to revoke the 
first Wagner Driveway access permit- when it was alleged to be trespassing,), the 
legal establishment of the right of way was questioned (prescriptive r@ht of way 
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was no /anger prescr@tive /i7 light of the 1996 alterations), and the location of 
CCR did not correspond to the location of the public records; and 
(2) not responding to Plaintiffs' Requests For Regulatory Takings Analysis 
and why further relief; action under 42 US. C. 1983, should not be granted to 
Plzintiffs. ((See I.C. 3 10-1208.) 
Further by Commissioners' failure to initiate validation proceedings on their own 
resolution, Defendants have denied Plaintiffs the right to a Judicial Review. 
Plaintiffs petition Court for further declaratory decree and relief under I.C. 5 67- 
8003 (3), as applied, and to invalidate Defendants actions and to Decree Defendants' 
actions (claims of prescriptive right of way and claims of "prescriptive right") as likely to 
improperly interfere with Plaintiffs' private property rights (Plaintiffs have colorable 
claim to a constitutionally protected property right, land) and that Due Process is 
required and require Defendants to show cause why Due Process was not afforded to 
Plaintiffs, and why further relief, action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 should not be granted to 
Plaintiffs. 
Defendants' implied defense that Defendants were trying to work the problems 
out informally is negated by Defendants' refusal to administer these formal procedures 
and the abdication of their responsibility of even an informal disposition by failing to 
issue a "final decision". 
There are no disputed facts in these matters. Court, Defendants, and Plaintiffs 
are all in agreement "no final decision" (Due Process) has been afforded Plaintiffs and 
that these matters have received no hearing. (see Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. €j 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 3 67-8003 (3) at 7: see Exhibit # 2 at 6, see 
Complaint, starting at 16). The Declaratory Relief under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) does not 
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require any factual determinations (it is an evaluation process-thereby its declaratory 
nature) to decree that Plaintiffs have colorable claim to a constitutionally protected 
property right, land, and that Due Process is required before any action was taken or 
for Defendants to show cause why due process was not afforded Plaintiffs. These are 
matters of law. Further actionlrelief may be granted by Court to determine injuries 
alleged by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (see Mathews v. Eldrai?, 424 U.S. 319, 96 
S.Ct.893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). 
111. Court misstates Plaintiffsr petition for declaratory judgment and 
Court's grounds for dismissal of motions for declaratory decree and relief are 
not supported by Court's cited cases. 
"A declaratory judgment must clariw and settle legal relations in issue and afford 
relief from the uncertainty and controversy which gave rise to the action." Harris v. 
Cass/a County 106 Idaho 513,681 P.2d 988. 
Plaintiffs will separate this argument for reconsideration into three parts: A. 
matters pertaining to I.C. tj 40-203a only, B. matters pertaining to I.C. 5 67-8003, and 
C. matters pertaining to both. 
A. MATTERS PERTAINING TO I.C. 5 40-203A 
2. The Court declares matters nol: petitioned for and avoids 
declaring the matter Plaintiffs petitioned for. 
"The Plaintiffs' first motion for declaratory judgment regarding whether the 
Highway District must hold a validation hearing seeks an advisory opinion from the 
Court regarding the duties of the Highway District and whether the Highway District 
must be required to hold public proceedings in order to validate Camps Canyon Road as 
a public highway." (See Opinion And Order On Plaintiffsr Motion For Declaratory 
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Judgment Of I.C. 5 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 
5 67-8003 (3) at 5). 
As abutting landowners to CCR, Plaintiffs have rights, as a member of the 
general public, and have rights, associated with their land ownership and the right of 
way of CCR traversing their property and the application of general statutes, policies, 
and/or customs regarding the determination of the limits of the right of way CCR to 
Plaintiffs and their particular situation. 
Plaintiffs do not request a declaration of their Public rights ("...whether the 
Highway District must be required to hold public proceedings in order to validate Camps 
Canyon Road as a public highway."), as they have never asked the NLCHD to validate 
the right of way, CCR, as beins Public or not in the public interest by Plaintiffs petition 
and/or request of Commissioners to on their own resolution. The Commissioners have 
no duty to the public to perform or not perform an action involving the public as a 
whole. 
Further, the Commissioners are prohibited from seeking new public assets under 
I.C. fj 40-203a. (See Plaintiffs' Brief I n  Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory 
Ruling Of I.C. 5 40-203a, at 6, GaIvin K Canyon County High. Dist No. 4, 134 Idaho 
579, 6 P.3d 829, "Section 40-203a may onlv be used to validate an existinq hishwav of 
public riqht of way about which there is some kind of doubt. It does not allow for the 
creation of a new public right." (Emphasis added by Plaintiffs.) 
Under Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment under I.C. 5 40-203a, Plaintiffs 
have asked the Court to declare Plaintiffs' riqhts to have their presented evidence (see 
Exhibit #3) receive Due Process and Equal Treatment under the Law under I.C. 5 40- 
203a. (See Cump/lant, at 18-20, Q. 8) f. i., ii., iii 
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2. COURT'S CITED CASES DO NOT SUPPORT COURT'S 
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 
gS 40-203a AS BEING "ADVISORY" 
Unfortunately, or by lack of experience, Plaintiffs inserted a question which the 
Court views to be advisory. The question is; "Although there may be better paths (Due 
Process) to resolution, is I.C. fj 40-203a a manner under which the nature (type), width, 
location, and use of a right of way/highway may be questioned and resolved?" The 
phrase "[allthough there may be better paths (Due Process) to resolution ..." is a 
statement of Plaintiffs' inexperience and not the search for advice. 
"Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act does not permit the Court to issue an 
Advisory opinion. Guidance on this issue is provided in Noh 1! Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 
798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002)." (See Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. 5 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) a t  5). The guidance of this cited case is a s  follows: 
(a) Standing "In order to satisfj, the requirement of standing, the petitioners 
must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and the substantial likelihood the judicial 
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Noh a t  800 
Plaintiffs alleqe and demonstrate: The Plaintiffs have rights to due process 
and equal treatment under the law to ask Commissioners to initiate this validation on 
their own resolution as  the actionslinactions and claims and denials of Defendants have 
adversely affected Plaintiffs rights of land ownership (See Complahtstarting a t  7, E.), 
rights to restrict others from their land (See Cornplaintstarting at  9, L., M., N.), rights 
to be able to market their land with a clear title, and rights to peacefully enjoy their 
land (See Cornp/ajnf starting at  10, P.), and Plaintiffs requested Commissioners initiate 
validation proceedings (Plaintiffs' right to due process) on their own resolution to clarify 
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and declare the limits of the right of way through a process of the examination of 
evidence at a hearing-validation(See Complaintstarting at 18, Q. 8) f. i.). Plaintiffs 
right to a response, Due Process, (i.e, a validation proceeding to determine the legal 
establishment, proper recording of the right of way, and the informed location of the 
right of way of CCR) from the Commissioners, other than the one given (deliberate 
indifference) by the Commissioners is the Declaratory Judgment sought by Plaintiffs at 
this time (I.C. 3 10-1201, I.C. 3 10-1202, 1.R.C.P Rule 57, amongst others). 
Plaintiffs do not request any determination of in the public interest or not in the 
public interest of the right of way of CCR. The injuries alleged by Plaintiffs are private 
property right injury and not of a public nature. 
The case at hand bears no similarities to the Noh case. I n  Noh the advisory 
decision was based on the fact that The Indian Gaming Initiative (Proposition One) was 
only qualified to appear on the ballot and had not even won approval, as the election 
had not taken place. The Declaratory Judgment became hypothetical on whether the 
proposition won or not. The Noh petitioners claimed only alleged future injuries of a 
general and nonspecific nature. Plaintiffs, in the present case are not asking, "in the 
event that ... Plaintiffs may be injured?" 
The issuance of the permit, the non revocation of the permit, the trespass of the 
driveway access permit, the land taken by widening of the road, the damages to 
Plaintiffs' fence, as well as the loss of Plaintiffs' rights to restrict others from their land 
(See CumpIaintstarting at 9, L., M., N. and at 7 E.), rights to be able to market their 
land with a clear title, and rights to peacefully enjoy their land (See Cornpaintstarting 
at 10, P.) have all happened and are in controversy (see Complaint and see Answer). 
The declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs in the present case seek, will declare Plaintiffs' 
rights to Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law and Plaintiffsr obligation and 
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right to accomplish exhaustion of agency remedies which Plaintiffs seek by their 
colorable claim of a constitutionally protected property right, land, whether the alleged 
injuries are shown to be so or not. The injury Plaintiffs request declaration of is 
Defendants admitted denial of Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law. 
(b) Ripeness 'The traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff 
to prove 1 )  that the case presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and 
substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adjudication." 
Noh, at 801. 
1) Plaintiffs do not pose a hypothetical question a s  the Noh petitioners do 
on some future event. Plaintiffs have requested that Commissioners initiate 
validation and by Defendantsf inaction they have denied such request by their 
inaction (See Comp/aintstarting a t  18, Q. 8)  f. i.). The controversy exists in 
reality and is not hypothetical and no advice is sought a s  to whether Plaintiffs 
should request initiation of validation of CCR by the Commissioners own 
resolution or whether Plaintiffs should not request Commissioners initiate 
validation of CCR under their own resolution or whether Plaintiffs should seek 
some other form of D u e  Process. 
(2) Plaintiffs seek a declaration by the Court of Plaintiffs rights of Due 
Process (see Comp/aint) and obligation to exhaust agency remedies (see 
Answefj and as  requested of Commissioners to initiate validation of CCR on 
Commissioners' own resolution. The issuance of the permit, the non revocation 
of the permit, the trespass of the driveway access permit, the land taken by 
widening of the road, the damages to Plaintiffsr fence, a s  well as  the loss of 
Plaintiffs' rights to restrict others from their land (See Cornp/aintstarting a t  9, L., 
M., N.  and a t  7, E.), rights to be able to market their land with a clear title, and 
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rights to peacefully enjoy their land (See Comp/aintstarting at 10, P.) have all 
happened and are all real and a substantial controversy exists (see Comp/aint 
and see Answefl. 
(3) The judicial determination sought by Plaintiffs is a matter of law and 
requires no findings of fact. Plaintiffs allege Commissioners must afford Plaintiffs 
Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law and initiate validation 
proceedings on their own resolution, This is a matter of duty for a public official, 
as this is an application of general laws to specific individuals and Plaintiffs have 
a right to due process, as well as the protection of the sth and 1 4 ~ ~  mendments 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
Further, the fee is reasonable in the matter of the public question, but the fee is 
not required by I.C. fj 40-203a when the initiation is by Commissioners' resolution and 
the fee would be unreasonable in this case, as it is a matter of public official duty and 
due process afforded to Plaintiffs. 
B. MATTERS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT UNDER I.C.3 67-8003 (3) 
I. The question of whether in the view of judicial economy this 
judicial determination is better made later wifl be discussed under a fater 
heading. 
2, Turning now to Defendants' stated objection to Plaintiffs' 
Motion (I.C. 5 67-8003) as no 'final decision" has been made by Defendants. 
The Court's opinion that, "Its not necessary for the Court to make a determination 
whether a final determination was made by the Highway District because the issues 
presented by the Plaintiffs; negligence, trespass, takings, and damage claims, are 
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appropriately addressed in the underlying civil action. Before making a determination 
of declaratory judgment, the Court would need to hold an evidentiary hearing in order 
to resolve factual issues in question." (see Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. Ej 40-203a And Plaintiffsr Motion For Declaratory 
Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003 (3) a t  7) The Court misstates the factual issues. The 
fact ua I issue is, was due process afforded to Plaintiffs, not do P/ainf!i"fs have a factual 
injuty? There is no dispute that  a formal final decision was not given. No evidentiary 
hearing of the factual issue is necessary in the case that no due process was afforded. 
Plaintiffs reiterate that Defendants' objection is frivolous. Defendants have no 
discretion to violate the law, in this case not to provide Due Process-not to issue a 
'final decision" or to respond in some meaningful way. Commissioners' denial of 
Plaintiffs' right of Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law and Plaintiffsr 
required exhaustion of agency remedies by Commissionersf refusal to initiate validation 
proceedings under their own resolution, failing to establish a formal disputed case, 
hearing or some other manner of due process, and/or abdication of the Commissionersr 
duty to provide "final decision" under some form of informal procedure, the 
Commissioners have violated the law. 
Further, Defendants are required to have provided a predeprivaton hearing or show 
cause why this was not feasible and Plaintiffs have not waived any constitutional rights 
to a predeprivation hearing by requesting post deprivation hearing. These violations do 
not then create a legal excuse for further violations of the law. Plaintiffs also sought 
D u e  Process under IRTA and Defendants refusal to reply once again violates Plaintiffsr 
rights to Due Process and obligation to exhaust agency remedies. The manners in 
which the legislature has provided for local agencies to comply with constitutional 
requirements are foiled by the Defendants refusal to apply the statutes a s  intended. In 
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Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) The Supreme Court recognized, in a review of the 
legislative history under which Section 1983 was passed, that one reason section 1983 
was passed was that state laws were not being enforced. 
"It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a 
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance 
or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of 
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied 
by the state agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 36.5 US.  I67 (1962) 
3. Plaintiffs' request for Declaratory Judgment under I. C, 5 67- 
8003 (3) does not require an evidentiary hearing, only the determination 
that Plaintiffs have a colorable claim to a constitutionally protected property 
right. 
No evidentiary proceeding is necessary. Due Process and Equal Treatment 
Under the Law are matters of law. I.C. 5 67-8003 (1) reads, "...All state agencies and 
local governments shall follow the guidelines of the attorney general." Defendants have 
no discretion in this matter and may only defend their inaction/action by showing they 
have afforded Plaintiffs Due Process in some other manner, prior to this event and they 
have already stated they have not-no hearing has been before the  omm missioners and 
no final decision has been made. 
4. I.C. 5 67-8001. reads, "The purpose of this chapter is to establish an 
orderly, consistent review process that better enables state agencies and local 
governments to evaluate whether proposed regulatory or administrative actions may 
result in a taking of private propetty without due process of law." This statute states 
the two rights Plaintiffsf Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) 
petitions the Court to  declare; (1) Administrative actions which may be carried out 
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without due process and (2) Administrative actions which may result in taking of private 
property ' 
"The Defendants argue that the particular relief sought pursuant to the Idaho 
Regulatory Takings Act requires a "regulatory taking" or final decision." (see Opinion 
And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. 5 40-203a And 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. Ej 67-8003 (3) at 7) The Court 
fails to conclude that final decision, "regulatory taking" and/or administrative action are 
all the same in effect and in the light of the statute. 
Plaintiffs petition the Court to determine (evaluate) that Plaintiffs have a 
colorable claim to a constitutionally protected property right, land ownership and its 
inherent attributes that goes with land ownership and if the administrative 
actionslinactions of Defendants mav result in a taking of private propem without due 
process of law. No evidentiary hearing is necessary in this determination of colorable 
claim, only the decree that Defendants need to show cause why Due process has not 
been afforded Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs allege they have a colorable claim to a constitutionally protected 
property right, land, and have rights to Due Process (see McCuIfoch v. Gfasgow, 620 F. 
2d 47 (sth Circuit 1980), (plaintiff was entitled to Due Process before road was built 
over land of disputed ownership); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983, 32 
L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14'~ ~mendment property right even though dispute exists); Carey 
v. Pl;ohl/s, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) '...right to procedural 
due process is 'absolute' in the sense i t  does not depend upon the merits of a claimants 
assertion...") under the IRTA to file Requests For Regulatory Takings Analysis. 
I.C. 5 67-8003 (1) reads, '...All state agencies and local governments shall follow 
the guidelines of the attorney general." 
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Court also fails to note that Defendantsf argument as stated by the Court, "The 
Defendants argue that the particular relief sought pursuant to the Idaho Regulatory 
Takings Act requires a 'regulatory taking' or final decision." (See Opinion And Order On 
Plaintiffsf Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. €j 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) at 7), that I.C. fj 67-8002 (4) 
"Regulatory takingff means a regulatory or administrative action resulting in deprivation 
of private property that is the subject of such action, whether such deprivation is total 
or partial, permanent or temporary, in violation of the state or federal constitution." 
The point turns on the definition of action and as such is any order or rule which 
determines the lesal rights, duties, privileses, immunities, or other lesal interests of one 
or more specific persons, or the Defendants performance of or failure to perform anv 
duw placed on them by law. Failure of this duty gives Plaintiffs right of Declaratory 
Judgment on the Requests and a voiding of the governmental action. Failure of 
Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with due process prior to the actions taken and/or 
failures to act violates the 5m Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and this 
inaction/action triggers the protection of the 14"' Amendment of the U.S Constitution 
(as well as Article I fj 23 and 514 of the Idaho State Constitution and numerous Idaho 
State Statutes and Federal Statutes). (see Lingle v. Chevron USA, 544 US 528 (2000), 
(d) "A plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated 
taking may proceed by alleging a "physicalff taking...r') 
C. MATTERS PERTAINING TO BOTH I.C. f j  40-203a AND I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) 
The private property rights, land, of Plaintiffs have been adversely affected by 
the actions of the Defendants and Plaintiffs sought due process, exhaustion of agency 
remedies (see McVicker v. City of tewiston, 134 Idaho 34, 37, 995 P.2d 804, 807 
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(2000) ("Because the doctrine of exhaustion of agency remedies generally requires that 
a case run the full gamut of administrative proceedings before an application for judicial 
review may be considered..."), and remedy under I.C. 5 40-203a, and I.C. fj 67-8003 
(3). Defendants include in their defenses failure to exhaust agency remedies ( see 
Answer). 
The Court has denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 
67-8003 (3) on grounds of judicial economy. Plaintiffs also include now in this 
discussion Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment on I.C. 5 40-203a, in the 
confidence that the Court- will reconsider its Opinion and Order to deny Plaintiffs' 
Motion. 
First, comparison of the present case, the controversies arising under I.C. 5 40- 
203a and I.C. f j  67-8003 (3) and the cited cases of Scoff K Agricu/tura/ Prod~rcts Corp., 
Inc., 102 Idaho 147, and Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002) brings 
to light distinguishable points. I n  Scott, the Declaratory Judgment Motion was initiated 
(a) by Scott (b) months before the injured defendants initiated the second action. I n  
the present case, both actions, (a) civil suit CV 2008-180 and Plaintiffs Motions for 
Declaratory Judgments are brought to the Court by Plaintiffs and the Motions for 
Deciaratory Judgments are brought after the Complaint was filed and (b) under the 
same civil case. The judicial difficulty of multiplicity of cases is not applicable in the 
present case. The judicial difficulty in present case is to resolve controversies that can 
be before trial. 
Comparison of the present case, the controversies arising under I.C. tj 40-203a 
and I.C. f j  67-8003 (3) and the cited case of Noh the present case exemplifies a real 
and concrete case, not "advisoryf', as in Noh, the hypothetical question of an act yet to 
be voted upon. Present case has nothing to do with a "political questionf' (see Luther v. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONIBRIEF TO =CONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDG3iENT OF 1.C. 6 40-303a AND 
PLAJXTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDG_MENT UxDER I.C. § 67-8003 (3) o k 8 $  2 3 
Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581) nor a "friendly suit" (see United States v. Johnson, 319 
U.S. 302, 63 S.Ct 1075, 87 L.Ed. 14113 and is not advisory. 
Secondly, the civil case GV 2008-180 contains several controversies. "The 
Constitution limits the exercise of the judicial power to "cases" and "controversies". 
"The term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so in that it is less 
comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature." Per Mr. Justice 
Field in In r e  Pacjfic Rajlway Cornrnh, 32 Fed. 241, 255, citing Chisholm v, Georgia, 2 
Dall. 419, 431, 432. See Muskrat K Unitedstates, 219 U.S. 346, 356, 357; OldColony 
Trust Co, v Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 723, 724, cited in Aetna Life Is. Co. v. 
Haworth 300 U.S. at 239. The matters of Plaintiffs' I.C. Ej 40-203a and I.C. Ej 67-8003 
(3) motions for declaratory judgments are "controversies" in the civil "case" CV 2008- 
180 and i f  "distinguishable at all" from the matters of the entire civil case "is so in that 
it is less comprehensive than the latter". Plaintiffs argue that the idea of pretrial 
motions and discovery is to limit the limitable controversies, and undisputed facts and 
to determine causes for action, and hence jurisdiction of the court, as to economize the 
trial courts' and juries' time involvement. Plaintiffs filed both Declaratory Motions with 
this in mind. 
Thirdly, declaratory relief-that Due Process is required-is also found under 
section 1983. 
\I 
... except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission talten 
in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief sliall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief u7as unavailable." 
Fourth, the idea of the judicial economy is not solely a matter of economics as it 
is also a matter of justice and the economics of all those participating in the application 
of justice to the case and controversies. In  the matter of judicial economy Plaintiffs 
request the Court to consider the matters of economy and justice of the particular case 
at hand. 
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On 4/12/06 three parties converged on the meeting of the NLCHD 
commissioners, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the Wagners. The controversy was the first 
permit issued to the Wagners for a driveway access. The sides, issues, and economies 
stood as follows: 
I) The Wagners wanted a driveway access to their new home site. (The 
Wagners could move their driveway access to the west and excavate the hillside and 
avoid confrontation of the property line. This would be expensive, time consuming and 
damaging to a stable environment.) 
2) The NLCHD had altered CCR in 1996 and the historic driveway purchased by 
Eli Harris in 1911 from Per and Anna Johanson had been rendered inaccessible without 
major excavation, environmental damage, and financial expense. 
3) The Halvorsons wanted to own and peacefully enjoy their land, be able to 
restrict others from their land, and have a clear and marketable title to their land. I n  
consideration of the economies of the Wagners, the environment, the financial expense 
of the Halvorsons to abate the nuisance and trespass of the permitted driveway, Don 
Halvorson attended the 4/12/06 meeting of the NLCHD. I n  this consideration the price 
of the land (Plaintiffs economic concern) involved did not outweigh any conceivable 
judicial economies (resolution to the trespass). The price of the land involved at that 
time was approximately $5600, the cost of a survey to determine and change the 
involved property line. Don Halvorson suggested to the Wagners and the Defendants 
that they, as responsible (in consideration of their wants and prior actions) and as 
reasonable people, share the cost of the survey. The economics of justice now stood 
Wagners $2300, NLCHD $2300, Halvorsons loss of a small piece of land which has been 
rendered somewhat uneconomically workable as either farm or ranch land by the 
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changing of CCR, but clear marketable title would be maintained by survey and 
conveyance of the piece of land to the Wagners or the NLCHD. 
At the meeting of 4/12/06, Defendants in a biased display of defiance and 
governmental abuse, arbitrarily and with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs 
constitutional rights portrayed a government function that would shock the conscience 
of any elected democratic institution or people. No exigent circumstances were present 
to necessitate the abridgement of any one's constitutional rights. All parties being 
present at the 4/12/06 meeting denied infeasibility of a hearing. The only thing that 
stood in the way of Due Process was the Defendants' own arrogance and abusive 
indifference. 
After the meeting of 4/12/2006 the sides, issues and issues stood as follows: 
1) Wagners continued unabated use of nuisance and trespassatory driveway 
access permitted by Defendants. 
2) The Defendants stood in violation of Idaho State Constitution and Statutes 
and the U.S. Constitution for the improper interference with Plaintiffs property rights by 
the taking of land for a non public use, the taking of land for the widening of CCR and 
drive way access permit issued and not revoked without Due Process and Just 
Compensation and the unconstitutional claiming of prescriptive rights to the Plaintiffs 
land to the northeast of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. 
3) The Halvorsons now out $5600 for the cost of a survey to abate the nuisance 
and trespass permitted by the NLCHD and constructed by the Wagners, and the 
beginning of a 2+ year ordeal of looking for Judicial economy in resolving the limits of 
the CCR right of way. 
Presently the sides, issues, and economies stand as follows: 
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I) Halvorsons continue the expenditure of time, money, and effort to resolve 
the case and the present controversies, and continue in the loss of ownership, the right 
to restrict others the right of a clear and marketable title to their land and right to 
peacefully enjoy their land without Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law. 
2) The Wagners have a new driveway, built by the tearing down the entire 
hillside of the 3+/-acre parcel. 
3) The environment lost its deserved stability by the refusal of the NLCHD to 
accommodate a deeded easement as a resolution to the trespass. 
4) Refusal of Defendants to accept culpability in the matter heightens the 
neighborly dispute as to the inaccurate claims of the Defendants to the general 
community, that the Halvorsons have caused the problems. 
5) Defendants continue to fight the resolution of the case and the controversies. 
The Defendants continue to enjoy a comforta ble living at the expense of the Plaintiffs, 
the Wagners, and the general public. NLCHD counsel continues to enjoy a comfortable 
living fighting the case and controversies on behalf of the Defendants and at the 
expense of the Plaintiffs, the Wagners, and the general public and now the Court, which 
just increases the expenditures of the Plaintiffs and the Wagners, and the general 
public. 
5) Economy of Justice lies in 'Justice delayed (is expensive to those who seek it) 
is justice denied (by those who delay it and pay nothing and receive remuneration for 
their improper delay). True enough, the Plaintiffs could have saved a great deal of 
time, money, and effort by simply acquiescing and walking away. Yet all economies 
and justice suffer from the abuse of judicial economy and governmental authority. 
6) The price of the tiny piece of land is now left still to be determined as well as 
the limits of the CCR right of way. 
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I n  the view of Plaintiffs there is nothing gained in an economic sense, in a sense 
of justice, or a sense of judicial economy to deny Plaintiffs' Motions for Declaratory 
Judgments of either or both of I.C. fii 40-203a or I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) at the present time. 
These Motions have been petitioned in the full light of judicial economy and economics 
and justice. These matters are appropriate matters to be declared in the civil case CV 
2008-180. Plaintiffs have a colorable title and in this claim have a constitutionally 
protected property right. Mathews v. E/dr@e, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct.893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 
(1976) provides guidance for the direction for the Court to proceed. Mathews provides 
no guidance for the Court to avoid the Due Process issue or deny Plaintiffs requests for 
declaratory rulinqs on the basis of an implied requirement of "heiqhtened pleadinss" 
(see Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)) 
V. I n  the alternative 
In  the alternative, Plaintiffs allege they have been ii7dividL/a//yinjured by 
Commissioners deliberate indifference of not initiating validation proceedings on their 
own resolution and/or responding to Plaintiffs Requests for Regulatory Takings Analysis, 
and.that the Commissioners were required to do so under their quasi-judicial capacity 
(see Cooper v. Boardof County Commissioners ofAda County, 101 Idaho 4.07, 614 P.2d 
947 (1980)). 
The legislature has granted the NLCHD the authority to maintain and repair and 
to straighten, widen, and alter CCR right of way, to issue and revoke and enforce the 
revocation of driveway access permits and to obtain necessary private lands for the 
straightening, widening, and altering of CCR through the civil proceedings of eminent 
domain. These authorizations have given the NLCHD the authority to determine 
Plaintiffs' legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests regarding 
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the application of these authorizations to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' property, land (see 
Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 594 P.2d 643 (1979). The decisions of the 
Defendants to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit, to not revoke the first 
Wagner driveway access permit, to widen CCR in 2005, to widen CCR in 2006, and 
amongst others have arbitrarily and adversely determined Plaintiffs' legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests, in particular Plaintiffs' rights to own, to 
peacefully enjoy their land, to be able to restrict others from their land, and to have a 
clear and marketable title to their land (see Complainf, at 7, E, and at 9, L., M., N.) and 
as such Defendants failure (to provide Due Process (substantive and procedural) and 
Equal Treatment Under the Law) to act provides Plaintiffs cause of action under 42 
U.S.C. 1983. (See Sm Diego Gas& Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656, n. 23 
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), when property is taken by the government but not in 
furtherance of a 'public use' the governmental entity may not be forced to pay just 
compensation, but landowner may nevertheless have a damages claim cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and see Lingle v. Chevron USA, 544 US 528 (2000), "Conversely, 
if a government action is found to be impermissible-for instance because it fails to 
meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process-that is 
the end of the inquiry." 
These controversies, of the Commissioners initiating validation under their own 
resolution and responding to Plaintiffs' requests under IRTA are real and substantial and 
Plaintiffs are requesting specific relief by requesting the Court to decree through decree 
of conclusive character as to whether Commissioners were required to initiate validation 
under their own resolution to resolve confusion of discrepancies brought before 
Commissioners by Plaintiffs and/or to respond to Plaintiffs' Requests For Takings 
Analysis to comply with their quasi-judicial capacity, 
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the Commissioners advice (emphasis added)--will Plaintiffs get their questions (limits 
of the right of way of CCR) answered by the Commissioners if Plaintiffs submit $750 fee 
and a petition for determining if CCR is Public or not in the public interest? Considering 
Plaintiffs have already submitted all the evidence necessary for Commissioners to 
initiate validation proceedings on their own resolution and they have not been 
responsive, it may be speculative to ask if the Commissioners will arrive at a different 
conclusion if Plaintiffs pay a $750 fee. Reason would say the Commissioners would not 
arrive at a different conclusion, especially in the light of the bias alleged by Plaintiffs. 
This question and any implied questions as to what the Commissioners' motivation for 
such legal advice is withdrawn until a later time. 
Plaintiffs have alleged injuries to their fence, confiscation of land, conversion of 
land, improper interference with Plaintiffs Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 
amongst others and have shown that their colorable claim may be so determined to be 
so, as well as their property rights are to be so properly protected, if said limits (legal 
establishment, accurate location, and proper recording) of CCR right of way were 
validated and/or Requests For Takings Analysis were responded to. 
Plaintiffs have alleged they suffered injury to their private property rights; that 
this judicial determination is not an adjudication of an injury suffered by all citizens and 
taxpayers and/or abutting landowners alike. For if the NLCHD has invalid right of ways 
in regards to all abutting landowners, they would have an unconstitutional 
policy/custom, or if Defendants are refusing Plaintiffs the right to a valid right of way 
while providing all other abutting landowners a valid right of way, Defendants have not 
treated Plaintiffs equally under the law (in either case, Defendants are liable under 42 
U.S.C. 1983). The injuries Plaintiffs allege are specific to Plaintiffs. As abutting 
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landowners, Plaintiffs have a right to be treated similarly as all abutting landowners and 
have a legally established right of way traversing their property, conforming to the 
public records, and without the errant and knowingly unlawful issuance of the first 
Wagner driveway access permit in the trespass upon Plaintiffs property (Defendants 
either do not know where the actual location of CCR is due to alterations of CCR or they 
do and have knowingly issued the first Wagner permit and widened CCR in deliberate 
indifference to Plaintiffs constitutionally protected property rights, arbitrarily denied 
Plaintiffs due process, and are abusing their authority, and are trespassing). Plaintiffs 
seek cause of action from Court's decree. 
The judicial determinations requested by Plaintiffs are ripe. The controversy, do 
the Commissioners need to initiate validation in such matters, presents definite and 
concrete issues, is real and substantial, and there is a need for adjudication. No 
validation can pi-oceed and/or response to Requests, and thus no agency determination 
of their application of law to opinions of fact can occur if Commissioners do not initiate 
validation and/or respond to Requests. Plaintiffs are denied their rights to Due Process 
(Procedural and substantive) as well as the right to Equal Treatment under the Law by 
Commissioners inaction, failure to establish a verbatim record and failure to respond to 
Plaintiffs in a meaningful way-to give Plaintiffs a "final decisionf' and allow a Judicial 
review if Plaintiffs so wish. (I.C. 3 40-203a carries a legislative required Judicial Review 
if Plaintiffs are aggrieved by Commissioners decision.) 
Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgments Of I.C. 3 40-203a and Under I.C. 67- 
8003 (3) are not advisory or hypothetical. They are real, substantial, concrete, and ripe 
and Plaintiffs have standing. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges Commissioners failure/s to act and initiate validation 
proceedings on their own resolution and/or respond to Plaintiffs' Requests For 
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Regulatory Takings Analysis has/have deprived Plaintiffs of their alleged constitutionally 
protected property rights, land, without procedural due process (proper notice, hearing, 
right of substantive and meaningful examination of the evidence, right to a final 
decision based on the evidence, the right to a judicial review of the matters, and 
amongst others) and equal treatment under the law (that all abutting landowners have 
a right of a legally established right of way, or to be shown cause on a reasonable basis 
as to why the GCR right of way does not need to be legally established, accurately 
located, and/or its location to correspond to the public record, or that Commissioners 
need not evaluate their administrative actions for the possibilities of taking of private 
property without the due process of law). 
On this Day of July, 2008.Q /i 1 
RESPECTFULLY SUBM?JTED, iU(~ib9~ 
Don Halvorson 
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GMHAM, P.X. 
414 S. Jefferson 
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Don Halvorson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 1 
(I-Iusband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-180 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE 
) APPLICATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
VS. ) MOTION TO VACATE AND RESET 
) HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) TO RECONSIDER 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICEIhRD ) 
ESANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, ) 
\ 
I 
Defendants. 1 
Defendants, through counsel, make ex parte application or, alternati~ely, move tlris Cou? 
under Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed herein on 
July 1 1,2008, and set for hearing on July 29,2008, to a date and time convenient for the Court, 
Plaintiffs and Defendants' counsel. 
DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION OR, .ALTERNATIVELY, h4OTION TO VACATE 
_&VD RESET IXE-mTG ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECOhTSIDER -- 1 0 ; tl-1 
As grounds for this application md motion, Defendants' co'~u1ssl represents ttlat he will be 
out of the office and, tberef~re, unavailable to appea before tl~:: Co~~r t  f om July 25,2038 through 
August 25,2008. 
In tlie event the Court does not 32-nt Defendants' ex paz-te applic~tion, Defendants do not 
desire to file a brief but do reqt~est telephonic oral argument upon this motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of July, 2008. 
LAWDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAh4, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE, CF SERVICE 
i liereby cenifq. that on illis 17th dzy of July, 2008, I catrsed a true a~ct correct copy of tlGs 
document to be served on the following individual in the mmner i~tlicated 'nslo\v: 
/ DONHLVDRSON 
CHAFXOTTE HALVORSON 
1290 Ah/LERICAN RIDGE ROAD 
KENPRICK, IDAHO 83 537 
[ X] US.  M3il 
[ 3 Federal Express Sta~~dard Ovelnight hlfai1 I 
[ j FAX (208) 322-4486 1 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 
(Husband and Wife), 
1 
) Case No. CV 2005- 180 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
) EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE 
VS. ) AND RESET HEARING ON 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) RECONSIDER 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMSSIONERS FOR ) 
THE KORTH LATAW COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, 0RI;AhTD ARNEBERG, RICE4RD ) 
WANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNEi, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to Defendants' Ex Parte 
Application or, Alternatively, Motion To Vacate And Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion To 
Reconsider filed herein, this Court having reviewed the file in tlGs matter, and good cause 
appearing for granting Defendants' ex parte application; 
ORDER GRAiTIKG DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION 
TO VACATE ASD RESET HEARKG O X  PLAINTIFFS' h/iIOTIOM TO RECONSIDER -- 1 (JLSS 
NOW THEREFOE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Reconsider filed herein on July 11,2008, and set for hearing on July 29,2008, is hereby reset 
for hearing on AI~L~C 2 L7 ,- 7008, at the hour of q : 00 as m. Pacific T h e  
in the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, Idaho. 
4% IT IS SO ORDERED this 4day of *M + 2008. 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I caused a true and correct 
copy of this document to be served in the manner indicated below: 
-- -- 
DON HALVORSON 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD . 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 
N] U.S. Mail 
[ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAF-IAM, P.A. 
414 S. JEFFERSON 
P.O. BOX 9344 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
Y f ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ ] F M  (208) 322-4486 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
CLERK OF THE COUR 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDL4NTS' EX PrlRTE APPLICATION 
TO VACATE AKD RESET EEARI;\TG ON PLAINTIFFS' MO FION TO XECONSICER -- 2 ,. c ,  u , U  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), 
Plaintiff, 1 CASE NO. CV-08-00180 
1 ArnNDED 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
1 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF 1 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH ) 
LATAH COUNTY HlGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD 1 
HANSEN, S m W N  CLYDE, in their ) 
official capacities, and their individual 1 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
IT IS HERERY ORDERED that Friday, the 5" day of September, 2008, at the hour 
of 9: 15 a.m. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho, is the tinie and place set for a Telepl~oriic Scheduling Conference in the above- 
entitled matter with the COURT initiating the call. 
DATED this ,A 1d- day of July, 2008. 
AMENDED 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
SCI-EEDULhTG COAFERENCE 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED ORDER FOR 
TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE was mailed, postage 
prepaid, by the dgsigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, thii&day of July, 
2008, on: 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson 
1290 Ailierican Ridge Road 
Kendrick, ID 83537 
(208)289-5602 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow,. ID 83 843 
(208)883-1505 
PATTY 0 .  WEEKS, Clerk 
AMENDED 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
S CHEDULNG CONFERENCE 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 -. DE?L;TY 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & G2LM%!ihtl, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF LDAEIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAI-T 
DON & CHARLOTTE EVLVORSON ) 
(E-fusbasd and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSrvTE 
) BRILEF TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
vs. ) TO RECONSIDER 
1 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMfSSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAI-I COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAM3, ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
KANSEN, S m M  CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
1 
Defendants, through counsel, respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Coust's Opinion 
and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 40-203(a) and Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. $67-8003(3) ("Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider"). 
With due respect to Plaintiffs' efforts in this matter, Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and 
Brief does not set forth any arbwent that was not previously made in regard to the underlying 
motions. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not seem to understand the legal basis cited in the Court's Opinion 
and Order for denying Plaintiffs' motions. 
Defendants restate, by this reference, their objections to the motions as previously filed by 
Defendants on May 9,2008, and request that the Court summarily deny Plaintiffs7 -on to 
Reconsider. 
As an additional note, Defendants consider Plaintiffs7 Motion to Reconsider may have been 
unnecessary and, if so, to have needlessly increased the cost of litigation. Defendants do not want to 
be subjected to unnecessary legal expenses and utilize this brief as an opporhmity to remind 
Plaintiffs that improper pleadings are subject to sanction. 
Dated this 17th day of July, 2008. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifl that on this 25th day of July, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be senred on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON 
CEMXLOTTE K4LVORSON 
1 290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 
[ X ]  U.S. Mail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ 1 FAX (208) 322-4486 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
COURT MINUTES 
Presiding Judge 
CARL B. KERRICK 
Reporter 
NANCY TOINLER 
Date AUGUST 26,2008 
Time: 9:03 a.m. 
DON & CHAUOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), 
1 
Plaintiffs, Docket No. CV-2008-180 
vs. 
) 
APPEARANCES : 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) DON HALVORSON 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF For, Plaintiff 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH ) 
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT ) RONALD LANDECK 
ORLAND ARNEGERG, RICHARD 1 For, Defendant 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their ) 
Official Capacites, and in their Individual ) 
Capacities; DAN PAYhTE, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, 1 
Defendants. 
) 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: h;lOTION TO RECONSIDER 
BE IT KNO\&W, THAT THE FOLLOWhTG PROCEEDINGS WERE HAAD, TO-INIT: 
DCY 2199 
307 Don and Charlotte Halvorson present. 
Ronald Landeck present. 
321 Mr. Halvorson presents argument re: motion to reconsider. 
747 X4r. Landeck presents argument re: motion to reconsider. 
1 Page of 2 Pages 
COURT MINUTES AUGUST 26,2008 
CV-2008-180 HALVORSON VS. NORTE L A T M  GO. HWY 
90 1 Mr. Halverson presents rebuttal asgument. - 
1248 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
(1254)Recess 9:32 a.m. 
JENNY LANDRUS 
APPROVED: 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE 
HALVORSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY 
- HIGHWAY DISTRICT; BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY 
HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ORLAND 
ARNEBERG, RICHARD HANSEN, 
SHERMAN CLYDE, in his official 
capacity and in his individual 
capacity, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
) CASE NO. CV-08-00180 
1 
) ORDER SETTIXG CASE FOR TRIAL 
) AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
1 
1 
1 
) 
1 
1 
1 
IT IS HEREBY OmERED that the above-named case be set for JURY TRI.4L 
before the Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge, at the Latall County 
Courtl~ouse, at Moscow, Idaho, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on the 2oth day of April, 2009, 
for T H E E  to FOUR (3-4) days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following: 
disclosure of Plaintiff's expert witnesses shall be on or before 
October 3 1, 2008; 
disclosure of Defendant's expert witnesses shall be on or before 
ORDER SETThTG CASE FOR TRIAL 1 
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFEPSKCE 
December 12,2008; 
all discovery shall be completed by March 20, 2009; 
the last day for hearing dispositive motions shall be March 3,2009; 
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on April 13,2009, at the hour of 
11 :00 a.m., at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, at Lewiston, Idaho. Lead counsel trying 
the case must be present at the pre-trial conference. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party shall: 
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pre-trial 
hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses asserted by 
that party: 
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial 
conference to be marked; 
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for 
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared to 
submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing; 
4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibits or to make 
specific objections to its admissibility; 
5) Furnish opposing counsel with the names and addresses of all 
witnesses, the nature their testimony, experts' reports, and like 
instruments, and complete all other matter which may expedite both 
the pre-trial and trial of this case: 
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement; 
ORDER SETTIKG CASE FOR TRIAL 2 
AND PE-TRI_rlL CONFEAWNCE 
7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law relied 
upon: 
8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions counsel 
intends to request. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, 
one copy containing citations of authority and one copy suitable for 
submission to the jury. The Court uses the following instructions from 
IDJI and it is not necessary for counsel to submit them: 100, 109, 110, 
112, 122, 123, 124, 140, 141, 143, 144,145, and 900. 
DATED this c" day of September, 2008. 
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILJNG 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL 
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, this S*day of September, 2008, on: 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson 
1290 Arnerican Ridge Road 
Kendrick, ID 83537 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham 
P.O.Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAIZO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
1 
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife) 
Plaintiffs, 1 
CASE NO. CV 2008-00 180 
v. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' 
NORTH LATAI-I COUNTY HIGHWAY ) htOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH ) 
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RTCHARD 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their ) 
official capacities, and their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Court's 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratoly Judgment of I.C. 5 40-203A and the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3). The Court heard oral 
argument on August 26, 2008. The Plaintiffs proceededpro se ill the matter, and Mr. Halvorson 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PLX-WTIFFS' MOTION 1 
FOR RECONSIDER4TION 
presented argument. The Defendants were represented by Ronald Landeck, of the firm Landeck, 
Westberg, Judge & Graham. The Court, having heard argument and being fully advised in these 
matters, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
A comprehensive background of this matter is located within the Opinion and Order on 
PlaintiSfs ' Motion for Declaratory Judgment o f1  C. j 40-203A and Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Declaratory Judgment Under l: C. J 67-8003(3), filed on June 9, 2008. At that time, this Court 
denied the Plaintiffs' motions for declaratory judgment, determining that, based upon the 
outstanding issues of fact and for purposes of judicial economy, declaratory judgment is not 
appropriate on these issues. Further, the issues raised will be appropriately addressed through the 
underlying civil action. The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to reconsider its determination 
regarding both inotions for declaratory judgment. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 
On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. I l(a)(2)(B), the court iziust take into 
account any new facts that may affect the correctness of the prior interlocutory order. 
hiationsbanc -Mortgage Cory. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879, 884,908 P.2d 572,577 (Ct. App. 1995), 
citing Coeur d t4lene i2fining Co. v. First Aral'l Bank of hrorfh Idaho, 1 1 8 Idaho 8 12, 823, 800 
P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The burden is on the moving party to bring the new facts to the court's 
attention; the court is not required to search the record to determine 'ivlzether there are any new 
facrs that would affect its earlier decision. Coeur d 'Alene Afining Go., 1 1 8 Idaho at 823, 800 
P.2d at 1037. Finally, the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the 
OPINION AhD ORDER ON PLAnlTI?FS' &/TOTION 2 
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sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Beeh, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908,914 
(200 1). 
ANALYSIS 
The Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is timely, however, no additional facts, nor 
errors of law, have been presented which persuade this Court to alter its previous ruling. 
When considering a motion of this type, the trial court should take into account 
any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the 
interlocutory order. The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's 
attention to the new facts. We will not require the trial court to search the record 
to determine if there is any new information that might change the specification of 
facts deemed to be established. 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank ofNorth Idaho, 11 8 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 
1037 (1990). This Court notes that it is not necessary for the party seelung reconsideration to present 
new facts to the court,' however, the party must not simply reiterate its original argument, but must 
instead present additional information or set foifn an error of the Court in the previous ruling. See 
Joh~zson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,473, 147 P.3d 100,105 (Ct. App. 2006). Nothing presented by 
the Plaintiffs leads this Court to the conclusion that declaratory judgment is appropriate on this 
matter. 
1 In Johnson, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed several cases dealing with motions for reconsideration which were 
denied by the trial court. Most of these cases involved the trial court granting a motion for sumnary judgment, 
which in effect dismissed all or portions of a case. The Johnson Court found: 
None of these authorities preclude reconsideration of a trial court's interlocutory decision on the bases 
of the initial evidence. Indeed, a rule requiring new evidence on a motion for reconsideration would be a 
cause for concern. It uould prevent a party from drawing the trial court's attention to errors of law or fact 
in the initial decision, precluding correction of even flagrant errors except though an appeal. 
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,473, 137 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. Xpp. 2006). The case presented by the 
Halvorsons is unique in that this party is seeking declaratory jud-ment on the issues presented to the Court. 
This Court's denial of the motions for declaratory judgment does not dismiss the case before it, instead this 
Court determines that the matter is best left for factual determinations to be made by a trier of fact regarding the 
underlying civil actions. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON PL,.llNTIFFS' MOTION 3 
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As a matter of clarification, the denial of the Plaintiffs' motions for declaratory judgment 
does not eliminate the underlying claims made by the Plaintiffs; these issues are preserved for a trial 
on the merits of this case. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the adjudication of these 
claims, and such evidence must be determined by a finder of fact. Thus, declaratory judgment is not 
appropiate on this matter and the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
On June 9,2008, this Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of 
I.C. tj 40-203A and Plaintiffs7 Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. tj 67-8003(3). This 
Court determined that the motion pursuant to I.C. tj 40-203A requires the Court to issue an 
advisory opinion, which is not an appropriate role of the judiciary. Further, the Court determined 
that both motions for declaratory judgment are appropriately addressed through the underlying 
civil action. For reasons of judicial economy, both motions for declaratory judgment were 
denied. The Plaintiffs ask this Court to recoiisider its determination, however, the Plaintiffs have 
presented no additional facts on the matter, nor have the Plaintiffs established that the Court 
erred in its previous determination. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied. 
OPmION Ah3 ORDER Oh PLAINTIFFS' 1IOTION 4 
FCR RECONSIDER4TIOPu' 
ORDER 
The Plaintiffs' hfotion to Reconsider the Court's Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. $ 40-203A and Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment 
under I. C. fj 67-8003 (3) is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this $&day of September 2008. 
:ARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
OPINION Ah-D ORDER OX PLAIhTTFFS' MOTION j 
FOR RECONSLDERATIGN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RECO,NSIDERATION was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, thisEday of September, 2008, on: 
Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick ID 83537 
Ronald Landeck 
LANDECK TVESTBERG JUDGE & GRAHAM 
P 0 Box 9344 
hfoscow ID 83843 
Clerk of the Court 
Latah County Courthouse 
P 0 Box 8068 
Moscow ID 83843 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK 
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Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537 
(208) 289-5602 
Plaintiff, Pro se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) 
Plaintiffs ) 
VS. ) 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) 
Commissioners for the North Latah County ) 
Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard ) 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official ) 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 
Individual Capacity ) 
Defendants ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2008-180 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION 
OF THE ISSUE OF THE 
NULLIFICATION OF THE 
ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE 
RIGHT OF WAY AND 
SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF 
PROOF OF PRESCRIPTION 
AND/OR VALIDATION OF A 
LEGALLY ESTABLISHED 
1 RIGHT OF WAY 
Under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure rule 56, Plaintiffs move/petition Court, as a 
matter of law, for Partial Summary JudgmentlAdjudication of the Issue of the status of 
the original prescriptive right of way on Camps Canyon Road in light of the undisputed 
facts that in 1996 Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N 3WBM undewent 
alteration in which the physical location of the highway/right of way was changed and 
the width was increased. As a matter of law, the establishment of a prescriptive 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADSUDICATION OF 
THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF 
WAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF OF PRESCRIPTION AND/OR 
VALIDATION OF ,4 LEGALLY ES'r"AB!,ISHED RIGHT OF WAY 
easement rests on the usage of the identical strip of land over which the right was 
originally claimed. Subsequent to these admissions and answers to Plaintiffs' 
interrogatories this identity can no longer be claimed. "[lit is well settled under ldaho 
Law that any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the 
character, width, length and location of the easement. This Court does not hesitate to 
remand cases because of an inadequacy in the district court's description of an 
easement." Schneider K Howe, 142 ldaho 767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006) 
(internal citations omitted) 
The nullification of the establishment of the Camps Canyon right of way shifts the 
burden of proof to the one presently claiming prescription, and lor the legal 
reestablishment of Camps Canyon Road. 
Without a valid right of way, Defendants operate without the basis of their authority. 
Camps Canyon Road no longer lies on the identical strip of land it did before the 1996 
alteration which is presumed (neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants bring evidence or claim 
to the contrary) to be identical to the strip of land occupied by Camps Canyon Road at 
the end of the prescriptive period in the absence of any known changes to Camps 
Canyon Road between the prescriptive period and 1996. The United States Court of 
Appeals, Federal Circuit Hash v. US., 403 F.3d 1308 at 577 "This authority is consistent 
with "the long established rule" in ldaho "that any right gained by prescription is confined 
to the right as exercised during the prescriptive period. It is limited by the purpose for 
which it is acquired and the use to which it is put." /&ho Forest /ndus., /nc. v. Hqya'en 
Lake Wafershed/mprovementDisf., 112 ldaho 512, 733 P.2d 733,736 (1987) (citation 
omitted). As the ldaho Supreme Court explained in Gibbens K Weisshaupf, 98 ldaho 
633, 570 P2d 870, 875 (1 977), "prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and 
thus the rights obtained by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by the 
courts." (Emphasis added.) 
UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS 
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I .  39 American Jurisprudence 24 Highways, Streets, and Bridges 530. "Location 
and termini of way. The public cannot acquire a right by prescription to pass over a 
tract of land generally, but only in a certain definite line of way. To establish a 
public road by prescription there must be a use of the identical strip of land over 
which the riqht is claimed. It is not indispensable, however, to the establishment of 
a highway by adverse user that there be no deviation from a direct line of travel if 
the travel has remained substantially unchanged; it is sufficient although at times 
there may have been slight deviations from the common way to avoid 
encroachments, obstacles, or obstructions upon the road." (Emphasis added.) 
2. In a case involving a prescriptive highway the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1901 
that "It was an easement in the land, not the fee to the land, which the public 
acquired by the road, and the measure of the easement was the width of the road." 
District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 92 at 108 (1901), 21 S. Ct. 283. 
(Emphasis added. 
3. 39 American Jursprucfence 24 Highways, Streets, and Bridges §63 "Prescriptive 
ways As  a general proposition, the width of a highway established solely by 
prescription or user is determined by the extent of such user, and the width of the 
road a s  used at the end of the period of prescription fixed by the statute of 
limitations is the established width of the highway in such cases  , at least where 
that width has been used throughout the prescriptive period. 
While there are cases  which appear to recognize that a highway acquired by 
prescription or user does not extend beyond the beaten or traveled path, it is more 
generally held that the public easement is not necessarily confined strictly to the 
actual beaten path or traveled track in every instance, but such right extends to 
such width a s  is reasonably necessary for public travel. 
The easement for a street includes such use of the land at or beneath the surface 
a s  will make the easement effective, and in determining the width or extent of an 
PLAINTIFFS ' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/,4DJUDICATION OF 
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easement by prescription, a similar concept of use must be employed. The width 
of a highway acquired by prescription or user is not necessarily the same as that of 
a formally established highway. It is sometimes provided by statute that highways 
acquired by user shall be made a certain width. However, it has been held that if a 
statute were construed to provide that any road dedicated by adverse public use 
was dedicated to a specified width regardless of the width of actual usage, the 
statute would be unconstitutional. Such a statute raises only a rebuttable 
presumption and, where the presumption is rebutted, the roadway is restricted to 
that area actually appropriated and used for road purposes." (Emphasis added.) 
4. Eo =Ro, where Ro = the road width of Camps Canyon Road at the end of the 
prescriptive period, and Eo = the width of the right of way easement at the end of 
the prescriptive period. The ruling on whether Camps Canyon Road lies within the 
original prescriptive right of way width lies in whether R x ~  Ro for any ,. 
5. Rlg96 (1) = RO and Elgg6 (1) = EO where Rlgg6 (1) = the road width of Camps Canyon 
Road in 1996 and EIgg6 (1) = the width of the right of way easement of Camps 
Canyon Road prior to the alteration of Camps Canyon Road. Generally, Plaintiffs 
do not dispute that conditions precedent were performed or have occurred. Camps 
Canyon Road met the requirements for acquisition and establishment as a 
prescriptive right of way/highway and continued as such under the presumptions 
that the centerline was located in 1996 prior to the 1996 alteration as the centerline 
was located at the end of the prescriptive period and the width prior to the 1996 
alteration was the width at the end of the prescriptive period. 
6. On questioning Defendants bring forth no specific information to indicate any 
substantial change in Camps Canyon Road from its establishment to 1996. 
Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories, INTERROGATORY NO. 3 -"List all available 
information and documents you know of, the names, addresses, phone numbers 
and whereabouts of anyone, who may have information of or the possession of 
documents concerning the acquisition of the prescriptive right of wayihighway, 
CCR, the time of the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right-of-way/highway, 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU-MMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OF 
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CCR, the establishment of the prescriptive right-of-wayihighway, CCR, at  the end 
of t h e  prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of way/highway, CCR. 
RESPONSE: Object to this Interrogatory a s  unduly burdensome and oppressive in 
that it covers an unlimited time frame and seeks information and documents not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without 
waiver of objection, Documents regarding CCR in NLCHD1s possession are  
primarily set  forth in District foreman's journals and Commissioner Minutes. Width 
of CCR was widened on the north side in 1996 to approximately its present width. 
CCR was widened on south side in 2005 and 2006 by approximately four feet of 
road surface and the addition of sloping cut banks. All District Commissioners and 
the foreman, including Payne, for the CCR where subdistrict is located have 
knowledge of this information." 
7. Defendants' objections a re  unfounded. The determination of a prescriptive way is 
dependant on all the circumstances pertaining regardless of the extent of the 
history. Meservey K Gullifor4 14 Idaho 133, 93 P.780 (1908) ("Width of Highways 
established by prescription or public use had to be determined from a 
consideration of circumstances peculiar to each case...") 
8. In 1996 Camps Canyon road was widened. RIgg6 (2) > RIgg6 (1) and therefore Elgg6 (2) 
> E1g96 (1) where Rlgg6 (2) = the road width of Camps Canyon Road in 1996 and Elgg6 
(2) = the width of the right of way easement of Camps Canyon Road after the 
alteration of Camps Canyon ~ o a d ~ .  There is no dispute that width was added to 
Camps Canyon Road in 1996. The amount of width and on which side of the road 
the width was added are not relevant to present argument. 
9. Therefore R199s (2).> Ro and El996 (2) > Eo. (Eo=Ro=R1996 (1)<R1996 (2)) 
10. The centerline of a road is a function of its width by definition of centerline. 
Therefore any unequal additions of width change the centerline, and any equal 
additions of width are an increase of width which results in R1996(2).> RO and 
> Eo . The land occupied now is not identical to the land originally claimed. 
Defendants acknowledge this. Plaintiffs First Request For Admissions, "Request 
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No. 3, subpart c. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3. - The 1996 alteration 
exceeded the limits of the prescriptive right of way in the following manners: 
subpart c. The actual physical location of CCR was altered in the straightening of 
the curves and the extension of the road bed around the rock outcropping and the 
washout of the roadbed. RESPONSE: Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. 
Object as to form of request to the extent it calls for legal conclusion. Without 
waiver of objection: Admitted." Defendants' objections are unfounded. The 1996 
alteration is relevant to any and all subsequent circumstances pertaining to the 
legal establishment of Camps Canyon Road. Defendants generally admit to a 
specific Request. Defendants have the authority to straighten, widen, and alter 
Camps Canyon Road and to apply their authority to specific situations and 
individuals in a quasi-judicial capacity. (See I.C. §§ 40-605 and40-1310. See 
Cooper v. Board of County Comrn'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P2d 947 
(1 980)') 
In support of Plaintiffs' MotionlPetition For summary JudgmentfAdjudication of 
the Issue Of The Nullification Of the Original Prescriptive Right Of Way And Subsequent 
Burden of Proof Of Prescription AndfOr Validation Of A Legally Established Right Of 
Way, Plaintiffs offer these points. 
First the end of anything, by way of reason, requires a beginning. An end and a 
beginning are inextricably joined. As Plaintiffs wish an end to this dispute, they begin 
with this summary judgment motion as the beginning to that end. 
Secondly, the heart of the dispute lies within the notion of the limits of the right of 
way of Camps Canyon Road. These limits, such as the location of, the width of, the use 
of, and the very type of right of way, amongst others, provide the boundaries of the 
authority of the Defendants. Further there are matters which are contested to be 
contained within the limits of this authorization which don't even occur therewithin and 
the determination of what belongs tofor is authorized under a right of way shall shed 
light on these matters also. 
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Third, the present dispute of the Complaint wanders aimlessly in an 
argumentative circle around this issue. Without a determination of the status of the 
original prescriptive right of way, the effects of the 1996 alteration to that determination, 
and a proper showing of where the burden of proof lies (Plaintiffs have no obligation to 
establish a legal or valid right f way for Defendants), Plaintiffs chase the same rabbit 
(due process) around the same tree (final decision). 
Fourth without the delineation of the basis for Defendants' authority to operate 
they are free to alter and widen Camps Canyon Road, issue permits and fail to revoke 
driveway access permits, and to destroy any of Plaintiffs property that lies in 
Defendants' path with impunity and without notice or hearing and to do so with the 
freedom to destroy all evidence in the process, leaving Plaintiffs without any legal 
remedy or ability to stop Defendants' continued assaults. 
Fifth, Plaintiffs' challenges to Defendants' operations out of the bounds of their 
authority, trespass, is needful of a concrete definable right of way and not an amorphous 
constantly fluctuating easement defined on the arbitrary whims of the Defendants. 
Sixth, sufficient contrary and undisputed evidence to the presumption of the 
location of Camps Canyon Road as it was at the end of the prescriptive period and to 
the presumption that the width of the right of way is as it was at the end of the 
prescriptive period exists and no fact finder is necessary as both parties agree that 
Camps Canyon Road was widened and changed in location. As a matter of law no 
theory of prescription would allow for these undisputed changes. 
Seventh, this summary judgment deprives Defendants of the free evidence of the 
presumption, and as the reasonably designated caretakers of the evidence of proof, this 
summary judgment will properly obligate the Defendants with their rightful duty of 
maintaining a valid and adequately and legally defined right of way. 
Finally this motionlpetition for partial summary judgment should be granted to 
begin to narrow the dispute to its elemental parts and thus not present a morass of 
obfuscated opinions of fact and opinions of the applications of law to a bewildered jury 
6 
On this _ i f i a y  of September, 2008. 
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Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180 
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North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) 
Commissioners for the North Latah County ) 
Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard ) 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official 1 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 
Individual Capacity ) 
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STL4TE OF IDAHO ) 
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ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE 
OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE 
ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT 
OF WAY AND SUBSEQUENT 
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)ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say: 
1) We are the plaintiffs named in the above case. 
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2) We first became aware of Defendants adverse actions and improper interference with 
regard to our property rights underlying to and abutting to Camps Canyon Road in the 
late fall of 2005 when the NLCHD graded the road and pushed 6 inches of gavel to 
the northeast into the buffer (area between the fence and the road and its supporting 
structures) left by us when we reconstructed the line fence in 1997. 
3) We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription to the lands abutting to 
and underlying Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in our fee 
simple title on 4/12/06 at the regular meeting of the Comlnissioners of the NLCHD. 
4) We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence, 
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Camps 
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2085 on 4/12/06. 
5 )  We gave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of 
prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence, to 
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to widen Camps Canyon 
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06. 
6) We continued to give Defendants fair wanling of our f a d s  opinionls of fact/s and 
interpretation of the application of law to our facts and opinion/s of facts and sought 
remedy and settlellient with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum of either 
paying $750 and file for petition to validate Czrnps Canyon Road or getting a lawyer 
in September of 2007. 
The above statements are true to the best of our knowledge. 
ti: - 
of September, 2008. 
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Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537 
(208) 289-5602 
Plaintiff, Pro se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) 
Plaintiffs ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
VS. 1 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
Commissioners for the North Latall County ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT1 
Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard ) ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE 
Hallsen, Shennan Clyde, in thsir Official 
- - -  
Y 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) OF THE NLCEJD'S STANDING 
D m  Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) OPERATING PROCEDUREIPOLICYI 
Iadi;.-i&a! C~paciry ) CLSTOM OF 'LTiil>Ei\iB~G .I 
Defendants 1 PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
Urzder I.R.C.P. Rule 56, Plaintiffs come before this Court seeking a Partial Summary 
JudgmentlAdjudication of the Issue Of The Facial Validity Of The NLCHD's Standard 
Operating ProcedurelPolicylC_ustom For Widening Of A Prescriptive Right Of Way under Case 
No. CV 2008- 180. As a matter of law, the NLCHD's standard operating 
procedurelpolicy/custonl/administrative procedurels for their broadly delegated power for 
widening of 2 prescriptive right of w-ay does not circumscribe deprivations with constitutionally 
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adequate procedures. Procedural safeguards provided by Idaho Statutes are not built into the 
procedure/policy/custom~adrninistrative procedurels effecting deprivations, and/or remedy/s for 
erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law are not built into the 
procedurelpolicy/custom/administrative procedurels. (See Zinef-mon v. Burch 494 U. S. 1 13 
starting at 124, Zimmernzan v. City ofOaklarzd, 255 F.3d 734, (9th Circuit, 2001), Logan v. 
Zimfizerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982)(availability of postdeprivation remedy is 
inadequate when deprivatiou is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official 
conduct was not "unauthorized"). 
The civil procedures of proper interference witb an abutting, adjoining and underlying 
landowners' property rights and landowner right to proper notice and hearing and right to be 
heard at a meaningful time and right of a meaninghl response and right to be treated as all 
similarly situated persons or to be shown that not to be so similarly treated is rationally related to 
a legitimate govei-nnlent interest, is left uncircwnscribed to the discretion of the Defendants. 
Deprivations to abutting, adjoining andlor underlying land owners are predictable and 
easily identifiable as widening, straightening, altering andlor changing a highway are planned 
activities. The authority to deprive has been given to the defendants, that is, the authority to 
widen, straighten, alter and/or change a prescriptive right of way. The Defendants have also 
been given the concomitant duty to insure only proper interference u-it11 abutting, underlying and 
adjoining landowner's property rights and to initiate procedural safeguards set up by state 
statutes to guard agzii~st unlawfii deprivatio~s an2 to set fo'ctri'il remedial procedures for erroneous 
deprivations. 
Relevant factors include the affected private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, 
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the governnlent's interest, including 
burdens that additional safeguards would entail. See &fathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 3 19,335 
(1 976). In most cases, some type of predeprivation notice and hearing are constitutionally 
required before a property interest is invaded. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1 978), 
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 1 13, and Parratt v. Taylor, 45 1 U. S. 527, (1 98 1). 
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UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. PLAINTIPFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES (PAYNE) 
Plaintiffs' Second Illterro~atories 1 Please state the standard operating procedure for 
straightening, widening, altering, and/or changing CCR. 
Response: 
"The standard operating procedure for North Latah County Highway District public roads 
established by psescription or public use, except those of a lesser width presently existing at the 
time those highways are establislied, is to widen such roads as required for proper construction 
and maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width of 50 feet. On information and 
belief, CCR is a public highway established by prescription or public use and, therefore, would 
be constructed and maintained in the discretion of the District as such forth above. 
2. As stated in the response to the intenogatory, there are no operating procedures in place. 
The standard operating procedure simply is at the discretion of the District to "widen such roads 
as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width 
of 50 feet." No operational procedures, safeguards andlor remedies for erroneous deprivations 
are outlined or described. 
3. Neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs dispute the District's lack of discretion to widen a 
prescriptive right of way that is already 50 feet. 
4. Neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs dispute the District's discretioil to widen roads which 
are of a lesser width presently existing at the time ;hose highwaj-s [roadsj are established. 
ARGUhfENT FOR GFUNTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5. There exists no set of circumstances under which the NLCHD policy for the widening, 
straightening, altering andlor changing of a prescriptive road/highway which are of a lesser width 
presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established would be valid without the 
circumscription by and inclusion of the requirements of the proper governmental interference, 
including statutory safeguards and statutory remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by 
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Idaho State statutes, to assure an abutting, adjoining, andlor underlying landowner's right to due 
process (procedural and/or substantive) andlor equal treatment under the law andlor compliance 
-4th Idaho State Statutes. 
6. 39 American Jurisprudence 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges $30. "Location and 
termini of way. The public cannot acquire a right by prescription to pass over a tract of land 
generally, but only in a certain definite line of way. To establish a public road by prescription 
there must be a use of the identical strip of land over which the right is claimed. It is not 
indispensable, however, to the establishment of a highway by adverse user that there be no 
deviation from a direct line of travel if the travel has remained substantially unchanged; it is 
sufficient although at times there may have been slight deviations from the common way to 
avoid encroachments? obstacles, or obstiuctions upon the road." (Emphasis added.) 
7. In a case involving a prescriptive highway the U.S. Supreme Cowt stated in 1901 that "It 
was an easement in the land, not the fee to the land, which the public acquired by the road, and 
the measure of the easement was the width of the road." District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 
U.S. 92 at 108 (1901), 21 S. Ct. 283. (Emphasis added.) 
8. Eo = Ro, where Ro = the road width of roads which are of a lesser width presently existing 
at the time those highways [roads] are established (at the end of the prescriptive period), and Eo = 
the width of the right of way easement of roads which are of a lesser width presently existing at 
the time those highways [roads] are established (at the end of the prescriptive period). 
At the discretion of t l~e  District, any a d  a11 chsilges In width a;zcl/or changes in location in any 
roads which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are 
established (at the end of the prescriptive period) would require statutory safeguards and 
remedies for erroneous deprivations as any change in width and or location negates that those 
roads would lie within the identical strip of land over which the right is [was] claimed. 
9. Any land outside of the identical strip of land over which the right is [was] claimed lies 
outside the authority of the NLCHD. 
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10. The Defendants have the discretion and authority to widen, straighten, alter or change a 
highway, however, once the choice has been made the Defendants have no discretion as to how 
the operation is performed. "In order that act of county commissioners in laying out highway be 
valid, whether upon public domain or private property, board must conform to law giving such 
authority, as power to establish highways rests in legislature and right may be exercised only in 
such manner as legislature provides." Gooding Hwy. Dist. V Idaho Irrigation Co. 30 Idaho 232, 
165 P 99 (1917). 
11. The authority to widen, straighten and/or change a highway lies in I. C. $ 8  40-605 and 
40-1 3 10, as do statutory safeguards of survey prior to taking of private property, accurate 
description of land required, attempts to make agreements with landowners, recording and 
conveyance: 
I.C. 6 40-605. LAYING OUT OF NEW HIGHWAYS WIDENING, CHANGING, OR 
STRAIGHTENING EXISTING HIGHWAYS PURCHASE OF RIGHTS-OF-WAY BY 
AGREEMENT. ". . .Commissioners may also change the width or locatioil or straighten 
lines of any highway under their jurisdiction. If, in the laying out, widening, changing or 
straightening of any highway it shall become necessary to take private property, the 
cornrnissioilers or their director of highways shall cause a survey of the proposed 
highway to be made, together with an accurate description of the lands required. The 
commissioners shall endeavor to agree with each owner for the purchase of a right-of- 
way over his land inc!uded within the description. If they ase zble zo agree with tke 
owner, the commissioners may purchase the land out of the county highway h n d  under 
their control, and the land shall then be conveyed to the county for the use and purpose of 
highways." 
I.C. 6 40-13 10 2) The highway district shall also have the right to acquire either by 
p~urchase, or other legal means, all lands and other property necessary for the 
construction, use, maintenance, repair and improvement of highways in their system. The 
highway district may change the width or location, or straighten lines of any highway in 
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their system, and if in the constructing, laying out, widening, changing, or straightening 
of any highways, it shall become necessary to take private property, the district director 
of highways, with the consent and on order of the highway district commissioners, shall 
cause a survey of the proposed highway to be made, together with an accurate description 
of the lands required. He shall endeavor to agree with each owner of property for the 
purchase of a right-of-way over the lands included within the description. If the director 
is able to agree with the owner of the lands, the highway disirict commissioners may 
purchase the land and pay for it out of the funds of the highway district, and the lands 
purchased shall then be conveyed to the highway district for the use and purpose of 
highways. 
12. When Defendants have been given the authority to straighten, widen, and alter roads 
which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established 
and to apply their authority to specific situations and individuals they do so in a quasi-judicial 
capacity. (See Cooper v. Board of County Cornrn '7s ofAda County, 10 1 Idaho 307, 614 P2d 947 
(1 9(50).) Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law are required in all specifically and 
individually applied instances. 
13. Prior survey, conveying and recording are required in all instances of changes beyond 
identical strip of land over which the right is claimed whether the activity is straightening, 
widening, altering, andlor changing. The NLCHD has no authority to do otherwise. The 
YLCHD's Standard Qperatlng Procedure for xideni~ig all roads :vhich ase of a lesser width 
presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established does not circumscribe the 
broad authority the NLCHD has to widen, straighten, andlor change u~ith these statutory 
safeguards. Further, Idaho Statutes and procedural and substantive due process rights are 
ignored when such changes are made without prior notice, hearing, survey, agreement with 
ou7ner, proper and accurate record keeping, recording, and conveying. 
14. The NLCHD's Standard Operating Procedure for widening all roads which are of a lesser 
width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established violates procedural 
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due process rights by not providing adequate notice and predeprivation hearing and ignores and 
violates statutory safeguards in Idaho Statutes (see I.C. Title 7 Chapter 7, I.C. Title 40 Chapter 
20,I. C. $5 40-604, 40-605,40-608,40-13 10,40-2302,40-1336, I. C. 40-204, Idaho State 
Constitution (Article I $ 5  13 and 14), and U. S. Constitution (5" and 14" Amendments) 
15. The NLCHD's Standard Operating Procedure for widening all roads which are of a lesser 
width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established violates procedural 
due process rights by arbitrarily ignoring any remedies for erroneous d6privations provided by 
notice and hearing and Idaho statute or tort law. (See I.C. $  40-302a, IRTA, ITCA, exhaustion of 
agency remedies, amongst others.) 
16. The NLCHD's Standard Operating Procedure for widening all roads which are of a lesser 
width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established effectively avoids, 
denies, andor does not make allowance for any notice andlor hearing whether predeprivation or 
post deprivation. (In acknowledging the absence of post deprivation hearing Plaintiffs do not 
acknowledge such post deprivation remedies are adequate, rather in the alternative to the denial 
of predeprivation notice and hearing, Plaintiffs are saying Defendants policies, customs, and 
procedures also deny any exhaustion of agency remedies, judicial review, andlor tort claim 
remedies. Trespass, nuisance, andor inverse condemnation arc: not covered by the ITCA and 
such actions are denied by the arbitrariness and capriciousness of Defendants actions/failures to 
act and abuse of Defendants discretionary powers. (See Lingle v. Chevron USA IEc. (04-163) 
544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F. 3d 846 and Crolvn Pitiizt L?evelopmerzl: Irzc. v. City oYSz~r2 Valley, 
506 F.3d 851 (9''' Circuit 2007).) 
17. The NLCHD has no authority to create a prescriptive right of way only the authority to 
acquire and maintain a prescripti-ye right of way. Defendants cannot do clandestinely (create a 
prescriptive right of way) what they could not do in the open Court Room (See U. S. v. 
Diekinson, 33 1 U.S. 745 (1 947). 
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As a matter of law this facial challenge is not a small matter. The potential that this 
standard operating procedure/policy/custom rnight operate as invalid in some strained set 
circumstances andor in some conceivable manner is insufficient to sustain a ruling of invalidity. 
In the present case, however, it is not a set of special or speculative circumstances which could 
cause an event of inadequate safeguards andor lack of remedies for erroneous deprivations; it 
would be in all such cases of widening of all roads which are of a lesser width presently existing 
at the time those highways [roads] are established. All such roads would be under the same 
constraints. 
If there are 600miles of roads under the authority of the NLCHD, many of which were 
acquired by prescription, there are 1200 miles of property lines for which the proper respect and 
proper interference is demanded. The respect for property lines is no less required for 
prescriptive rights of way than it urould be for deeded rights of way. Where there is an implied 
distinction (that the bounds of a prescriptive right of way are amorphous, vary with the 
Defendants' discretionary change in the road and are changeable at the discretion of the 
Defendants and deeded rights of way are rigid) between prescriptive and deeded rights of way 
andlor betureen individual abutting, adjoining, and /or underlying landowners to prescriptive 
rights of way which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] 
are established, any unlike treatment must be reasonably related to a legitimate government 
interest and none are stated. "[I]t is well settled under Idaho Law that any judgment determining 
the e:;istence of an easement m s t  also specifjj the cliaracter, width, fengih and location of the 
easement. This Court does not hesitate to remand cases because of an inadequacy in the district 
court's description of an easement." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 
1239 (2006) (internal citations omitted) 
All prescriptive rights of way which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time 
those highttrays [roads] are established are in the same set of circ1mstances. They have the 
potential to be widened to the limit of 50 feet at the discretion of the Defendants. Deprivation is 
foreseeable and predictable. A predeprivation notice and hearing is not impracticable andlor 
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infeasible. The choice to widen a prescriptive right of way is a matter of planning, and not of 
exigent circumstances-it is not "unauthorized". This combination makes a post deprivation 
remedy inadequate 
In the alternative, in the event that a post deprivation remedy would be adequate, there 
exists no set of circumstances under which the NLCHD policy for the widening, straightening, 
altering and/or changing of a prescriptive rosdlhighv~ay which are of a lesser width presently 
existing at the time those highways [roads] are established would be facially valid as this 
policy/custom/standing operating procedure is not circumscribed by any agency remedy. 
For the Plaintiffs to prevail in this partial summary judgment does not take away the 
Defendants discretion to widen a prescriptive right of way, it simply promotes that the 
interferences with abutting and underlying landowners' property rights is done properly, as is 
statutorily and constitutionally required. The statutory safeguards and/or remedies are in place, 
in the Idaho Code, but tlieir workability remains unknou.11 if the safeguards are not implemented, 
in the policies/customs/standing operating procedures of the NLCHD. 
Failure to circumscribe and/or provide for or to ignore statutorily provided safeguards 
and/or remedies for erroneous deprivatioi~s is abuse of the broadly delegated power to widen, 
straighten and alter prescriptive rights of way which are of a lesser width presently existing at the 
time those highways [roads] are established 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1 990) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is 
inadequate ivhen deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official 
conduct was not "unauthorized"). 
"Each of ous due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
because hiniinum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not 
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its ow11 procedures that it may deem 
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.' Vitek v. Jones, 435 U.S. 
480,49 1-(1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 6 U.S., at 166-1 67 (POJVELL, J., concurring in part); 
id., at 2 1 1 (MARSHL4LL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU-Mh4ARY JUDGMENTiADJUDICATION OF 
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDING OPERATING 
PRCCEDURE/POLICY/CUSTO-M FOR T4'IDENlKG A PRESCNPTIVE RIGHT-OF-'&'AY 
destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered and 
rejected such an approach: 'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, . . . 
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without 
appropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [Tlhe adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of 
a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.' Vitek v. Jones, 
445 U.S., at 490--491, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 167-(opinion concurring in 
part)." Logan v. Zirnnzerrnarz Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, at 332 (1982) 
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit Hash v. US., 403 F.3d 1308 at $77 
"This authority is consistent with "the long established rule" in Idaho "that any right gained by 
prescription is confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive period. It is limited by 
the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to which it is put." Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. 
Hayden Lake WatershedIrnprovement Dist., 112 Idaho 512,733 P.2d 733,736 (1987) (citation 
omitted). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Gibbe~s v. @'eisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 
P2d 870, 875 (1 977), "prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and thus the rights 
obtained by prescription should be closelv scrutinized and limited bv the courts." (Emphasis 
added.) 
On this 6 Day of 
-1 Q- ILL0 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Don Halvorson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Q& 
I hereby certify that on this A t h  day of S f o %  er, 008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & 
GRAHAM, P .A. 
4 14 S. Jefferson 
[x] U.S. hilail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 883-4593 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUh4MARY JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION OF 
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDIXG OPERATINTG 
PROCEDUREIPOLICYICUSTOhI FOR WIDENhTG A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-T1JL4Y 
10 
P.O. Box 9344 1 
Moscow, ID 83843 
CARL E3. KERRICK 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PMTIXL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OF 
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDIhTG OPER4TIbTG 
PF<OCEDUREIPOLICWCUSTOhl FOR 'IVIDENIXTC A PESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
2 1 0 3 :; -2 
[x] U.S. Mail 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0896 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Oveinight Mail 
[ 1 FAX 
Don ~alvorson 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
4 14 S . Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 833-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN ANL) FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CE4RLOTTE FFALVORSON 1 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008- 180 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE 
) APPLICATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
vs. ) MOTION TO RESET 2-IEARING ON 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL, 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) S W A R Y  JUDGMENT 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COL'WVIISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAE-I COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, R T C H m  ) 
HANSEN, SHEfLIW CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
1 
Defenda~~ts. 1 
Defendants, through coullsel, make ex parte application or, alternatively, move ths Court 
under Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary 
Jud-ment filed herein on September 19,2008, and set for hearing on October 21,2008, and to reset 
DEFEhTDAVTS7 EX PAR.TE APPLICATIOK OR, A!CTE~TATWEZ;U, MOTION TO RESET 
H E A W G  ON PL;1II?TTLFFSY MCTIOX FOR PL4RTLlt SL;mL-?;RY KDG3IEST -- 1 0 ' 2 ,-: : 
LJ\. 3 
the hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at 9:00 a.m. at the designated courtroom of the Nez 
Perce County Courthouse at Lewiston, Idaho. 
On Friday, September 26, 2008, Plaintiff Don Halvorson and Defendants' undersigned 
counsel Ronald Landeck ("I" or "my") met at my office to discuss Mr. Halvorson's pending 
Motion for Partial Sunmary Judgment. During that meeting, I explained to Mr. Halvorson that 
my schedule in the upcoming weeks would make it extremely difficult to respond to the motion 
within the allotted time. Mr. Halvorson then agreed, without any conditions, to the resetting of 
the hearing to Tuesday, November 18, 2008, to Defendants' filing any opposing affidavits and an 
answering brief on or before October 28,2008, and to Plaintiffs' filing a reply brief no later than 
7 days before the date of the hearing. I told Mr. Halverson that I would prepare a Stipulation for 
his signature and that I would also prepare a proposed Order and, upon our execution, submit the 
signed Stipulatio~i and Order to the Court. The attached, proposed Stipulation, Order and draft 
transmittal letter to Judge Kerrick were prepared by me and picked up by hfrs. Halvorson at my 
office on the following Monday, September 29, 2008. Based upon my discussion with Mr. 
Halvorson, I expected to receive the signed Stipulation the next day. When the signed 
Stipulation had not arrived by October 1, 2008, I asked my assistant to call Mr. Halvorson (as I 
t 
was out of the ofiice) and Mr. Halvorson told her, in essence, that he wanted other issues 
resolved in the case before he would sign the proposed Stipulation. I called Mr. Halvorson on 
October 2,2008, and he told me that fie wanted certain issues resolved in the case before he 
would sign the proposed Stipulation. I told Mr. Halvorson that he had not placed any co~iditions 
upon his agreement to enter into the Stipulation, that I had relied on his word and that because 
almost a week had passed since we had agreed to the new schedule it would be even more 
difficult for Defendants' counsel to meet Defendants' existing response deadlines in respect to 
DEFEhBAUTS' EX PARTE MPLIGATION OR, ALTEItYLATIVELY, RilOTIOY TO RESET 
I-TL-iimTG ON PL,-4IN-TIFFS' icriOTlON FOR PARTIAL SUlZ3IAJYY ~L73i;hlFNT -- 2 
f ' 7  1 " fJ & ?,--? 3 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment than when the scheduling agreement was made 
on September 26. 1 told Mr. Halverson that I would be filing this pleading with the Court if he 
was not going to keep his word. 
As Eurther grounds in support of Defendants' application or motion, Defendants' counsel 
represents that he was/is scheduled out of the office on October 1,2, 3, 8 and 9, 2008, and is also 
in the midst of relocating his office. In addition, undersigned counsel's only legal assistant is out 
of the office hom October 3 to October 13,2008. 
For good cause shown, Defendants request the Court enter the Ex Parte Order granting 
the relief requested. In the event the Court does not grant Defendants' Ex Parte Application, 
Defendants request a hearing on this Motion at the earliest possible time. 
RESPECTFULLY SUl3MITTED ths  7% day of October, 2008. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
By: 
At$rneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7* day of October, 2008,I caused a true and 
correct copy of this document to be sewed on the following individual in the manner indicated 
beiow: 
DON HALVORSON [ XI U. S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Ron d J. Landeck t! 
DEFEhQAKTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION OR, AALTERNRN4TIVELY, VOTIOhT TO RESET 
E-IELUGVTG ON PL-.riLZTTIFFS' MOTION FOR P-%TLrV, SUiL2?,LilRY L'DG-MENT -- 3 0 2 L l y  d k 
September 30,2008 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Re: Halvorson v. North Latah Cozinty Highway District, 
Case No. CV-2008- 180, Latah County District Court 
Dear Judge Kerrick: 
The parties in this action filed today in Latah County District Court, the enclosed 
Stipulation to Reset Hearing Schedule Re Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Jud,gnent. I am enclosing for your use a proposed Order Resetting Hearing Schedule Re 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgnient. We have hrnished the Latah County 
District Court Clerk with copies of the proposed Order to be collformed and eiivelopes 
for mailing to the parties. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Enclosures 
c: Don Halvorson 
(w/encls.) 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
41 4 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, I'N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 1 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) STIPULATION TO RESET HEARING 
) SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
vs. ) FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
? 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ? 
' DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMI\/nSSIONERS FOR 
TEE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICmRD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, iil their individual ) 
capacities; D;I;N PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, ? 
1 
Defendants. 1 
Plaintiffs and Defendants, tlxough counsel, hereby stipulate to vacate the hearing noticed 
by Plaintiffs for October 21, 2008 at 9:00 a.111. on Plaintiffs' hiIotion For Partial Surnrnar-y Jud-gnent 
filed on September 19,2008, and to reset the hearing 011 Tuesday, November 18, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. 
at the designated cow-troom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse at Lesviston, Idaho. 
STIPULATION TO RESET HEARING SCEDLTLE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMhL4RY KJDGh4ENT -- 1 
Plaintiffs and Defendants m h e r  stipulate that Defendants shall serve any opposing 
affidavits and an answering brief at least by October 28,2008, and PIaintiffs may thereafter serve a 
reply brief not Iess than 7 days before the date of the hearing. 
Plaintiffs and Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an order in accordance 
with this stipulation. 
Dated this - day of ,2008. 
Do11 HaIvorson, Plaintiff 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GR4WAM, P.A. 
By: 
Attornkys for Defendants 
STIPULATION TO RESET H E A m T G  SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' R?OTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMM'iZRY SUDG5IENT -- 2 O'qg w 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
JAMES L. WESTBERG, ISB No. 2264 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GR/1_HAM, P.A. 
4 14 S . Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRTCT COURT 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 1 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-180 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) OROER =SETTING HEARING 
) SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
VS. ) FOR PARTIAL SUhjlMilRY JUDGMENT 
1 
NORTH LATAW COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COh4MISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE XORTH LATAJ3 COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND AIZIYEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in IGs individual capacity, 1 
) 
Defendants. 1 
THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to a Stipulation To Reset 
Hearing Schedule filed herein by the parties and good cause appearing; 
ORDER RESETTlhTG I-IEAmTG SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUlcflMARY JUDGMENT -- 1 0341 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The hearing noticed by Plaintiff for October 21,2008, at 9:00 a.m. on Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed in the above-entitled matter on 
September 19,2008, is hereby vacated. 
2. The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment filed in the above-entitled 
nsatter on September 19,2008, is reset for hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, 
commencing at 9:00 a.m. at the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County 
Courtliouse at Lewiston, Idaho. 
3. Defendants shall serve any opposing affidavits and an answering brief at least by 
October 28,2008, and Plaintiffs may thereafter serve a reply brief not less than 7 days 
before the date of the hearing. 
Dated this day of ,2008. 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
ORDER RESETTTKG KEALWG SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' LriOTiON FOR PiZRTIAL 
CL,ERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this - day of ,2008, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this documelit to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON 
CHAlLOTTE E-fALVORSON 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 537 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ IFAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. JEFFERSON P.O. BOX 9344 
MOSCOM/: ID 83843 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 883-4593 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk 
By: 
Deputy 
ORDER RESETTlhTG HEARTNG SCEEDULE R E  PLADTTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
R O W D  J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
4 14 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
P.M. =#%ST 9% iMM3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAI-IO, IN AhD FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAII: 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 
(Husband and Wife), 
) 
) Case No. CV 2008-180 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
) EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE 
VS. ) AND RESET HEARING ON 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARhEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in Iis individual capacity, ) 
) 
Defendants. 1 
THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to Defendants' Ex Parts 
Application or, Alternatively, Motion To Vacate And Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Jud,gnent filed herein, this Court having reviewed the file in this matter, and 
good cause appealing for granting Defendants' ex parte applicatio~~; 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACL4TE 
Ah33 RESET HE~UIXTG ON PLA41;VTLt;'FS' LMOTION FOR PARTWL SLMMARY 
JbDG34ENT -- 1 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Jud,gnent filed herein on September 19, 2008, and set for hearing on 
October 21, 2008, is hereby reset for hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m. Pacific Time in the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this l ~ l ' k i y  of October, 2008. 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this\ %ay of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be sewed on the following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON ] U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON & F  ederal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 [ ] Hand Delivery 
RONALD J. LANDECK [ f iu.  s . Mail 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
4 14 S. JEFFERSON [ ] FAX (208) 322-3486 
P.O. BOX 9344 { ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOV?, JD 83843 
ORDER GRANTmTG DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE 
1A'D RESET H E a G  ON PLAINTIFFS' hlOTlOK FOR PARTIAL SL3lMAXY 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
4 14 S . Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDMO,  IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 
(Husband and Wife), 
) 
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE 
) APPLICATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
vs. ) MOTION TO RESET HEARING ON 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL, 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHW14Y ) StJh4MARY JUDGMENT FILED 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) OCTOBER 6,2008, AND BREF 
THJ3 NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, OR.LAI\,TD ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in h s  official capacity and ) 
in h s  iildividual capacity, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
Defendants, through counsel, make ex parte application or, alternatively, move this Court 
under Rule 7@)(3) I.R.C.P. to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Susnmary 
Judgment filed herein on October 6,2008 (the October 6 Motion"), and set for hearing on 
Kovenlber 4,2008, and to reset the hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at 900  a.m. at the 
designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse at Lewiston, Idaho. 
DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATIOX OR, KTERNATPVELY, MOTION TO RESET 
HEA&RJXTG ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTUL SL%MARY JUDGMEIIT FILED i) J 4 j OCTOBER 6,2008, Ai2D BRIEF -- 1 
As grounds for this application and motion, Plaintiffs did not serve the October 6 Motion at 
least twenty-eight (28) days before November 4,2008, the time Eixed for the hearing, in violation of 
Rule 56(c) I.R.C.P. The record before this Court establishes that the October 6 Motion was filed on 
October 6,2008, and served on Defendants7 counsel by mail only and that Defendants noticed the 
hearing on this Motion for November 4,2008. Rule 56(c) I.R.C.P., supplemented by Rule 6(e)(l) 
I.R.C.P., require that a motion for summary judgnent be served at least 3 1 days in advance of the 
hearing, that is, the 28 days required under Rule 56(c) and the additional 3 days that must be 
allou.ed for response under Rule 6(e)(I). Therefore, Plaintiffs' service by mail 29 days before the 
hearing date did not meet the mininlum 3 1 days, advance notice of the hearing required under Idaho 
rules of civil procedure. See Ponderosa Paint Manufactu1-ing, Inc. v. Yuck, 125 Idaho 3 10,3 16,870 
P.2d 663,669 (Ct.App. 1994). 
As fk-ther grounds in support of Defendants' application or motion, Defendants7 counsel 
represents that Defendants' Ex Parte Application filed on October 7,2008, sets forth good cause to 
reset Plaintiffs' other pending Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed on September 19,2008, 
for hearing on November 18,2008, and that same cause, incosporated herein by this reference, also 
applies in large part to this application or motion. In addition, the issues set forth in Plaintiffs' two 
(2) pending motions are related and judicial economy would be best served by hearing these 
motions on the same date. 
Defendants also intend to file a motion for s m a r y  judgment in this action such that 
Defendants' motion can also be heard on November 18,2008. 
For Plaintiffs' failure to coniply with applicable civil d e s  and for good cause shown, 
Defendants request the Court enter the Ex Parte Order granting the relief requested. In the event 
DEFEhDANTS' EX PARTE ,QPLICATION OR, ALTERNATN-ELY, AIOTIO&- TO RESET 
m m T G  ON P L M I F F S '  MGTiON FOR PARTLX SU343Z-2RY SUI3GPimm FILED 
OCTOBER 6,2008, A\'D BRIEF -- 2 0917 
the Court does not grant Defendants' Ex Parte Application, Defendants request a hearing on this 
Motion at the earliest possible time. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of October, 2008. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
i 
1, 
By: 
Rondld J. Landeck 
~ t t & e ~ s  for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following- individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ X] U. S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1 290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FA)( (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Ron d J. Landeck - 
DEFENDLkUTS' EX P m T E  APPLICATION OR. _&TERNATIVELI', MOTION TO RESET 
HE,?JXIKG ON P L L W E F S '  MOTION FOR PL.?illTLAL SL142vLiY 3t-DGhGNT FILED 
OCTOBER 6,2008, ill33 BRIEF -- 3 ( j 1 ! 4 d  kd A 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
4 14 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDICIAL, DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
) EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE 
vs. ) AND RESET HEARING ON 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
NORTH LATAEI COUNTY HIGHWAY ) SU_MMARY JUDGMENT FILED 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIOmRS FOR ) OCTOBER 6,2008 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND A N B E R G ,  I Z T C W  ) 
HANSEN, SKERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
1 
Defe~dants. 1 
THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to Defendants' Ex Parte 
Application or, Alternatively, Motioil To Vacate And Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' h'fotion for 
Partial Summary Jtrdgment filed herein, this Court having reviewed the file in this matter, and 
good cause appearing for granting Defendmts' ex parte application; 
ORDER GRPINTIT.TG DEFENDAVTS' EX PAATE APPLICATION TO VACATE 
A\TD RESET HEARING ON PLAIitTPFS' hfCITION FOR PARTIAL SWL"\ilil~?Y ( j"<s JLIDGMENT FILED OCTOBER 6,1008 -- 1 C, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial S u m a r y  Judgment filed herein on October 6,2008, and set for hearing on November 
4, 2008, is hereby reset for hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
Pacific Time in the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, Idaho. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this -2 $ h a y  of ~ctober,  2008. 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of October, 2008,I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON ~ + + j  U.S.  ail 
CEJLARLOTTE KALVORSON C[: ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KEhr>RICK, IDAHO 83 537 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
RONALD J. LANDECK @'~u.s. Mail 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. ! [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
41 4 S. JEFFERSON [ ] FAX (208) 883-4593 
P.O. BOX 9344 [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ORDER GRAhTTMG DEFENDAVTS' EX P,ilRTE APPLICATION TO VACATE 
A\TD RESET HEL4RIIPU'G ON PLANTLFFS' XfOTiON FOR PARTIAL SKifMARY 0I;U-J 
.I12G?AENT FILED OCTOBER 6,2008 -- 2 
Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537 
(208) 289-5602 
Plaintiff, Pro se 
-, *: ,.: . . - >-.$P , . ,-.- CLERK OF L 13 / ?iL, i t i?V; i i  i 
i"-f?,"i p, i;" 1 ).+,I!<J '.7': i ! 
iN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Haivorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
Plaintiffs 1 
VS. 1 PLAINTIFFS' 
North Latah County Sighway District; Board of ) INTERROGATORIES AND 
Commissioners for the North Latah Cor~niy ) REQUESTS 
Highway District. Orrand Arneberg, Richai-c! 1 FOR ADMiSSIONS AND 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) (PIRADR) 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 
Individual Capacity 1 
Defendants 
Plaintiffs submit these Defelldarits xspcnszs ds true anli acirr!-ate responses to Plainliffs' 
Requests for Admissic;nr; and Interrogatories: 
1. m n t i f f s '  First Reque~t For Admissfons (Ar.nehea.p, Clyde, Hansen, Pavnel Request for 
Admission No. 3 The 1996 alteration excrecied the limits of the prescriptive right of \yay in the 
following manners: subpart c The acrtlal physical location of CCR was altered in the 
straightening of the c u 7 e s  and the extension of the road bed around the rock outcropping and the 
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES AX11 REQUESTS FOR 4DhlTSSIONS AT43 
DEl?Eh-DANTS' RESPONSES (PIYADR) 1 w- I O ,J ,:; 
washout of the roadbed. Response: Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to form of 
request to the extent it calls for legal conclusion. Without waiver of objection. Admitted. 
2. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Arneberg, Clyde, Hansen, Payne) Interrogatory 
No. 3. List all available information and documents you know of, the names, addresses, phone 
numbers and whereabouts of anyone, who may have information of or the possessio~l of 
documents concerning the acquisition of the prescriptive right of waylhighway, CCR, the time of 
the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of way/l~ighway, CCR, the establishment of the 
prescriptive right of wayhighway, CCR, and /or the width, location and use of the prescriptive 
right of way, CCR, at the end of the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of 
waylhighway, CCR. Response: Object to this Interrogatory as unduly burdensome and 
oppressive in that it covers an unlimited time frame and seeks inforn~ation and documents not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiver of 
objection, Documents regarding CCR in NLCHD's possession are primarily set forth in 
District's foreman's journals and Commissioner minutes. Width of CCR was widened on the 
north side in 1996 to approxirnatefy its present width. CCR was widened on south side in 2005 
and 2006 by approximately four feet of road surface and the addition of sloping cut banks. All 
District Commissioners and the foreman, including Payne, for the CCR where the subdistrict is 
located have knowledge of this infor~nation. 
3. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 7. When did you issue the first driveway 
access permit to the Wagners? Response To PIaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 7. On 
information a id  belief, during Spring 2006. 
4. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 6. When did you first become aware of a 
property Iine dispute between the Wagners and Plaintiffs in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel? 
Response To Plaintiffs' Second Interro~atories 6. In Spring 2006 Robert Wagner informed 
District Foreman Dan Payne that Don Halvorson does not agree that Mr. IYagner's driveway 
approach is located wholly on Wagners' property. The District Commissioners first b= ,came 
aware of the dispute when Mr. Halvorson attended a meeting in Spring 2006 to ask that the 
District perform a survey of the Halvorson/Wagner property lines. 
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGi/lTORIES AKD REQUESTS FOR ADLfISSIONS ARTD 
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5. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Armberg. No. 10, Clyde No. 8, Hansen No. 10, 
Pavne No. 10) State the number of meetings you have had with the Halvorsons in trying to 
resolve the dispute over CCR. Response: One meeting in July, 2007 at CCR. I was present at 
several meetings of NLCHD commissioners in 2006 and 2007 where Mr. Halvorson was present 
and addressed CCR issues. 
6. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) f 2. subparti, What are the dates of 
the "issue" with reference to the dealings of the Halvorsons with the NLCHD on the matter from 
your knowledge; that is, how long have the Halvorsons been talking to the NLCHD about the 
driveway permit and/or the NLCHD's unauthorized activities on CCR in the SENE of Section 15 
T39N R3wBM? Response: Since 4/12/06. 
7. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 1. Please state the standard operating 
procedure for straightening, widening, altering, and/or changing CCR. Response: "The 
standard operating procedure for North Latah County Highway District public roads establisl~ed 
by prescription or public use, except those of a lesser width presently existing at the time those 
highways are established, is to widen such roads as required for proper construction and 
maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width of 50 feet. On information and belief, 
CCR is a public highway established by prescription or public use and, therefore, would be 
constructed and maintained in the discretion of the District as such forth above. 
8. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories Ilt-fansen) 30. Wow have you, as Commissioner 
of the NLCHD, applied the law to the facts and opinions of facts you ascertained of Plaintiffs' 
colorable claim and/or allegations of you're their taking of their land, your damages to Plaintiffs' 
fence, and your issuing and not revoking driveway access permit for unlawful and unauthorized 
acts (if so please state these facts, opinions of fact and the application of the laws to these facts 
and opinions of fact) or have you intentionally stonewalled Plaintiffs with inaction and 
deliberate indifference (if not, please state what deterrningtions you have made, what the rational 
basis was for these determinations, what final decisions of these determinations you have related 
to Plaintiffs, and how these final decisions ha\-a been transmitted to Plainriffs during the last two 
years)? Response to PIaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 30: In addition to statements set forth 
PLAINTIFFS' Tr\,TTERROC,4TORTES AND REQUESTS FOR XDhflSSIONS AhTD 
DEFEND,ANTS' RESPONSES (PIR4DR) 3 O y y J  
in Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories, Richard Hansen met with Don Halvorson a 
week or so after the 4/12/06 meeting to understand Mr. Halvorson's position on these matters 
and to attempt to resolve Mr. Halvorson's concerns. The District has not made "final decisions" 
on any matters involving CCR. 
9. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Hansen) 4. For what reasons did you turn dov;n 
Plaintiffs' request that you initiate validation proceedings of CCR? Response to Plaintiffst 
Second Interrogatories (Plansen) 4. Because it was not in the District's interests to do so as 
CCR was a public road established by prescription for public use. 
10. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arnebrg) 5. What steps did the NLCHD take 
to insure no private property was improperly taken and/or not recorded in the widening and 
changing of the location of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996? Response to 
Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Axeberg) 5. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge 
but generally knows that the District makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) 
foot right-of-way in connection with public roads established by prescription or public use. 
11. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneber~;) 6. What steps did the NLCHD take 
to insure no private property was improperly taken and/or not recorded in the widening and of 
CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 2005 and/or 2006? Response to Plaintiffst Second 
Interro~atories (Arneberg) 6. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally 
knows that the District makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of- 
way in connection txith public roads established by prescriptioii or public use. 
12. Plaintiffs' Second Interro~atories (Arneberg) 13. In Plaintiffs' First Request For 
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 28, your response, an objection to the Request For 
Admission was that the form of the request, "...misstates the state~nents made". Please restate 
thk statements in your own words. Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interropatsries (L4rneberg) 
13. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District makes 
-
every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in connection with public 
roads established by prescription or public use. 
PLAINTIFFS' NTELPROGATORTES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSfOKS AND 
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13. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 14. In Plaintiffs' First Request For 
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 28, your response, an objection to the Request For 
Admission was that the form of the request, ". . .misstates the statements made". Please restate 
your words and/or your meaning to the words, if the words are to imply anything but what your 
words stated as recorded in the minutes of the 3/21/07 meeting, "Orland Arneberg said he's lived 
out there his whole life and can testify that the road hasn't moved". Response to PIaintiffs' 
Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 14. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but 
generally knows that the District makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) 
foot right-of-way in connection with public roads established by prescription or public use. 
14. Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 12. In Plaintiffs First Request For 
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 26, you stated, "Admitted. I first became aware of this 
issue when Halvorsons and Wagners appeared at a Commissioners meeting to discuss it. I had 
no further conversations with Mr. Wagner during the permitting phase. I have since spoken to 
Mr. Wagner on several occasions concerning his problems with Mr. Halvorson." In regards to 
this admission and your stated qualifications, answer the following interrogatories. Subpart d. 
How did the different parties become aware of the same Commissioners' meeting to discuss the 
same issue; that is how did John Bohman, Gary Osborn, Bob Wagner, Kate Wagner, Patsy 
Wagner, Francis Wagner, and Don Halvorson all arrive at the same place at the same time; that 
is, were John Bohrnan, Gary Osborn, Bob Wagner, Kate Wagcsr, Patsy Wagner, Francis 
Wagner, on the meeting agenda, or was Don Halvorson on the meeting agenda and who put them 
on the agerida? Respsnse to Plaiatiffs' Second Ir,f,errogatsrffss (Ameberg) 12. S u h ~ a r t  d. I 
do not know. Subpart e. Did either or both parties receive notice and if so how was notice 
provided? Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Ameberrr) 12. Subpart e. I do 
not know. Subpart f. Was the issue put on the meeting agenda; that is, why did you choose to 
address Don Halvorson rather than any of the other people in the room? Response to Plaintiffs' 
Second fnterroeatories (Arnebere) 12. Subpart f. I believe because District secretary Dan 
Carscallen informed me that Dan Hdvorson wanted to address the Commissioners. Subpart g. 
Do you have any reasonable explanation for the confluence of both parties arriving at the same 
PLAINTIFFS' IiVTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS AND 
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meeting with the availability of the time on the meeting schedule to address the issue? Response 
to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 12. Subpart g. The word we had was that 
Don Halvorson was going to speak to the Commissioners about an issue involving the Wagners, 
although I do not knotv how anyone else learned that information. Subpart h. Was any 
conlmunication directed by the NLCHD (including commissioners and/or employees) to either 
party about discussing the issue at a commissioner's meeting? Response to PIaintiffs' Second 
Interrogatories (Arneberg) 12. Subpart h. Not to my knowledge. Subpart i. Was the 
meeting you refer to the 4/12/06 meeting? Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 
(Arneber~) 12. Subpart i. Yes. Subpart j. What are the dates of the "issue" with reference to 
the dealings of the Halvorsons with the NLCHD on the matter from your knowledge; that is, how 
long have the Halvorsons been talking to the NLCHD about the driveway permit andlor the 
NLCHD's unauthorized activities on CCR in the SENE of Section 15 T39N R3wBM? 
Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arnebertr) 12. Subpart i. Since 4/12/06. 
15. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 6. When did you first become aware of 
a property line dispute between the Wagners and Plaintiffs in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel? 
Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interro~atories (Pavne) 6. In Spring 2006 Robert Wagner 
informed District Foreman Dan Payne that Don Halvorson does not agree that Mr. ?Vagner's 
driveway approach is located whollyhon Wagners' property. The District Conmissioners first 
became aware of the dispute when h4r. Halvorson attended a meeting in Spring 2006 to ask that 
the District perform a survey of the HalvorsodMiagner property lines. 
16. Plaintiffs' Second interrogatories (Pavne) 7. T+~rhen did jTW issue the first 
driveway access permit to the Wagners? Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrotratories 
(Pawe) 7. On information and belief, during Spring 2006. 
17. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 8. When did you take final action on 
the first Wagner driveway access permit (Latah County Building department shows record of 
you signing off on the question of road access for the Wagners' building permit in hlarch 2006)? 
Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavnef 8. Object as this interrogatory is 
ambiguous as to what is meant by "take final action". Without waiver of said objection, 
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES AND EQUESTS FOR .ZDbfISSfONS AND 
DEFENDANTS' RESPOhTSES (PIRADR) 6 O;'c,r 
following District's issuance of the first driveway access permit to the Wagners, the Wagners 
requested a substitute driveway access permit sometime within several months after March 2006, 
the District issued that second Wagner driveway access permit as a replacement for the first 
driveway access permit, and the first permit was impliedly revoked by the District as a condition 
of the issuance of the second permit. 
18. PIaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Payne) 9. What was the final action taken on 
the first Wagner driveway access pennit? Response to Plaintiffsf Second Interrogatories 
(Pavne) 9. See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 8 -- Object as this interrogatory is 
ambiguous as to what is meant by "take final action". Without waiver of said objection, 
following District's issuance of the first driveway access permit to the Wagners, the Wagners 
requested a substitute driveway access permit sometime within several months after Marc11 2006, 
the District issued that second Wagner driveway access permit as a replacement for the first 
driveway access permit, and the first permit was impliedly revoked by the District as a condition 
of the issuance of the second permit. 
19. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 10. Did the Wagners apply for a second 
driveway access permit? Response to Plaintiffsf Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 10. Yes. 
On this 21st Day of October, 2008. 
20. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 1 Please state the standard operating 
procedure for straightening, widening, altering, andor changing CCR. Response to Plaintiffs' 
Second Interrogatories CPavne) 1. The standard operating procedure for North Latah County 
. . Highway District public roads established by prsscnption or public use, except those of a lesser 
width presently existing at the time those highways are established, is to widen such roads as 
required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width of 
50 feet. On information and belief, CCR is a public highway established by prescription or 
public use and, therefore, would be constizzcted and maintained in the discretion of the District as 
such forth above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Don Halvorson 
PLAINTIFFS' NTERROGATONES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS AND 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21St day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & 
GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overniglit Mail 
[ ] FAX (208) 883-4593 
[XI Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, ID 8350 1-0896 / [ ] Hand~&livc)-y ,(9 
/&-k,m .- 
Don Halvorson 
Moscow, ID 83843 
CARL B. KERRICK 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
P.O. Box 896 
PLAINTIFFS' m-TERROGATORIES AXD REQUESTS FOR XDh/lISSIOKS AND 
[X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
[ 1 FAX 
DEFENDANTS' ES?OXSES (PIKADR) 8 
North Latah County Highway District 
1132 White Avenue 
&foscow, Idaho 83843 
Deary Phone; (208) 877-1101 Moscow Phone: (208) 882-7490 PotIatch Phone: (208) 875-0317 
F a :  (208) 877-1298 Pax: (208) 883-3926 Fax: (208)875-8967 
nlchd@nlcXld.corn 
April 3,2008 
To Whom It May Concern: 
The following twenty-six (26) pages are genuine copies of Highway District documents given to 
Don Halvorson. I have copies on file of the same documents to show they are genuine. 
Dan Carscallen 
Clerk 
North Latah County Highway District 
The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of 
Commissioners was held at the Moscow office on April 12,2006 at 1:30 pm. Present 
were Chairman Orfand Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan 
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan Carscallen. 
The  minutes from the meeting on March 8,2006 were approved as read. 
Richard Hansen made a motion to pay the bills as they appear on the back of this page. 
Orland Arneberg seconded. The  motion passed. 
Don Halvorson came in with concerns about development along and improvements to 
Camps Canyon Road. Mr. Halvorson's main complaint was that improvements to the 
road increase traffic and encourage development. He complained that there was no 
speed controI on the road, and the creek crossing was hard for a vehicle with a trailer. 
Mr. Halvorson also said there were property line disputes from road widening and 
moving of the roadway. Mr.  Halvorson brought in hand-drawn maps showing where 
he contended the road used to be versus where it is now. Mr. Halvorson also said he 
wanted a survey of his and his neighbor's property, but he wanted his neighbor and the 
Highway District to pay for it. Bob Wagner said he had no issues with the Highway 
District, and he has had suneys ,  but they did not meet with Mr. Hafvorson's 
satisfaction. Frances Wagner said there was really only one issue today an that  was the 
road has not moved, and the south side is where it has always been, therefore there was 
no historical difference on the south side of the road which borders hlr .  FTalvorson's 
property. Mr.  Halvorson said he'd be keeping an eye on what the Highway District did 
on that road. 
The  commissioners went into executive session to discuss pending legal matters a t  2:35 
The commissioners came out of executive session at 4:20 
The  commissioners set the budget hearing for July 26 
Richard Hansen said the brush cutter would be on Big Creek Road the week of April 17 
Speed limit classes are on April 18 and 19,2006 
Paul Stubbs said Lou Lively wants to use public right-of-way on the platted streets in 
Harvard  to access property outside Harvard city limits. The commissioners said it was 
okay to use the public right-of-way, but the Highway District would not be maintaining 
them. 
The  next meeting was scheduled for April 26,2006. 
Being no fur ther  business, the meeting adjourned at 3:35 pm 
Chairman Secretary 
The  regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Commissioners 
was held a t  the Moscow office on &larch 21,2007 a t  2:30 pm. Present were  Chairman 
Orland Arneberg,  Commissioner Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan Payne, Paul Stubbs  a n d  
Don Brown, a n d  Dan Carscallen. 
The minutes f rom the meeting on March 7,2007 were approved as read. 
The  bids fo r  rock a t  the Nagfe/Shattuck pit were opened. They were  as follows: 
Deatley Crushing 
tons s~ze  priceiton extens~on 
40,000 314" mlnus $480 $192,00000 
5,000 1 1/4" m~nus $4 65 $23,250 00 
3,000 1/2" ch~ps $6 30 $18,900 00 
1,000 Sand Eq $6 20 $6,200 00 
1,000 6" m~nus $4 62 $4,620 00 
North Idaho Crushing 
tons size priceiton extension 
40,000 314" minus $4.42 $1 76,800.00 
5,000 I 114" minus $4.42 $22,100.00 
3,000 1/2" chips $4.42 $13,260.00 
1,000 Sand Eq. $4.42 $4,420.00 
1,000 6" minus $4.42 $4,420.00 
total $244,970.00 total $221,000.00 
Richard Hansen made a motion to accept North Idaho Crushing's low bid. Orland 
Arneberg seconded. The  motion passed, 
Don Halvorson came in to discuss issues he has with the alignment of the Camp ' s  Canyon 
Road. (Mr.  Halvorson's letter is a t  the end of these minutes) Ron Landeck  asked about  the 
old driveway. M r .  Halvorson said the driveway was west of the  original a n d  brought  
pictures to show it. Richard Hansen asked Don Halvorson if he had  any problem with Bob  
Wagner's cur ren t  driveway. Don Halvorson said he had no problem with it. Don Halvorson 
said the road is not where it used to be. Richard Hansen showed pictures from 1949 and  
1965 tha t  show the road in the same place it is today. Don Halvorson said the  picture may 
not show enough detail to sflow a 50 to 80 foot difference in roadway position. Or land  
Arneberg and  Richard Hansen doubted the road could have moved that  f a r  and  i t  would 
probably show even a t  this scale. Don Halvorson said the original piece of property was  
deeded to give road access. Richard Hansen asked wha t  any of this had to d o  with the 
highway district. Don HaIvorson said he didn't want  the road moved but would like some 
assurance tha t  the road would stay  here it is. Mr.  Halvorson was also concerned with how 
people parked on the road. Tami Van Houten said she  parks  on the road and  walks down 
the hill to h e r  house on occasion. Richard Hansen asked Dan Payne if a n j  thing else would o r  
could be done to the road. Dan Payne said he's done most everything that  could be done 
~ i t h o u t  m a j o r  construction. Don Halvorson said he just wanted assurance that  there  would 
be some conferring with property owners if there were  to be any m a j o r  road changes. Dan 
Payne asked Don Halvorson about the road frontage that  was missing and  where  the 200 feet 
could have gone. Mr .  Halvorson explained that  it tvas due to the movement of the  road. Dan  
Payne said when he originally approved Bob Miagner's approach he  measured off wha t  it 
was supposed to be bu t  Don Halvorson claimed he was off. Bob Wagner  has since moved the  
driveway. Ricflard Hansen asked Don Halvorson wha t  he wanted. Don HaIvorson said he 
and Bob W a g n e r  wanted input if the highway district planned on making any changes to the  
road. Don HaIvorson said he wanted to know if anything near  his fence so he  wouldn' t  have 
to deai with damage. kilr. Halvorson said he didn't wan t  any  problems. Richard Hansen 
explained that technically the fence encroached on the right-of-way. Ron Landeck quoted 
Idaho  Code 40-109 that says t h e - ~ i ~ h w a y  District's right-of-way is what they need to 
maintain a safe roadway. Don Halvorson said he had people who corrld testify tha t  the 
roadway had moved. OrIand Arneberg said he's lived out there his whole Iife and  can testify 
t ha t  the road hasn't moved. Richard Hansen said the property Iine issues have nothing to do 
with the highway district. Ron Landeck explained that the highway district doesn't just 
build roads a t  will without consulting with Iandovvners. Landeck said the highway district 
makes themselves aware of concerris and  would keep don informed. Ron Landeck said that 
by looking at  the aerial photos one could see there have been no major changes in the 
position of the roadway in the Iast 40 years. Don Halvorson asked about him and  Bob 
Wagner  giving a deed to North Latafi County Highway District for the road right-of-way. 
Mr. Wafvorson said his biggest deal was getting money back for the survey he had done. 
Richard Hansen said that was between him and Bob Wagner. Richard Hansen asked Don 
Halvorson if he and Bob Wagner wanted the ultimate decision on any road improvements. 
ilk. Halvorson said he just wanted input. Richard Wansen said there is a n  existing road with 
a 50 foot prescriptive right-of-way and Don Halvorson seemed only to be  worried about  
movement of the road without his prior knowledge. Kichard Hansen asked Mr. Halvorson if 
he  felt his fence was more than 25 feet from the center of the road. Don Halvorson said he 
thought i t  was. Richard Hansen said he thought it wasn't. Don Halvorson said his only 
intent was to maintain his fence. Dan Carscallen asked Don Halvorson if -- as long as 
nothing moves without first consulting with Nalvorson and  '~F'agner - everything is oltay. 
Don Halvorson said that everything was okay. 
John  and R'felanie Wolf attended to discuss a road access farther down Camp's Canyon 
Road. Dan Yayne said he would discuss it with them on site when they had a chance. 
The  Cornniissioners went into executive session at  2:55 Dm. 
T h e  Commissioners adjourned from executive session at  3:50 pm. 
T h e  Conlrnissioners asked that excavator specs go out so bids can be opened on April 11. 
Don Rro.a;n asked if the Case roller should be auctioned off or if thejp should continue to run 
it. Kichard Hansen said he'd rather not run it, OrIand Arneberg said to go ahead and  
auction i t  off with the surplus equipment. The surpirrs auction is scheduled for  April 25. 
'There was some discussion about a gravel road standard. The e o ~ r ? ~ i s s i o n e r s  felt that  a 
gravel standard should be included in the specifications for  certain cases. 
Don Bran-n asked about sight distance. T h e  cornmissioners said to continue with the 200 foot 
s tandard until the new road standards are  adopted. 
Being no fur ther  business, the meeting adjourned at 4:50 pm 
The next meeting was scheduled for April 11,2007. 
Chairman Secretary 
AGENDA 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGPHFVAY DlSTRZCT 
Wednesday, September 12,2007,1:30 P.M. 
Highway District Office 11 32 White Avenue 
Call to Order 1 .  
2. Approve minutes July 25, 2007 
3. pay bills 
4. Open Rock Bids 
5 .  Open surplus grader bids 
6. Don Halvorson 
7 .  Latah Trail proposal - Tom Lamar 
5. Blaine Street Extension - Susan Wilson, Team Idaho 
9. Map, Bridge Discussion - Hodge and Associates 
10. Caterpillar discussion - Butch LaFarge 
1 1 .  Executive Session pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-2335(1) if necessary 
12. Other Business 
The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Gomrnissioners 
was held at the Moscow office on September 12,2007 at 1 3 0  pm, Present were Chairman 
Orland Ameberg, Commissioners Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen, Foremen Paul 
Stubbs and Tim Sturman, and Dan Carscallen. Commissioner-Elect Charles Bond also 
attended. 
The minutes from August 22,2007 were 'approved as read. 
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed on the back of this page. Richard 
Hansen seconded. The motion passed. 
The cornmissioners opened bids for rock in Moscow and Deary. They were as follows: 
DeAtley Crushing 
Hunt Pit (Deary) 
45,000 tons 518" minus $3.93 /ton $1 76,850.00 
2,000 tons 1 112" minus $3.83 /ton $7,660.00 
1,000 tons 112" chips $4.43 /ton $4,430.00 
1,000 tons 3" minus $3.83 /ton $3,830.00 
1,000 tons Anti-Skid $4.43 iton $4,430.00 
Deary Total $197,200.00 
Jensen Pit (Moscow) 
45,000 tons 518" minus $3.99 Iton $1 79,550.00 
5,000 tons 112" chips $4.49 /ton $22,450.00 
Moscow Total $202,000.00 
Grand Total $399,200.00 
North Idaho Crushing 
Hunt Pit (Deary) 
45,000 tons 518" minus $4 75 Iton $21 3,750 00 
2,000 tons 1 112" mlnus $4 75 /ton $9,500.00 
1,000 tons 112" chips $4 75 /ton $4,750 00 
1,000 tons 3" mrnus $4 75 Iton $4,750 00 
1,000 tons Anti-Skid $4 75 Iton $4,750 00 
Deary Totai $237,590.00 
Jensen Pit (Moscow) 
45,000 tons 518" minus $4.30 /ton $ I  93,500.00 
5,000 tons 112" chips $4.30 Iton $21,500.00 
Moscow Totai $21 5,000.00 
Grand Totai $452,500.00 
The Commissioners decided to discuss the bids later in the meeting so they could get 
through the agenda. 
Don Hafvorson attended to ask if the photos of the Camp's Canyon Road that the Highway 
District had were evidence in substantiating the North Latah County Highway District's 
claim that the road has never moved. Mr. Halvorson asked if those photos could be 
orthogonally rectified so the commissioners7 ruling could be an informed one. Ron 
Landeck said that  no proceeding has been in front of the commissioners to have them make 
a ruling. Landeck said that if Mr. Halvorson wanted a ruling of some kind he needed to 
file a petition for validation of public right-of-way, then the commissioners could formally 
accept any evidence and have a public hearing regarding the road. Mr. Halvorson said he 
has come before the commissioners with a complaint and  tried to get it rectified, but to no 
avail. Landeck said the form for validation is available. Mr. Hafvorson said it was never 
offered. Dan Carscallen said that was because the Highway District was never sure what 
Mr. Halvorson wanted, and he gave Mr. Halvorson an application for validation of public 
right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson asked why he had not been offered the form before. Landeck 
said that the commissioners were trying to work this out as informally as possible. Mr. 
Halvorson asked why the process was not yet formal. Landeck explained that  the formal 
process requires a public hearing, Mr. Nalvorson said that  the Highway District's ability 
to prove that the Camp's Canyon Road is still located where it has always historically been 
located has not been shown, in his opinion. Landeck said it was not the Highway District's 
responsibility to initiate the validation proceeding, but as a landowner Mr. Halvorson can 
file a petition to initiate the formal proceedings. Don Halvorson asked if he could have a 
response to his earlier filings regarding regulatory takings or  would he have to re<file those. 
Landeck said there would be no official response to those filings as they do not technically 
relate to. the proceedings, but that Mr. Halvorson would not have to re-file them. Mr. 
Halvorson said he did not feel time was being well spent and there should be quicker 
response to his communications. Dan Carscallen said that the response to his earlier 
communications was that he should petition for validation of public right-of-way. Mr. 
Nalvorson said he was not getting the answers to his questions. Landeck said the questions 
submitted were not really something the commissioners could answer. Mr. Halvorson 
asked how complaints were normally dealt with by the commissioners. Landeck said that 
they deaI with complaints all the time and usually they a re  resolved informally. Sherman 
Clyde said that the fence that the tree fell on was in the public right-of-way. Mr. Walvorson 
contended that it didn't used to be until the road was moved, in his opinion. Mr. 
Halvorson asked that  if he filed for validation of public right-of-way would he get his 
money back if he prevailed. Landeck said there was no guarantee that he would get his 
money back, as the frling fee was put in place to cover legal fees and research. Landeck 
said the response to said petition was outlined in Idaho Code and that the North Latah 
County Highway District would respond as required. Don Halvorson said there was pubiic 
a n d  private interest overlapping in this situation. Mr. Halvorson said that the Highway 
District had a responsibility to the public interest. hlr. Halvorson asked Ron Landeck if he 
represented the Highway District or  the commissioners. Landeck said he  represented the 
Highway District, and  he represented the commissioners as well, since they are  the elected 
representatives of the North Latah County Highway District. Landeck said he also has 
advised the commissioners on several issues in the past. Mr .  Halvorson said that  he may 
have a lack of knowledge regarding highway district issues and that may not entitle him to 
resolution, but  he felt that Ron Landeck and the highway cornrnissioners could use their 
knowledge. Mr.  Halvorson said that the validation petition was not exactly what he 
wanted, but he feels the North Latah County Highway District is abusing the statutes. 
Richard Hansen said that Mr. Halvorson's assertion that the highway district is impeding 
his interests shows a lack of sensibility on Mr. Halvorson's part. Mr. Halvorson said that  
the tree through the fence was still a big issue. Richard Hansen said rhe highway district 0;:;; 
4s 
could remove the tree if it was within the prescriptive right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson said 
tha t  the highway district did not have that right. Richard said the tree belonged to the 
landowner. Mr. Halvorson said the tree came from across the road. Dan Payne asked Mr. 
Halvorson if he saw him o r  one of his crew pushing the tree through the fence. Mr. 
Halvorson said he did not. Dan Payne said that unless Mr. Halvorson eould prove the 
highway district pushed the tree through the fence he should drop that issue. Mr. 
Hafvorson asked Landeck if that was the Highway District opinion. Landeck said that was 
Dan Payneys opinion and that until Mr.  Halvorson filed his petition for validation of public 
right-of-way he would advise the commissioners to not talk specifics. Mr. Halvorson said 
that  40-203 in  the Idaho Code provided for the commissioners to initiate validation 
proceedings on their own. Sherman Clyde said that there were other people who are  on the 
agenda and  he  asked hlr .  Halvorson to wait until the end of the meeting to finish his 
business. Mr. Halvorson said he would wait. 
Tom Lamar  came in representing the Latah Trail Foundation to follow up on  a meeting 
that  was held out a t  the Wallen Road/Latah Trail intersection. Tom said tha t  the 
Foundation, Latah County Board of Commissioners, and  representatives from the Idaho 
Transportation Department and North Latah County Highway District met out there to 
talk about a bridge across Wallen Road. Bids are going out for the bridge a n d  trail 
improvements. Tom asked if the highway district could grade and rock the road with 
gravel to make it a usable surface. Tom said that volunteers had cleared vegetation and  
brush to allow room for improvement work and would continue to do so over the next 
weekend, finishing by September 15. Tom Lamar wanted to officially request the highway 
district's assistance in making the trail usable. Tom said it might not serve all cyclists, but  
i t  .vvould help the majority of users. Tom asked if the commissioners had  any ideas, but  
that  he would like 3 inches of gravel graded and compacted. Sherman Clyde asked Tim 
Sturman his feelings on the project. Tim said some of the rail bed is i n  good shape and 
would tune u p  nice, bu t  other parts had more of a river rock base and would need 518" 
gravel to make a usable surface. Sherman Clyde asked who would pay for the  rock. T o m  
Lamar  said the Latah Trai l  Foundation would set up a n  account a t  Nor.lh Idaho Crushing 
if the highway district would donate the hauling, Dan Payne said that the Deary crew 
worked on the City of Troy's par t  of the trail. Dan said the City of Troy paid for the rock 
while NLCHD and ITD hauled it, and NLCHD graded the rock, but i t  was paved shortly 
thereafter a n d  not left for a n  extended period. Dan Payne said that with a grader  working 
on the road that  width is a n  issue. Sherman CIyde asked Tom Lamas  when they planned 
on paving the trail. Tom said they weren't sure since the bridge is the priority and they'll 
pave what they have money for, and they plan to do it in the spring. Richard Hansen asked 
about doing the rock in the spring, since the road would have to be reprocessed before 
paving anjway.  Tom said they would like to use it as much as possible in the meantime. 
Sherman Clyde thought it might be more cost effective to do aI1 the work in the spring. 
Tom Lamar  asked about putting half the rock down in the fall then doing the rest in the 
spring. Dan Payne said there would have to be quite a bit put do%n to be processed, then 
be prepared to replace about 113 of it in the spring to make sure you have a good base for 
the asphalt. Dan Paqne wondered about peeling off the marbles to get down to some 
harder  base. Tom Lamar  asked if just doing some smaU bits here arid there where 
necessary to get through the winter would be good, and would the highway district commit 
to coming back in the spring to put a finish job on the trail. Richard Nansen said that 
should be okay, and Sherman Clyde and Orland Arneberg agreed. Tom Lamar said be 
would tell Latah County Parks Director Andy Grant to coordinate with Tim Sturman on 
the work. 
Scott Becker reported on the Boulder Creek Bridge. Scott said the abutments were okay 
and  are  sunk  well into the bedrock. Scott said that right now there needs to be a structural 
analysis of the bridge. The decking is getting bad and the bridge is only rated for 50,000 
Ibs. Dan Payne said it may be time to replace the bridge or  a t  least the decking. Scott 
Becker was going to ask if there were any other options and maybe go after emergency 
funds to replace the bridge. Sherman Clyde thought this was a good opportunity to go 
after grant  money for a project. Scott Becker said most grant money for  bridges is federal 
and  would be about two to four years out. Scott said there may be other ways to make the 
bridge work, and there may be other funds to go after with fewer strings attached. Scott 
said he would have enough information for a decision by the next meeting. 
Butch LaFarge asked about how the commissioners planned on paying for the excavator, 
and  he suggested they take the sales order around to various banks to find out what kind of 
financing is out there. Butch also asked if the commissioners still planned on a new road 
grader. Butch said he would bring up a machine and a simulator for the men to have some 
time with the new setup. 
The  commissioners went into executive session at 3: 15 pm. 
The  commissioners adjourned from executive session at 3:30. 
Don Halvorson asked what he could do  to solve his situation. Ron Landeck said Mr. 
Halvorson should file a petition for validation of right-of-way. Sherman Clyde said if Mr.  
Halvorson would file it the commissioners would act on it. M[r. Halvorson said the right-of- 
way was invalid. Sherman Clyde said -Mr. Halvorson had to fde for validation of right-of- 
way. Mr. Halvorson asked why the highway district would not file for validation. Both 
Sherman Clyde and  Richard Hansen said they felt the road is where it always has been, so 
they were okay with the road's location, therefore there was no reason for them to initiate 
\ratidation proceedings. Mr. Halvorson asked how to get a contested case. Ron Landeck 
said to s ta r t  mith a validation petition. Landeck said that if Mr. Halvorson had other issues 
he should get an attorney. Mr.  Halvorson said that the validation petition would not deal 
with the trespass issues. Landeck said that hiring a lawyer would be Mr .  Malvorson's first 
step. Sherman Clyde said that both sides were just going round and round over the same 
issues and  that  Mr. Halvorson should just hire a Ianyer. 
Sherman Clyde made a motion to accept DeAtley's rock bid. Richard Hansen seconded. 
The motion passed. 
Ron Landeck said the new zoning ordinance is eausing right-of-way issues. In order to get 
a building permit, people have to show that they have access to a public road .i-ia an 
easement o r  public right-of-way, Ron said the right-of-\yay maps will go a long ways to 
solving some of these probferns, 
There was some genera1 discussion about S k y ~ i e w  Estates. The Latah County Zoning 
Commission is having a hearing on it on September 19. 
There was some talk about the tractor/mowers and how they don't work as they were 
promised, Ron Landeck wanted Dan Carscatfen to get the Info to him from the bid and he 
would see if the highway district had any recourse regarding them. 
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned at  4:20 prn 
The next meeting was scheduled for September 26,2007. 
Chairman Secretary 
The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of 
Commissioners was held a t  the Moscow office on February 8,2006 a t  1:30 pm. Present 
were Chairman Orland Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Eansen, Foremen Dan 
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan Carscallen. 
The minutes from the meeting on January 4,2006 were approved with the change of 
"Bollman" to "Bohman" on page 2. 
Richard Elansen made a motion to pay the bills as listed on the back of this page. 
Ortand Arneberg seconded. The  motion passed. 
Kyle Steele from the DEQ in Lewiston attended to discuss with the commissioners a 
Watershed Advisory Group for the South Fork of the Paiouse River. Mr. SteeIe said he 
was soliciting members for the group. The  commissioners thought Sherman Clyde 
would be the best representative from the Highway District, and thought Don Brown 
could also attend when Sherman couldn't. 
Mr.  Steele then asked about widening of Camp's Canyon road, saying he got calls from 
the University of Idaho -who was conducting a study on erosion near the road - saying 
that  there was too much erosion happening. Dan Payne assured Mr. Steele that he had 
seeded grass to the banks on the road and that should help cut down on erosion. 
Butch LaFarge came in to clear up  some miscommunications that were had between the 
Highway District and Western States Caterpillar about the Accu-Grade system. Butch 
said Weftern States was willing to absorb all costs related to the misunderstanding, 
which would amount to approximately $3000.00, Butch asked if the Sighway District 
was willing to cover any of the costs, but he said h e  would ao t  require it. Richard 
Hansen said that since blame could be shared by both sides for the misunderstanding, 
the Highway District would pay for labor costs involved in instaffing the Accu-Grade 
hardware. Orland Arneberg agreed to that plan. Butch said he would bill the Highway 
District for  the labor, not to exceed $1000.00. 
Laura Taylor aiid Scott Eecker gave a presentation to the commissioners about  their 
progress on the transportation pfan. They said the Advisory Committee would be 
meeting on March 8,2006, at  Deary High School, 
hlike McDowell came in to discuss insurance options, A meeting with the employees 
was set u p  for February 24,2006 at the I\.loscow shop a t  noon. 
Dan Payne said he'd like to get some rock crushed in the Pa rk  area. The 
commissioners told him to pursue it. 
Dan Payne also mentioned the bridge proposal for Camp's Canyon road. Richard 
Bansen told him to contact Henry from Roscoe and  see what it would cost. 
The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of 
Commissioners was heId a t  the hloscow office on March 8,2006 a t  1:30 pm. Present 
were Chairman Orland Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Bansen, Foremen Dan 
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan CarscalIen. 
The  minutes from the meeting on February 22,2006 were approved as read. 
Richard Hansen made a motion to pay the bills as they appear on the back of this page. 
OrIand Arneberg seconded, The motion passed. 
The bid opening for a weathered steel bridge on the Camp's Canyon Road took place. 
There was only one bid from Roscoe Steel. The total bid from Roscoe Steel was 
$54,000.00. Richard Hansen made a motion to accept the bid minus the abutments, 
which were $7,800.00, thereby making a total of -@6,200.00. Ortand Antebe* 
seconded. The  c 6 6 ~ s s i o n e r s  had Dan Carscallen call Henry Kallis from Roscoe Steel . 
to tell him a n d  ask about the engineered plans. Henry did not want to throw in the 
plans, but  after some negotiating, he threw in the plans and  the special bolts for  
$700.00, making the total $46,900.00. Richard Hansen made a motion to accept that 
price. Orland Arneberg seconded. The motion passed. 
There was some general discussion about road conditions and other meetings to  be 
attended by various Highway District personnel later in the evening. 
The next meeting was scheduled for April 12,2006. 
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned a t  2 4 5  pm 
Chairman Secretary 
APPLIGATfON AND PERMIT TQ USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY -- APPROACHES 
COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTlON 
. . Start Date: 
NOTICE 1 
Est. Completion Date: / This permit shall not be valid for excavation 
until. or unless. the orovision of Idaho code, 
Road Name: 
Location: 
Sight Distance: 
Title 55, Chapter & have been complied 
with. 
PRIOR TO EXCAVATION, CALL ONE 
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE 
Posted Speed: 
Other I Explain: 
ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS: 
Telephone No. 1-800-342-1 585 I 
APPROACH 
Single Residence 
Muttiple Residence No. Served 
Businss type 
Agriculture 
SPECIAL PROViSfONS: 
WIDTH SURFACE TYPE 
ESTi MATED ADT (VEHICLE COUNT) 
Must meet the requirements of North Latah County Highway District (NLCHD) 
Approach Pdlcy and 349-221, ldaho Code. 
Sett reverse side b r  General Provisions. 
I CERTlFY THAT I AM ft1E OWNER OR AUTHOREED REPRESENTATIVE Of= THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE 
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF 
THIS PERMIT. [ NAME OF PERMITTEE [ APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT I 
ADDRESS 
I I I 
SUEUECT TO ALL TERMS, CONWTIMJS, AND PROViSfONS SHUWN ON THIS FORM OR ATTACHMENTS, PERMlSSDN fS HEREBY 
GRANED TO THE A W E N A M E D  APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRIBED ABOVE. 
NORTH UTAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT USE 
SIGNATURE OWNERIAUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE 
CITY STATE ZfP 
TEklPORARY PERMIT 
Tentative appmval subject to inspection of installatiin 
DATE 
FINAL PERMIT 
Appmved Me: d j e c t e d  t] Date: 
Corrections Required: 1 
NLCHD Autkxkecf fteprenbtive ,4pFrovd by: 
N LCHD A~thomed ,Repesentatk~e 
. * . . . . 1 . p  
2. The NLCHD may change, amend or terminate this permit or any of fhe conditions herein enumerated if permittee 
fa% to cornpfy with its provisions or requirements as set forth herein. 
,3. Approaches shall be for the bona fide purpose of s w i n g  access and not for the purpose of parking, conducting 
business, or servicing vehicles on the public right-of-way. 
4. No revisions w 8dditCons shall be made to an approach or its appurtenances on the public right-of-way without 
the writfen permission of tfie NLCHD. 
5. The permiftee shall furnish all material, labor and equipment involved in the consbudion of the approach and its 
appurtenances. This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on perrnit (12 inch 
minimum) curb and gutter, concrete sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall be good 
quality and are subject to inspection and approval by the NLCHD. 
6. The NLCHD reserves the right to require the permibe, its successors and assigns, at any time, to make such 
changes, additions, repairs and r e b t i o n s  to any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way 
as may be necessary to perrnit the relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, and maintenance of the 
roadway andlor to provide proper protection to life and property on or adjacent to the roadway. 
7. Approaches shall conform to tfie plans made a part of this permit. Adequate drawings or sketches shall be 
induded showing tbe design, materials, construction requirements and proposed location of the approach. All 
approaches shall be in accordance with Exhibits 9 ahd 2 3 of the Manual for Use of Public Right of Way - 
Standard Approach Policy. 
8. During the construction of the approach(es), such barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be 
erected and maintained by the permittee, as may be deemed necessary by the NLCHD. Said devices shall conform 
to the current issue of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and stored maten'ak 
shall be as far from the traveled m y  as feasible. Items stored within 30 feet of the traveled way shai! be marked 
and protected. The NLCHD may provide barricades (when available) upon request. 
9. In accepting this permit, the permittee, its successors and assigns, agrees to hold the NLCHD harmless from any 
liability caused by the installation, construction, maintenance or operation of the approach(es). 
10. If the work done under this permit interferes in any way with the drainage of the roadway, the permittee shall 
thtidly and at  his o m  expense make such provision as the NLCHD may direct to take care of said drainage 
problem. 
? 1. Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and debris shall be immediately removed and 
the roadway and roadside shall be left neat and presentable and to the satisfaction of the NLCHD. 
12. The permittee shall maintain at his or their sok expense the structure or object for which this permit is granted 
in a condition satisfadory to the NLCHD. 
13. Neitfier the acceptance of this permit nor anytfring herein contained shalt be construed as a waiver by fAe 
permittee of any rights given it by the constitution or laws of the state of Idaho or of the United States. 
14, No work shall be started until an authorized representative of the NLCHD has given witten notice to the 
permittee to proceed, except in case of an emergency when verbal authorization may be given with a writfen pennit 
and fee required M n  five (5) working days. 
15. This permit shall be void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before 30 days 
unless  otfremisct arranged with local road foreman. 




2MM Augusl 2006 
~ ' : * U T w i : ~  r y ! w ; i I  S,"'~?w T F 2006 s October 9~ T W  T 2006 F 8  
- if;',9!YAY Gvic Holiday (C) 
r )  i 
- -- 
3 MONDAY 
---- 
.- 
12 
- _ _ -  -_----. 
5 
-- 
Evening 
- 
r n A Y  
2241t41 

The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Commissioners 
was held a t  the Moscow office on August 8,2007 a t  1:30 pm. Present were Chairman 
Orland Arneberg, Commissioners Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan 
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Tim Sturman, and Dan Carscallen. 
The minutes from July 25,2007 were approved as read. 
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed. Richard Hansen seconded. The  
motion passed. 
Sherman Clyde took a moment to introduce Charles Bond, who was elected on August 7, 
2007, as the new commissioner from the kloscow Area. 
Jay McMunn from Cantenrood Estates came in to ask the commissioners if they had made 
a decision regarding the acceptance of the road system in Canterwood Estates as a par t  of 
the Highway District system. Richard Hansen asked that if the Highway District accepted 
the roads into the system and chip sealed it, would the homeowners association reimburse 
for labor and materials for that first chip seal. Mr. McMunn said that he understood that 
to be the deal. There was some discussion about costs, especially since the commissioners 
were unsure about  whether the road was wide enough and whether the road's base would 
be sufficient. Sherman Clyde said he would rather have the homeowners pay a contractor 
to chip seal the road, since the fact contractors are available to bid the project precludes 
the highway district from doing the ~vork. Sherman Clyde was also still concerned about 
the road base, The commissioners discussed that they may not want to take on the road 
"as-is" because of width and road base concerns. Richard Hansen said he was also 
concerned about  the proximity of the pump houses to the road right-of-way. The 
commissioners said they were not ready to make a decision yet, and wanted to move on 
with the meeting, but they nould deliberate on it later. klr .  hlcklunn said he 1ooI;ed 
forward to their decision. 
Dan Carscallen showed the commissioners the contract that Ron Landeck wrote up for the 
Bernard Olson rock pit. The con~missioners aid it looked okay and said that Don Brown 
wouId take it to Bernard to get it signed. 
Don Halvorson came in to say he wanted a third party mediator to negotiate a settlement 
regarding his issues on the Camp's Canyon Road. hlr. Halvorson asked if he could taIk 
directly to the Highway District attorney. Sherman Clyde said he was not in favor of Mr .  
HaIvorson talking directly to the Highway District's attorney. Richard Hansen didn't 
know  hat hlr .  Halvorson would gain other than not having to pay his own attorney. 
Sherman CIyde said the only thing hfr. Ha l~or son  wanted was to not haye to pay a lawyer. 
Orland Arneberg said the Highway District's lawyer could not represent both sides. 
Richard Hansen asked if hlr. F-falvorson was going to hire another lawjer.  h'fr. Halvorson 
said he would represent himself. The cornmissioners said they would not Iet Mr.  Halvorson 
deal directIy ~ v i t h  the highway district attorney,'so hlr. Halvorson presented a proposal to 
settle his issues with Camp's c a n i o n  Road. Dan Carscallen &ld hlr. Hal\ orson that the 
gigirway-District's attorney would-be gone for the kliowing week, so he hoped to have an  
answer to 3Zr. Hafvorson sbrnetime before September 12, 2007. 
Tim Sturman said the New HoIlandiLand Pride tractor/mower was not living up to 
expectations. Dan Payne said he was not satisfied with Deary's setup either. The  
commissioners decided to go meet with the staff a t  St. John Hardware after the meeting. 
Scott Becker came in and thanked Sherman Clyde on behalf of Hodge and Associates for 
his time as  Commissioner. Scott also took time to congratulate Charles Bond for his 
victory in the election on the prior day. Scott said that the right-of-way map  project was 
progressing and that all the permits for the investigations of the bridge by Boulder Greek 
campground were submitted and he was awaiting an answer. Scott said he expected to be 
able to begin work in September. Dan Payne said he was worried about how they would 
get a hoe down into the creek without disturbing too much of the bank. Richard Hansen 
said that any  brush taken out could be repIaced by planting some willow branches and they 
should use the new Cat  trackhoe to prevent oil leaks into the creek. Scott aIso said that 
applications would come out in September for  investment funds, so the commissioners 
might want  to look a t  what projects to apply for. Scott said there were also some bridge 
funds available, and he would alert the commissioners to what could be done. 
The commissioners went into executive session a t  2:33 prn 
The cornmissioners adjourned from executive session at 2:48 prn 
Alan  Martinson came in to tell the commissioners that he got a grant to pay for weed 
control and  would like to share it with the highway district. Alan said he would get with 
Dan CarscaIIen on how to get the funds. 
Sherman Clyde made a motion to deny the acceptance of the Canterwood subdivision 
roads into the highway district system, citing that he had to take the entire public interest 
into account when thinking about what roads to take into the system, and  that he could not 
in good conscience take that road into the system when there were so many questions 
regarding road width and the road's base. Richard Hansen seconded. The  motion passed. 
There was some discussion about getting bids for road graders. The  commissioners were 
each given a list of specifications so they could decide what to have listed in the specs for a 
road grader  bid. 
Sherman Clyde said he was not satisfied vrith the way things were looking on Cameron 
Road. Sherman said the road should be ~.ridened another 100 feet north. 
Being no fur ther  business, the meeting adjourned at 3:10 pm 
The next meeting was scheduled for August 22,2007. 
Chairman Secretary 
The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of 
Commissioners was held a t  the Moscow office on January 4,2006 at 1:30 pm. Present 
were Chairman Orfand Ameberg, Commissioner Sherman Clyde, Foremen Dan 
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan CarscalIen. 
The minutes of the regular meeting on December 14,2005 were approved. - 
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed on the back of this page. 
OrIand Arneberg seconded. The motion passed. 
The commissioners opened rock bids. They were as follows: 
Bidder: DeAtley Crushing 
Pit tonnage material priwAon extension 
Hunt 
Jensen 
Potlatch, 
25000 518" - $4.20 $1 05,000.00 
2000 1 112" - $3.95 $7,900.00 
2000 1/2 chips $5.00 $10,000.00 
30000 5/8" - $4.15 $124,500.00 
10000 3" - $3.95 $39,500.00 
10000 1/2 chips $5.00 $50,000.00 
2000 anti-skid $5.50 $1 1,000.00 
30000 314" - $4.10 $123,000.00 
4000 1 114" - $3.90 $1 5,600.00 
1000 6" - $3.65 $3,650.00 
2000 112 chips $4.90 $9,800.00 
grand total $499,950.00 
Bidder: North Idaho Crushing 
Pit tonnage material priceiton 
H ~ j n i  25000 3 8 "  - $3.34 
2000 1 112" - $3.34 
2000 112 chips $3.34 
Jensen 
Potlatch 
30000 518" - $3.34 
70000 3" - $3.34 
10000 112 chips $3.34 
2000 anti-skid $3.34 
grand total 
extension 
$83,500.00 
$6,S80.00 
$6,680.00 
V 
Sherman Clyde made a motion to accept the fow bid from North Idaho Crushing for 
the Deary, hloscow, and Potiatch area;. Orland Arneherg seconded. The notion !/ 
passed. 
Ron Landeck presented the petition brought by Grec Mann and Pam Ailliardfor-- 
~ h $ d  
- 
validation of public right-of-way. Ran pIaced into record the petition for validation, <if5! 
the notice of hearing published in the Daily News and delivered to abutting 
landowners, and road packet information from Latah County showing the opening 
and recording of Road #480 which took place in 1905 and 1906, showing the 
achowledgement of that being a public road. 
Orland Arneberg asked those in support of the petition to speak 
Greg Mann mentioned that there was no record of the road ever being 
formaIly abandoned. 
Pam Hilliard said she has lived there for almost SO years and it has always 
been a public access road. Ms. Hilliard also said she was not looking for maintenance, 
just continued public access 
Harold Ott said that when he bought the property to the North of the road he 
was told it was a public road and that it was the southern edge of his property. R e  
told the same thing to the peopIe he sofd the property to. Mr. Ott  supported 
vaiidation. 
Myron Emerson from Bennett Lumber Company said that Bennetts have been 
using that road for access for over 32 years and support validation. 
Gene Riggs said he has used t h e  road for over 30 years for recreational 
purposes and has always thought of i t  as public access. Mr. Riggs supported 
Validation. 
Maw S a g e r  said he has always ridden horses there and would like to see it 
remain a public access. 
Harriet Akin wanted to address issues other than recreation. Ms. Akin said 
that the road was needed for fire access, since it is the only way to get into and across 
the canyon. Ms. Akin said local ranchers also retrieved their cattle using that road. 
John Bohman, rural captain for the Troy Volunteer Fire Department, said that 
road is B crscfa! fire access to the canyon lands. 
Gary Osborn also said that road was the only fire access to the canyon, and 
that he has been using the road for 45 years. Be also said that he would think that at! 
property owners would be in favor of keeping that public access for fire protection. 
Kenny Cadson, Troy Rural Fire Commissioner, said the road should stay 
public access to protect the public from fires in the canyon. 
Ron Landeck asked what kind of historical uses there were. He was told 
matorcycle, ATV, horseback riding and hunting were the  main uses. Ron was told 
that use has lessened in the past few years, and a lot of that  had to do with certain 
property owners voicing their opposition to access. Dan Pagne said most activity is 
during huntiag scason. 
Orland Ameberg then asked if there was any opposition to the petition. 
Mark Moorer, on behalf of Shawn and Michelle Oneil, showed the 
commissioners photographs of the road and said it wss too much in: disrepair to allow 
the public to access it. Mr. Moorer aIso showed the Commissioners a survey of the 
road done by Melvin Taggart. The survey showed the existing road versus the 
unrecorded deed that he found at the courthouse, Mr. Moorer said the existing road 
did not exactly match the deed. Mr. Moorer said the Oneits owned the property to 
the North of the road, as  they were told this when they bought it from the Otts. Mr. 
Moorer said that Mann and Ott  were the ones who put up the gate and no trespassing 
signs up on the road. Mr. Moorer said the photographs showed the Iack of 
maintenance and deterioration of the road, Mr. Moorer also said the road may 
qualify as a "404 waterway" and be subject to federal reguIations. He said the 
R i l i a r d m a n n  group had been logging down there in prior years and used another 
road for hauling the lags out across their own property. ~ r - h f o o r e t  said the OneiIs 
purpose in opposing the road validation was not to keep hunters and others from 
accessing the public lands, not to keep Iandowners from accessing their lands. They 
just fee1 this road in unnecessary since a11 Iandowners had road access to other roads 
in the area. H e  also said there haven't been any fire trucks in there for some time, a t  
Ieast not in the last two years. Mr. Moorer wanted the commissioners to be sure they 
took into account what kind of public road this would end up being, what kind of 
improvements they would be making, and what kind of cost to the public validation 
would entail. Ee said this road really only appeared to conrteet two other public 
roads. Mr. Moorer said it appeared the only legitimate purpose for validation was to 
allow a cheap logging road for the petitioners. He also wanted to know why the road 
was gated, and why the no trespassing signs were put up by Mann and OtL 
Shawn Oneil wanted to cIarify that while Mann and Ott put u p  the gate, Mr. 
Oneil put up  the "No Trespassing" signs. Ron Landeck asked Mr. Oneil how long he 
had owned the property, and hfr. Oneil said 4 years. 
Orfarid Arneberg asked if there was any rebuttal. 
Greg Rlann said the gate was put up  by himself and hlr. Ott  to discourage 
access by kids looking for a place to get drunk and start fires, but it ivss never locked 
or signed, and they never ran anyone off the road. Mr. Mznn said that roads don't 
stay improved when there is no logging going on, He also said that just because there 
hasn't been a fire truck down there doesn't mean there haven't been any fires. Mr. 
,Mann said the condition of the road was due to heavy snowfa11 and rain and floods in 
the Iate 90's after the  last logging job was done using that road. B e  said the reason 
lags were took off through a CRP field is because the ground was frozen and it %--as 
easiest. Mr. Mann said the road is on a good rock base and was in good shape before 
the floods and could be brought back into shape easily. 
Ron Landeck asked Greg Mann if he had ever been denied access. hls. 
Eilliard said she talked to Mr. Oneil in mid-November and totd him they planned on 
doing some logging in that area, and hlr. Oneil said he had a problem with them using 
that road. She said there were other neighbors who have told her they were denied 
access. Ron asked when the "No Trespassing" signs showed tip. Mr. Mann said they 
showed up  in 2003, 1Mr. Mann said he was told by Mr. Payne and  iMr, Kirkland that 
iMr. Oneil had told them they could no longer go through on that road because of 
reforestation. 
Harold Ott  said his family was told they could no longer access the canyon via 
that road. Mr. Ott  said his wife was riding her horse on Bennett land and Mr. Oneil 
grabbed the reins of the horse and  ordered her out of there. Mr. Ott  said that the 
Oneils' claim that they don't care if the public is still allowed access via that road is 
totally untrue. 
Kevin Sandquist said his father was doing some fogging in June  2005 and got 
permission from Mann and Billiard to go across their land to the road in question. 
Mr. Sandquist then talked to Mr. Oneil about opening u p  the road to get the logs out 
since it made better sense. Mr. Oneil told Mr. Sandquist that he would stop Mr. 
Sandquist. Mr. Sandquist asked permission to go across private land and increase the 
length of haul and the expense of logging io general so he would not have to enter into 
what  he perceived would be a costly legal battle. Kevin Sandquist felt this was a case 
of access being denied. Mr. Sandquist asked Mr. Oneil if he had anything to add 
since it was only he and Sandquist's father, Mr. Oneil said he did not have anything to 
add. 
Greg Mann said that every togging project he has done on his property has 
been approved by the Idaho Department of Lands. He said if there had been 
violations the IDL would have corrected them. 
Harriet  Akin said she was denied access by Mrs. Oneil when she and her 
daughter were riding horses on that  road. She also asked why the condition of the 
road was an issue since the only issue was right-of-way, not road maintenance. 
Gene Riggs asked about the other road that goes down into the canyon, a n d  
there was clarification that it was across private ground, and the road petitioned for 
validation is the only pubfic right-of-&ay in the area. 
Greg Mann showed a copy of the corrected warranty deed between the Otts 
and Oneils that showed that the property line was the "county road", so it was 
understood a t  the time that the road was public right-of-way. 
Orland Arneberg closed the public hearing a t  2:25 prn. Ron Landeck explained that 
there was goirrg to be firrdings of fact and csnc!usions. As a pofr?t of c!ariEcrrtiaa, Ren 
explained the difference between "public highway" and "public right-of-way". Ron 
then said that based on testimony, the  commissioners needed to decide whether 
validation of the public right-of-way was in the public interest. 
Sherman Clyde said it looked like the road has been used by the public and  it 
was in the pnbIic interest to validate it as pubfic right-of-way based on testimony he'd 
heard- Orland Arneberg agreed tha t  testimony favored validation. There was some 
discussion about the original deed versus the survey of the existing road. Sherman 
Clyde made a motion to validate this section of road as pubfic right-of-way, using 
Taggart's survey of the existing roadway as the legal definition of the right-of-way. 
Orland Arneberg seconded. The motion passed. Ron Landeck said he would 
generate the findings of fact 2nd conclusions of law and have those avnilahle by the 
meeting on February 8,2006: 
Karen Stubbs came in to discuss Cameron Road. Ms. Stubbs was asking for the 
Highway District's preferences with that road. Sherman CIyde said he would like 
Camerons to deed right-of-way on that section of road so there would be room to put  
snow if there was ever a need. The commissioners asked Ron Landeck to write 
something up clarifying what the Highway District wants. 
Ron Landeck said he and Chairman Arneberg met with Taggart's attorney and  had 
a n  offer of settlement. Sherman Clyde said he was uncomfortable making a decision 
without Potlatch Commissioner Richard Hansen present to know what is going on. in 
his area. 
The next meeting was scheduled for February 8,2006. 
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned a t  4 0 0  pm 
Chairman Secretary 
Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537 
(208) 289-5602 
Plaintiff, Pro se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband 2nd Wife)) 
Plaintiffs ) 
VS. 1 
North Latah County Highway District; Eoard o i  ) 
Commissioners for the North Latah County ) 
Highway District, Qrland Arneberg, Rickird ) 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in rheir Official ) 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; 1 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 
lndividual Capacity ) 
Defendants \ 1 
Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUhllMARY 
JUDGMEN7/ADJUDICATION 
OF THE ISSUE OF THE 
CAUSE FOR ACTION UNDER 
42 U. S. C. 1983 
Under lRCP liul-2 56 and purs~tant o "2 U. S. C 1953, and for the reasons set forth in the 
attached Memorand~im, ?laintiffs hcre5y Kosi= this Covrt for an order granting of partial 
summary judgment. As set forth nore full:; irr the acco;~panying h4einorandumn of Law, at the 
present state of extensive discovery in this ma,tter and fcir this Motion, rhere is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact. rZll of the reiol-J evideilce cor~fillns that Plaintiffi have requisite elements 
for sustaining an action under 42 U. S, C. 1983, and that Defendants, acting under the color of 
PLANTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTI,-11; SU3,lhl;IRY JUDCMENTIADJUDtCi4TION OF 
THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSE Ft3R ;?._t:TI.3?: UNDER 32 U. S .  C. 1983 
1 
law, are liable under said statute for the alleged deprivationis of Plaintiffs' property rights, liberty 
rights, and right to be free fi-om the alleged seizure of their property by Defendants ~vliether for 
public use or private use. In the alternative Plaintiffs have requisite elements for sustaining an 
action under 42 U. S. C. 1983, and that Defendants, acting under the color of law, are liable 
under said statute for tlie alleged improper interference by Defendants with Plaintiffs' property 
rights. 
This motion is based on the records and file herein, the supporting memorandum 
submitted herewith, Plaintiff's concise statement of material facts, and Plaintiffs affidavit and 
exhibits. 
As a rnatter of law, Plaintiffs bring forth this Motion for granting of cause of action under 
42 U. S. C. 1983 against Defendants or alternatively entry of liability of Defendants to Plaintiffs 
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 1983. Plaintiffs are entitled to this partial summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Oral argument requested. 
DATED this 2 1 st day of October, 2008. 
Don Halvorson, plaintiff pro se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte ~alvorson (Husband and Wife)) 
Plaintiffs 
VS . ) 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) 
Commissioners for the North Latah County ) 
Highway District, Orland Arne berg, Richard ) 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official ) 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 
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Defendants 1 
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PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION 
OF THE ISSUE OF THE 
CAUSE FOR ACTION UNDER 
42 U. S. C. 1983 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 3, 2008 Plaintiffs brought action to redress alleged deprivations effected by 
Defendants, acting under the color of law, of rights secured to Plaintiffs by the Idaho State 
Constitutio~i and statutes and the laws and Constitutioil of the United States. Plaintiffs brought 
these actio~is against the Defendants for declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief, damages, and attorney fees and costs under Idaho and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
PLAINTIFFS' M E M O M N D M  IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' hlOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUhlMARY JUDGhfENTIADJUDIC12TION OF THE ISS'C'E OF THE CAUSE FOR ACTION 
LINGER 32 U. S. C. 1983 1 L > o  
Idaho statutes, Idaho and Federal Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. $ 5  1983, 1985, and 1988 for the 
improper and unconstitutional infringement of their property rights and in the alternative for 
negligence, negligence per se, inverse condemnation, trespass, nuisance, amongst others. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1.  The NLCHD has the authority to widen, straighten, and change roads/highways/rights of 
way. See I.C. $$ 40-605,40-13 10, amongst others. 
2. The NLCHD has the authority to issue and revoke driveway access permits. See I.C. $5 
40-604, 40-1 3 10, amongst others. 
3. The NLCHD has the authority to survey, record changes in roads/highways/rights of 
way, and convey. see I.C.59 40-604,40-605,40-608,40-6 10,40-13 l0,40-1336,40-2302. 
4. The NLCHD has the authority to hold public meetings and hearings and to keep records, 
including verbatim transcripts of, of meetings and hearings. See I.C. Title 40. 
5. Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected property interest (right, entitlement) in the fee 
simple title to their land located in SENE Section 15 T39NR3 WBM and as their lands underlie 
and abut and adjoin to Camps Canyon Road. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as the basis 
for their property right, a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as instrument #4244 1 1 dated 
12/9/1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the real property, situated in the State of 
Idaho, County of Latah as described in said instgurnent, including that land ~ ~ h i c h  underlies 
Camps Canyon Road as described in said deed. (See Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary .Tudgment/Adjudication Of The Issue To Grant Plaintiffs 
Cause For Action Under 42 U. S. C. 1983 (PA) at 7.) 
6. Plaintiffs property rights, liberty rights, right to be free of improper seizure of their land 
(permanently or temporally, for public or not for public use), and right to redress for grievances 
against a government agency without being subject to retaliation for seeking to protect their 
th th property rights are protected by and found in the 1 St, 3 , 5 and 1 4th Amendments to the U. S. 
Constitution and Article I: $1, $2, $3, $ 13, $14 and $17 of the Idaho State Constitution. 
PLAINTIFFS' h'lEMORhXDUhI P\I SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION FOR PARTIAL 
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7. In 1996 the NLCHD straightened, widened, and altered Camps Canyon Road in the 
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. (See Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Requests For Admissions and 
Defendants Responses (PIRADR) at I., 2.) 
8. In the late fall of 2005, the NLCHD once again began to widen Camps Canyon Road in 
the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. (See PIRADR at 2.) 
9. In the spring of 2006 the NLCHD issued the Wagners a driveway access permit, 
Plaintiffs allege ivas trespassing of their property. (See PIRADR at 3 .) 
10. Plaintiffs first noted the construction of the first Wagner driveway access on or about 
4/08/06. (See PA, at 8.) 
1 1. On 411 0106 Plaintiffs called NLCHD district foreman Payne and notified him that the 
first Wagner driveway access, on Plaintiffs' information and belief, was on Plaintiffs property. 
(See PA at 9). 
12. On 4/12/06 Plaintiff, Don Halvorson, attended NLCHD regular Commissioners' 
meeting and complained to commissioners that on his information and belief that the permit for 
the Wagner driveway access was issued for access across Plaintiffs' property. Don Halvorson 
also coinplained about the late fall 3005 extensioii of width to Camps Canyon Road and the 
injury to his fence allegedly due to the pushing of a wind fallen tree through the fence by the 
grader operator. Defendants stated all matters were within their 50 foot/25 feet from centerline 
prescriptive right of way. Plaintiff reminded Commissioners that the NLCHD had altered Camps 
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996 and that on his information and belief 
there no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel and even 
if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no extension of the right of way 
(prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline encumbering Plaintiffs' property greater 
than die width of Camps Canyon Road and its supporting structures. (See PA at 10; see Exhibit # 
2 at page 1; see PIRADR at 14, 10, 11, 12, and 13.) 
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13. Plaintiffs requested a survey of the pertinent area by Rimrock Consultants. On 
information and belief after the stakes were set for the survey the Wagners obtained a second 
driveway access permit. (See PIRADR at 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19.) 
14. In the summer and fall of 2006 Defendants once again commenced widening of Camps 
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 311- acre parcel and in doing so Plaintiffs allege Defendants 
have encroached on and done damage to Plaintiffs' fence and have physically invaded and 
continue to occupy Plaintiffs land. ((See PIRADR at 2; See Complaint) 
15. On several occasions, Plaintiffs have mitten letters to Defendants and have attended 
several meetings of the commissioners of the NLCHD, in which they have sought action on tlie 
iss-~les of the location, width, -use, character, and the clarification of their legal rights under tlie 
Camps Canyon right of way. ((See PIRADR at 4, 5, 6, 15 subpart j.; See Complaint; See Exhibit 
% 2.) 
16. There have been no hearings afforded Plaintiffs at any time and the Defendants have 
offered no final decision 011 any and all matters. No hearing in any or in all matters of trespass, 
nuisance, inverse condemnation, property damage, deprivations of rights has been afforded 
Plaintiffs. See Court transcript Plaintiffs' Motions for declaratory judgments under I. C. $Ij 40- 
203a and 67-8003 (3) (Defendants' defense to hlotion for Declaratory Judgment Under I. C. Ij 
67-8003 (3) "No final decision"). See Exhibit ff 2 at page 6, (LMinutes of the 9/12/07 meeting of 
the NLCHD Commissioners), "Ron Landeck said that no proceeding has been in front of the 
con~missioners to have them make a ruling." (See also PIRADR at S.) 
17. On their information and belief Plaintiffs continue to complain that Defendants on a 
routine basis of maintenance impact their fence and land on a continued and inevitable basis. It 
is not if Defendants ~vill again widen the road but rather that with each grading of Cainps 
Canyon Road in the vicinit~~ of the 3+/- acre parcel Defendants take more land and further impact 
on and threaten Plaintiffs' fence. (I. C. Title 40 gives Defendants authority to grade and 
jurisdiction over Camps Canyon Road.) 
PL-4INTIFFS' MEMORA4NDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMhf4-1RY JUDGLMENT/ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSE FOR ACTION 
18. On September 12,2007 Defendants told Plai~ltiffs that they would not consider 
Plaintiffs allegatio~is of property right violations unless Plaintiffs paid a $750 fee and if they 
would not do so Plaintiffs needed to get a lawyer. (See Exhibit # 2 at page 8.) 
19. Defendants in any manner or at any time in the process of altering Camps Canyon Road, 
in the coliductioli of any meeting of the Commissio~lers of the NLCWD or in issuing driveway 
access permits to the Wagners do not deny or bring forth any other manner of operation other 
than in their capacities as employees or commissioners of the NLCHD, that is they were 
actinglfailing to act under the color of law. 
20. Exhibit # 2 minutes from NLCHL) Commissioner's meetines; 
A, Exhibit # 2 page 2-3 "Richard Elansen explained that technically the fence 
encroached on the right of way. " In light of history of changes in Camps Canyon Road 
dispute requires a predeprivation hearing. 
B. Exhibit #2 paEe 3 "Richard Hamen said the property line issues have 
nothing to do with the highway district. " Deliberate indifference to the deprivations. 
C. Exhibit #2 page 6 "Sherman Cljjde said that the fence that the tree fell on 
Hras in the public right of way. " In light of l~istory of changes in Camps Canyon Road 
dispute requires a predeprivation hearing. 
D. Exhibit # 2 page 8 "Sherman C l ~ d e  and Richard Hansen said theyfelt tlze 
road is where it has always has been, so they were okay with the road's locatiorz, 
therefore there was no r*easonfor them to ir~itiate validation proceedings. " In light of 
history of changes in Camps Canyon Road doubt and dispute requires a predeprivation 
hearing. Determination of the accurate location, valid establishment of, and!or lack of 
agreement with the public record are objective, not based on the subjective feelings of the 
Commissioners. 
E. Exhibit ff 2 page 20 "i2rlr. Halvorson asked $'he could talk directly to the 
Highway Distf-ict attorizey. She~man Clyde said he was not in favor of Mr. Halvorsorz 
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talking directly to the Highway District attorney. Richard Hansen didn't know what 
ikhar. Halvorson would gain other than not having to pay his own attorney. Sherman 
Clyde said the only thing Mr. Halvorson wanted was to not have to pay a lawyer. Orland 
Arneberg said the Hingway District S layyer could not represent both sides. Richard 
Narzsen asked ifMr. Halvorson was going to hire a lawyer. Mr. Halvorson said he 
would represent hirnselJ: The commissioners said they would not let Mr. Halvorson deal 
directly with the highway district attorney ... " 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
Summary judgment can only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and, 
as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 758 P.2d 406 (Ct.App. 
1987), rev. denied (1 988). 
No Due Process (substantive and/or proceduraf) 
It is with Defendants refusal to deal fairly, equitably and/or constitutionally with Plaintiffs 
that they now appear in this Court, and for relief in these matters now seek partial summary 
judgment. As Defendants' counsel candidly admits, there has been no hearing before the 
Comissioners. No final decision has ever been forth coming to Plaintiffs in any m d  all 
matters. 
Defendants' policies/custorns/standard operating procedures hal'e not afforded 
Pfaintiffs adequate due process-Elements of a 1983 Claim 
42 U. S. C. 1983 reads, '"very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
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o~nission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this 
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Colu~nbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia." 
Persons: Defendants in their official capacities. "Local governing bodies (and local officials 
sued in their official capacities) can, therefore, be sued directly under 5 1983 for monetary, 
declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations where, as here, the action that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision 
officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent 
official policy. In addition, local governments, like every other § 1983 "person," may be sued for 
constitutioiial deprivations visited pursuant to govermnental "custom" even though such custom 
has not received formal approval through the government's official decisionmaking chantiels." 
Monell v. Department ofSoc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
Persons: Defendants in their individual capacities. "State officers may be held personally 
liable for damages under 1983 based upon actions taken in their official capacities." Hafr v. 
itilelo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) 
Under the color of state statute. There has been no inferelice for any party to the contrary 
that Defendants were not acting under the law while altering Camps Canjron Road, issuing the 
IVagners driveway access pennits or holding or failing to hold meetiiigs/hearings. 
Subjects orA causes to be subjected to A local government is said to have an unconstitutional 
policy wlien it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate 
indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the 
employee making a wrong decision. See City of Canton 11. Harris, 489 U.S. 3 78 (1 989) Gold v. 
City oflZ/iriar??i, 1998 14% 54803 (I  1th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town qflake Barnilton, 117 F.3d 488 
(1 lth. Cir. 1997) (When proper course of action "is obvious to all without training or 
supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not 'so likely' to produce a wrong 
decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to 
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train or supervise." At 490.) Unconstitutional policies may also exist if an isolated action of a 
government employee is dictated by a "final policymaker" (See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 
475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 337 (1997). An uncollstitutional 
policy/custom may be present if the authorized policylnaker approves a subordinate's decision 
and the basis for it. (See City of St. Louis v. Pi~aprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). All matters 
alleged by Plaintiffs are the result of the policy makers' authority and approval. The alleged 
matters of deprivation to Plaintiffs' property are the result of the carrying out of the policy 
makers policies and not the "unauthorized" activity of a tort feasor for an employee. (See 
PlRADR at 10, 1 1, 12, and 13 .) 
NOTE The Supreme Coui-t has rejected the notion that a plaintiff must meet a heightened 
pleading standard to state a claim against a murlicipality for an ullconstitutional custom or policy. 
(See Leatlzer~zan v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1 993)). 
Deprivation of rights In order to state a claim for a deprivation of Due Process, a plaintiff 
must show: (1) that he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest; (see Board of 
Regents ofstate Colleges v. Rotlz, 408 U.S. 564, (1972); Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudernzill, 
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)), and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without due process of 
law (see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)). Plaintiffs' fee simple 
title affords a collstitutional property right. 
Defendants admit that no hearing and/or final decisio~i has been afforded Plaintiffs in their 
possible/plausible claim to the lands underlying and abutting to Camps Caiiyoli Road in the 
vicinity of the 341- acre parcel. No valid explanation has been given to Plaintiffs for the 
location, width, use, and/or character of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road subsequent to 
the alteration in the precedent conditions of the right of way in 1996, and for that matter the 
widening of 2005 and 2006. No notice or hearing has been provide Plaintiffs to request rhem to 
rem0.i-e their fence. Such action, as notice and hearing to abate an encroaclme~~t, could result in 
a judicial review-an action the Defendants urant to avoid. 
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Due process requires that "a deprivation of life, liberty, or property" be preceded by notice 
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (see Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. 
Louderrnill, 470 U.S. at 542; Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981); Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palnzer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). 
If Defendants can feasibly provide a pre-deprivation hearing, it must do so regardless of the 
post-deprivation remedies available. See Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 1 13 starting at 124, 
Zirnmerman. v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9th Circuit, 2001), L o p  v. Zinzrnerman Brush 
Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982)(availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when 
deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not 
"unauthorized"). Any and all actions and/or failures to act under the color of law could feasibly 
be preceded by notice and hearing. Altering a road is a discretionary activity, there are no 
exigent circumstances. Defendants have not brought forth any reason for infeasibility of 
predeprivation notice and hearing. The 4/12/06 meeting was attended by all necessary parties 
and was afforded time on the agenda. The only thing preventing a hearing was the Dcfendants 
not wanting it to be recorded. (See PIRADR at 14.) 
In the absence of any hearing and/or final decision in any and all matters as so complained 
and alleged in Plaintiffs' Con~plaint, Defendants' standard operating procedures/policies/customs 
are facially invalid and/or invalid as applied, for it is not that Plaintiffs have not tried to elicit 
action and resolution to the matters, and it is quite evident that the actionsifailures to act which 
Plaintiffs complain of have effected alleged depril-ations of Plaintiffs' property rights are 
authorized NLCHD activities. The standard operating procedures/policies/customs brought forth 
by Defendants under the broad authority delegated to the Defendants by the Idaho State 
Legislature to widen, straighten, change, and or alter rights of way/roadslhighways, to issue 
and/or revoke driveway access permits, to determine and/or deal with encroachments to rights of 
way/roads/highways, to maintain valid rights of ways/roads/highways in view of doubts of the 
legal establishment, in view- of the numerous alterations to rigfits of ways!roadskigh~vays and in 
view of the in congruencies of public record with the Location of rights of wayslroadsjhighm~ays, 
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and amongst other standard operating procedures/policies/customs are uncircumscribed with 
statutorily provided safeguards and/or remedies for erroneous deprivations. See Zinerrnon v. 
Bzkrch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124, Zitnnzerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9th Circuit, 
200 I), Logan v. Zimrnerrnan Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-43 6 (1982)(availability of 
postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process 
was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). (See PIWDR at 20, 10, 11, 12, 13 .) 
No dispute exists as to the alteration in the original prescriptive right of way. Defendants 
bring forth no objective data to support the original official establishment of Camps Canyon 
Road, or its reestablishment after the alterations in 1996,2005, or 2006. (see PIRADR at 1. and 
2.1 
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have the authority to 
widen, straighten, and/or alter Camps Canyon Road. 
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have the authority to 
issue and revoke driveway access permits. 
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have not begun to alter 
Camps Canyoil Road, in the vicinity of the alterations, anew after 2005 and beyond. (see 
PIRADR at 2.) 
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have issued the 
Wagners driveway access permits in the vicinity of the alterations to Camps Canyon Road. 
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have provided no due 
process and/or equal treatment under the law (Defendants bring forth no rational basis of a 
legitimate government interest not to) 
Technically the Defendants could follow their standard operating procedure for widening a 
prescriptive right of way and never see the light of a hearing room and move Camps Canyon 
Road across the entirety of SENE Section 15, annihilate anything in their path and destroy all of 
evidence of precedent conditions in the process as long as tJlere is no final decision to be 
evaluated by a judicial review 
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In addition to protection against these deprivations of procedural due process of invalid 
policies which do not afford Plaintiffs any hearing on any matter, the Due Process Clause has 
two substantive components--the substantive due process simpliciter, and incorporated 
substantive due process. 
Plaintiffs may state a claim for a violation of the substantive due process simpliciter if the 
defendant engaged in conduct that was "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional 
sense." See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 1 15, 128 (1 992); County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 
It is clear now that this applies to land cases and to Plaintiffs in the present case now also. 
"Conversely, if a government action is found to be iinpermissible for instance because it fails to 
meet the public use requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process that is the end of the 
inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action." Lingle v. Chevron, U.S. A. Inc. 
(04-163), 544 U.S. 528, 363 F.3d 846, (2005). (See also Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun 
Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
Adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim. On 
these grounds then Plaintiffs have due process rights of a predeprivation hearing-a simple 
notification of the intentions of the NLGHD to alter the right of way of Camps Canyon Road, 
and or when all parties were present and time was available on the meeting agenda at the 4/12/06 
meeting necessary to discuss and receive a rationally based decision on a legitimate government 
interest to lawfullly issue a driveway access pernlit. (See San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. Sari 
Diego, 450 U. S. 621,656, n. 23 (1981)(Brennan J., dissenting)(when property is taken by the 
government but not in furtherance of a "public use," "the government entity inay not be forced to 
pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, [but] the lando'ix,~ler may nevertheless have a 
damages cause of action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
violation."). 
In acknowledging the absence of statutory provided remedies for erroneous deprivations 
andlor post deprivation hearing, Plaintiffs do not ackbowledge such post deprivation remedies 
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are adequate, rather in the alternative to the undisputed denial of predeprivation notice and 
hearing, Plaintiffs are saying Defendants policies, customs, and procedures also deny any 
exhaustion of agency remedies, judicial review, and/or tort claiin remedies. Trespass, nuisance, 
and/or inverse condemnation are not covered by the ITCA and such causes for action, post 
deprivation tort claim, are not deemed adequate (see Parratt v. Taylor, as compared to 
"unauthorized" actions not found in Zinernzon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124) 451 U. S. 
527 (198 I), by the arbitrariness and capriciousness of Defendants actions/failures to act and 
abuse of Defendants discretionary powers. See also Lir-zgle v. Chevron USA Inc. (04-1 63) 544 
U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F. 3d 846 and Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City ofSun Valley, 506 
F.3d 851 (gth Circuit 2007). 
shall be liable . . . in an action a t  law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceedingfor redress 
This Court has jurisdiction, (see-Elbwlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)) and Plaintiffs are not 
required to exhaust all administrative and judicial state remedies as a prerequisite to a section 
1983 action (see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1 96l)(exlnaustion of judicial remedies is 
not a prerequisite)). Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section 
1983 action (see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1930)). Further, tort claim notice 
requirement prior to initiating suit does not apply (see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have adequately filled the requisites of a 42 U.S. C. 1983 claim. 
Plaintiffs have an ei~titlement/propei-ty riglit (the ownership and peaceful enjoyment of 
their land) given them under the statutes and Federal Constitution ( 5 ~  Amendmei~t including 
substantive and procedural due process and equal treatment under the law) as well as under the 
statutes and Constitution of the State of Idaho (Article I $5 13 &I.?.). 
Plaintiffs have a right to be free of retaliatory pieceinleal intrusions, invasions and 
occupations of their land and continued damages to their fence ( 5 ~  Amendment including 
substantive and procedural due process and equal treatment under the law). 
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Plaintiffs have a right to be free of the Defendants' abridgement of Plaintiffs right to 
petition for the redress of grievances (lSt Amendment of Federal Constitution). (This 
abridgement is, just as prosecutions are, "wrenching disruption[s] of everyday life." Young v. 
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 48 1 U.  S. 787, 8 14 (1 987). "Every prosecution, like every 
arrest, "is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free 
on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his 
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his 
friends." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,320 (1971).) 
Plaintiffs have a right to be free of the improper seizure of their property, whether for non 
public or public use (4"' Amendment to the Federal Constitution). 
In the alternative, Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected property right which 
demands only the proper interference of due process (substantive and procedural) and equal 
treatment under the law (5ti1 -4mendrnent to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article I $5 13 and 
14 of the Idaho State Constitution). After which just compensation may be deemed as 
appropriate. 
Further, in the in the absence of either predeprivation or post deprivation hearing or 
possible statutory remedial action (see Exhibit $2 starting at page 5 for Plaintiffs inquiries of 
Defendants counsel on matters of I. C. $ 40-203a and IRTA), Defendants fail to act (officially 
and/or fail to train employees in deprivation effecting actions andlfailures to act) in deliberate 
indifference to obvious alleged and continued complaints by Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have rights, as so enumerated above and specifically alleged to be deprived of, 
under the color of law: (1) Right to Due Process (substantive and procedural), (2) Right to be 
free of abusive governmental actions a id  failures of government to act, in deliberate 
indiffsrence to obvious and continued violations, (3) Right to be free of retaliations for 
expression of Plaintiffs' property rights (including damages to their fence and fmher piecemeal 
ilitrusions on their land), (3)  Right to notice and hearing for any and all expressions of the 
authority of Defendants to act as to enforce and/or effect deprivations of Plaintiffs' property and 
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or rights, status, or immunities through application of general laws, ordinances, policies, 
customs, and/or standard operating procedures to Plaintiffs or to their specific situation and/or 
land, (5 )  Right to the redress of grievances brought forth by the improper interference with 
Plaintiffs' property rights and elitra~ice to judicial review of that improper interference, (6) Right 
to be free of seizure of Plaintiffs' land or the improper interference with Plailitiffs' property 
rights whether it be for public use or not for public use (whether or not such 11011 public use be 
afforded to a friend, neighbor aidlor relative of any NLCHD Commissiolier andlor foreman), 
and (7) Right to Equal Treatment Under the Law in tlie application of any asid all statutes, laws, 
ordina~ices, policies, custosns and/or standard operating procedures or to be given a rational basis 
of a legitimate government isiterest for not affording Plaintiffs any such equal treatment. 
These rights are covered and protected by and extended to the State of Idaho and its local 
government agencies through the 1 4th ~~lnendrnelit of the Federal Constitution. Plaintiffs cannot 
be deprived of these aforesnentiolied rights without due process and equal treatment under the 
law and Plaintiffs may be afforded at the minimum such siomizial damages, declaratory and 
iiijunctive relief as this Court so deems appropriate. This snotiosi seeks only the granting of 
cause of action under 42 U.S. C. 1983, damages to be determined at trial. 
It is ~iow, as a matter of law, then that Plaintiffs petition this Court to declare their rights, 
status, immunities, and/or privileges under 42 U. S. C. 1983 and such Federal and State of Idaho 
statutes and Constitutions as aforementioned a i d  with notice request Defendants to show cause 
why tlie full effect and force of 42 U. S. C. 1983 and such Federal and State of Idaho statutes 
and Constitutio~is as aforementioiled should not be afforded Plaintiffs in any or all 
aforementiolied actslfailures to act and/or to bring forth rational basis of a legitimate govemrnei~t 
interest for not affording Plaintiffs equal treatment under the law as all similarly situated abutting 
underlying property owners and to show cause why further actionlrelief should not be so granted 
to Plaintiffs. (See Bivens v. Six U T T ~ T O W E  ATaiimed Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1 971), (United States 
Supreme Court ruiecl that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth 
Amendment freedom fiom unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by federal 
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agents.) See McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F. 2d 47 (5th Circuit 1980), (plaintiff was entitled to 
Due Process before road was built over land of disputed ownership). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14th Amendment property right even though 
dispute exists). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042,55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) 
(". . .riglit to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon tlie merits 
of a claimants' assertion.. ."). See Cooper v. Board of County Conzmissioners ofAda County, 
101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), (the test for functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity and due 
process requirements).) 
With respect to the extent of darnages available, the Supreme Court has noted that the 
basic purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate the victims of official 
misconduct, and therefore held that there is no limit on actual damages if they can be proven (see 
Carey v. Piphas, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)). But where they are not proved, only nominal damages of 
$1 .OO may be awarded (see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992)). Punitive damages may 
also be awarded, but not against a inunicipality (see Smitlz v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of 
iVe~.tiport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981)). A municipality may, however, be joiritly and 
severally liable (see Finch v. City of Verrzon, 877 F.2d 1497 (I 1 th Cir. 1989)). Injunctive and 
declaratory relief is also permitted (see 42 U. S. C. 1983). 
"It is abundantly clear that one reason tlie legislation was passed was to afford a federal 
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, 
state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, 
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state 
agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 36.5 US. 16 7 (1961) 
Relevant factors include the affected private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, 
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the government's interest, including 
burdens that additional safeguards would entail. See lWati~ews v. Eldridge, 324 U. S. 3 19, 335 
(1 976). In most cases, some type of predeprivation notice and hearing are constitutionally 
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required before a property interest is invaded. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1 978), 
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 1 13, and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, (1981). 
Plaintiffs petition Court to grant Plaintiffs partial summary judgment in this matter and as 
such grant Plaintiffs cause of action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 having fulfilled the requisite 
elements. 
On this 21st Day of October, 2008. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Don Halvorson 
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Plaintiff, Pro se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHG, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180 
Plaintiffs ) PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN 
VS. ) SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
Commissioners for the North Latah County ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ 
Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard ) ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official ) OFTHE 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) CAUSE FOR ACTION 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) UNDER 42 U. S. C. 1983 
Individual Capacity 
Defendants 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Latali ) 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say: 
1. We are the plaintiffs named in the above case. 
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2. We first became aware of Defendants adverse actions and improper interference with 
regard to our property rights underlying to and abutting to Camps Canyon Road in the 
late fall of 2005 when the NLCHD graded the road and pushed 6 inches of gavel to 
the northeast into the buffer (area between the fence and the road and its supporting 
structures) left by us when we reconstructed the line fence in 1997. 
3.  We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription to the lands abutting to 
and underlying Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+1- acre parcel in our fee 
siniple title on 4/12/06 at the regular meeting of the Cornniissioners of the NLCHD. 
4. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence, 
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Canips 
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2005 on 411 2/06. 
5. We gave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of 
prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence, to 
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to widen Camps Canyon 
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06. 
6. We continued to give Defendants fair warning of our f a d s  opiniods of factls and 
interpretation of tlie application of law to our facts and opiniods of facts and sought 
remedy and settlement with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum of either 
paying $750 and file for petition to validate Camps Canyon Road or getting a lawyer 
in September of 2007. 
7. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as 
instrument #424411 dated 12/9/1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the 
real property, situated in the State of Idaho, County of Latah as described in said 
instrument, including that land which underlies CCR as described in said deed. 
8. We first became aware of the construction of the Wagners first driveway access to 
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3%'- acre Parcel on or about 4/8/06. 
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9. On 4/10/06, I, Don Halvorson, called NLCHD foreman, Dan Payne, and Clearwater 
Power new construction foreman, known only to me as Clint, to inform them that the 
Wagners driveway access was on information and belief to be on our property 
crossing the east property line of the 3 +I- acre parcel. 
10. On 4/12/06, I, Don Halvorson, attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD 
Commissioners at 1132 White Ave Moscow Idaho. Those in attendance were Orland 
Arneberg, Richard Hansen, Ron Landeck, Dan Payne, Dan Carscallen, Paul Stubbs, 
Don Brown, Gary Osborn, John Bobman, Bob and Kate Wagner, Francis and Patsy 
Wagner, and a woman unknown to me. I complained to Commissioners that on my 
information and belief the permit for the Wagner driveway access was issued for 
access across our property. I also complained about the late fall 2005 extension of 
width to Camps Canyon Road and the injury to our fence allegedly due to the pushing 
of a wind fallen tree through the fence by the grader operator. Defendants stated all 
matters were within their 50 foot/25 feet from centerline prescriptive right of way. I 
reminded Cornmissioners that the NLCHD had altered Canips Canyon Road in the 
vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel in 1996 and that, on my information and belief, there 
no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and 
even if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no extension of the right of 
way (prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline encumbering our property 
greater than the width of Camps Canyon Road and its supporting structures. 
The above statements are true to the best of our knowledu 
Dated this 2 1" day of October, 2008. ofi /u- 
Don Halvorson 
;My cornrnission expires: 
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Charlotte Halvorson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180 
Plaintiffs ) PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE 
VS. ) APPLICATION/MOTION FOR 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO NAME 
Commissioners for the North Latah County ) EXPERT WITNESSES 
Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard ) 
Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official ) 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; ) 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his ) 
Individual Capacity ) 
Defendants 
Plaintiffs make ex parte application or, alternatively, move Court under Rule 
7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to enlarge time for Plaintiffs to name expert witnesses as scheduled on 
September 5, 2008 at pretrial telephone conference for October 31, 2008 and 
reschedule for December 31,2008. 
As grounds for this application/motion Plaintiffs cite recent order of this Court to 
extend time for and reschedule hearing for Plaintiffs motions for summary judgments 
PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICATION/f\/IOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TILIE TO 
NAR/~E XPERT T~JIIXTES ES I -. 8410 
properly scheduled for 10/21/08 and 11/4/08 and rescheduled at 11/18/2008. This 
rescheduled date for the hearing of these motions is beyond the scheduled date for 
Plaintiffs determinative date for naming expert witnesses and denies Plaintiffs the 
knowledge of the results of such hearings in the determinative process of the necessity 
of expert witnesses. 
Further as grounds in support of PlaintiffsFs' appIication/motion, Plaintiffs represent 
that the manner and grounds under which Defendants' counsel obtained rescheduling of 
Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgments was exploitive and abusive of process 
and/or process of discovery. 
Defendants' counsel notes as grounds for his rescheduling of Plaintiffs' motions 
for partial summary judgment as "[tlherefore, Plaintiffs' service by mail 29 days before 
the hearing date did not meet the minimum 31 days, advance notice of the hearing 
required under ldaho rules of civil procedure." (see Defendants' Ex Parte Application Or, 
Alternatively Motion to Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment Filed October 6, 2008, And Brief.) 
Plaintiffs aver that U.S. Postal Clerk at the Moscow, ldaho post office on October 
6, 2008 stated three postal rates and the delivery dates at each rate and each rate 
represented a delivery date of October 7, 2008-next day delivery. Any and all such 
error as claimed by Defendants' counsel is harmless-the additional days are intended 
for mail delivery and not for additional time of notice (see Keeven v. E s t ~ t e  of Keeven, 
126 ldaho 290, 882 P.2d 457) and the intent of the "error" is oniy meant to deiay the 
properly and adequately noticed partial summary judgments. In addition the Court's 
order granting Defendants' vacating and resetting hearing dates was signed and sent as 
of 10/14/08 from the Nez Perce County courthouse in Lewiston and Defendants' brief 
was sent from the Latah County courthouse in Moscow and both were received the next 
day, 1011 5/08, by Plaintiffs (evidence that U.S. Postal assertion of next day delivery 
works) Defendants do not say that the paper work did not arrive within the allotted 
required time , only that it was not mailed within the required allotted time. 
PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICL4TION/h40TION FOR EXLARGEh4ENT OF TIME TO 
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Further, Defendants' counsel incorporated reference to Plaintiffs' partial summary 
judgment filed on September 19, 2008 as "...and that same cause, incorporated herein 
by this reference, also applies in large part to this application or motion" is patently false. 
September 19, 2008 to October 21, 2008 is a total of 32 days. Additionally in reference 
to this Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment filed on September 19, 2008, Plaintiffs aver 
to the following history. 
Plaintiffs noted in a per se manual that in the sense of judicial economy, that is in 
requiring court time to resolve issues, attorneys may meet and stipulate to issues 
instead of using valuable court time. In this vein, Plaintiffs called and asked Defendants' 
counsel if he would view and respond to Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment and call 
back to discuss the motion. Defendants' counsel said he would and Plaintiffs submitted 
a copy of said September 19, 2008 submitted partial summary judgment motion several 
days before the September 19, 2008 filing. Plaintiffs never heard from Defendants' 
counsel and went ahead and filed the motion. This action extended Defendants' 
counsel's notice of the partial summary judgment even further, making Defendants 
claims even less applicable. 
On September 25, 2008 Plaintiffs once again called Defendants' counsel, this 
time to schedule time to discuss Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' interrogatories and 
requests for admissions and the inadequacy and evasiveness of Defendants' responses 
and Plaintiffs asked Defendants' counsel to comment on the September 19, 2008 filed 
partial summary judgment. Defendants' counsel set a meeting time on the next day 
(9126108) at his office at 10:OO a.m. 
Plaintiffs spent two hours revealing Plaintiffs' legal positioning in the litigation, 
requesting discussion of the admissions, interrogatories and the filed September 19, 
2008 motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants' counsel spent the two hours in 
argumentative posturing and avoiding any discussion of the intended matters and 
referenced his scheduling problems with going to Bellingham, Washington to visit his 
children, moving his office and aluded to other required time away from the office. 
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Defendants' counsel's only apparent intent on accepting the meeting was to obtain 
stipulation from Plaintiffs to reschedule hearing times to better serve his life choices. 
The meeting ended with Defendants and Plaintiffs agreeing to submit their 
stipulations for the other to consider. On Monday 9/29/2008 a.m. Plaintiffs hand 
delivered Plaintiffs stipulation list to Defendants' counsel and agreed to return at the end 
of the day to pick up Defendants stipulations (Defendants' counsel did not have paper 
work completed). Plaintiffs did pick up Defendants stipulations at the end of the day and 
waited to hear from Defendants' counsel. Tuesday evening Defendants' counsel's 
secretary called asking why Plaintiffs had not returned the signed stipulations and 
Plaintiffs told her they were waiting for Defendants' counsel to call as to what he would 
agree to. The next day Defendants' counsel called and in an angry tirade accused 
Plaintiffs of reneging on some deal and insulted Plaintiffs' integrity. Plaintiffs asked 
Defendants' counsel if he would stipulate to any of the facts Plaintiffs had submitted and 
Defendants' counsel angrily ended the conversation and hung up. 
As further grounds for Plaintiffs' in support of Plaintiffs' application/motion to 
enlarge time for Plaintiffs to name expert witnesses Plaintiffs not only represent that 
Defendants' counsel is abusing process by needlessly and/or without cause delaying 
motion practice and now does further abuse process of discovery by shortening limited 
time for discovery and resolution of undisputed facts not only by the obfuscation of the 
admissions requested and interrogatories asked, but also now by shortening the time 
available to determine what needs further discovery. 
Plaintiffs hold that the difficulties Defendants' counsel has with the extenuating 
circumstances of his life and career have no bearing on whether this case will ever be 
tried on its merits, rather only on the success he may have in abusing process of this 
litigation. 
For Defendants failure to show good cause and/or abuse of motion practice 
and/or abuse of the process of discovery and for Plaintiffs' good cause shown, Plaintiffs 
request Court enter the Ex Parte Order granting the relief requested, rescheduling the 
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date for naming of expert witnesses to December 31,2008. In the event the Court does 
not grant Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application, Plaintiffs request a hearing/conference on this 
AppicationlMotion at the earliest date. 
On this a s % a y  of October, 200 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Don Halvorson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this&f$day of October, 2008,I caused a true and correct copy 
Don Halvorson 
of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
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DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THX STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CE-IARLOTTE HAL,VORSON 
Ofusband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' FIRST MOTION FOR 
) PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR 
vs. ) ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND FOR 
) ATTORNEY FEES AND BRIEF 
NORTH LATAW COUNTY EZIGKWAY 1 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
TEE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, R I C W  ) 
HANSEN, SHlERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN P A m ,  in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
Defendants. 
Defendants, through counsel, (i) move this Court pursuant to Rule 2S(c) Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure for its Order protecting Defendants £ram annoyance, oppression and/or undue 
burden or expense in responding to each of Plaintiffs' additional discovery requests set forth in 
Items 1 through 10 below by vacating such discovery and declaring that additional discovery by 
DEFENDANTSy FRST hlOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR EhiLliRGESENT OF 
Tl;r\lE ,rtW FOR ATTORnEY FEES Ai'JD BRIEF -- 1 041.5 
Plaintiffs not be had except by Court order for good cause shown and (ii) move this Court pursuant 
to Rule 33(a)(3) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for its Order vacating PlaintiEs additional 
interrogatory requests set forth in Items 1 through 5 below and prohibiting Plaintiffs fi-om serving 
additional interrogatory requests in this action without first obtaining an order of the Court upon a 
showing of good cause. 
Defendants move this Court pursuant to Rule 6(b) I.R.C.P. for an enlargement of time to 
respond to Items 1 through 10 below should the Court not vacate such discovery requests. 
Defendants move pursuant to Rules 26(c) and (f) and 37(a)(4) that Defendants attorney fees in 
connection with tlSs pleading be paid by Plaintiffs wliose conduct necessitated its preparation and 
prosecution. 
BRIEF 
PENDING DISCOVERY REOUESTS AT ISSUE 
This motion addresses Plaintiffs' pending discovery requests in this action, as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Third Interrogatories (Ameberg). 
2. Plaintiffs' Fourth hterrogatories (Arneberg). 
3. Plaintiffs' Third liiterrogatories (Clyde). 
4. Plaintiffs' Third Interrogatories (Hansen). 
5. Plaintiffs' Third Interrogatories (Payne). 
6. Plaintiffs' Third Request for Admissions (Ameberg). 
7. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Clyde). 
8. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Hansen). 
9. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Payne). 
10. Plaintiffs Request fcr Discovery cf NLCKD Standing Operatlog Procedrtresllzolicies. 
DEFEhDANTS' FIRST MOTIOX FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR ENLrL-lRGE&ENT OF 
T B E  ,4nD FOR ATTORWIT FEES BREF -- 2 0416 
Items 1 through 10 above are contained in Defendants' First Record Supplement In Support of 
Defendants' First Motion for Protective Orders filed herewith ("'Defendants' First Record 
Supplement") as Items 1 through 10, respectively. 
RULE 33(a)(3) RELIEF 
Plaintiffs have previously served discovery requests on Defendants in this action that 
Defendants have either answered or responded to, as follows: 
11. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Arneberg). 
12. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admission (Arneberg). 
13. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Payne). 
14. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions (Payne). 
15. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Hansen). 
16. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions (Hansen). 
1 7. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Clyde). 
18. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions (Clyde). 
19. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg). 
20. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories mansen). 
2 1. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Payne). 
22. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Clyde). 
23. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Arneberg). 
Items 11 through 23 above are contained in Defendants' First Record Supplement as 
Iterns 11 through 23, respectively. 
DEFEhBAP;iTSY FIRST MOTION FOR PROPECTn?E ORDERS, FOR ENLLARGEiI/fEl\iT OF 
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Individual Defendants have already responded to interrogatories, including sub-parts, 
contained in Items 11, 13, 15, 17 and 19 through 22 in the number set forth opposite their name, 
as follows: 
o h e b e r g -  183 
o Hansen- 144 
o Clyde - 148 
o Payne-189 
See paragraph 3 and Items 1 1, 13, 17 and 19 through 22 of Defendants' First Record 
Supplement . 
Rule 33(a)(3) I.R.C.P. limits to forty (40) the number of interrogatories that a party is 
allowed to serve on another party without obtaining a stipulation from such party or an order of 
the court. Plaintiffs have not obtained either. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have now served the 
individual Defendants with additional interrogatories, including subparts, contained in Items 1 
through 5 above requesting responses related to corresponding, additional requests for 
admission contained in Items 6 through 9 md 23 in the number set forth opposite tlieir name, as 
follows: 
o Arneberg- 78 
o Hmsen-40 
o Clyde-40 
o Payne-40 
See paragraph 3 and Items 1 through 9 and 23 of Defendants' First Record Supplement. 
Plaintiffs are in substantial violation of Rule 33(a)(3) in that they have already far 
exceeded the number of interrogatories allowed to be served without stip~lation or court order 
DEFE%-DLANTS7 FIRST AMOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR Eil'1LARGEREWT OF 
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and they now propound additional interrogatories in Items 1 through 5 above. Defendants 
request that the Court vacate Items 1 through 5 and prohibit that Plaintiffs from sewing 
additional interrogatory requests in this action without first obtaining an order of the Court upon 
an showing of good cause. 
RULE 26(c) RELIEF 
Further, prior to sewing Items 1 through 11 above, Plaintiffs had previously served 
individual Defendants have already answered those requests for admission, including sub-parts, 
contained in Items 12, 14, 16, 18 and 23 in the number set forth opposite their name, as follows: 
o Arneberg- 130 
o Hansen- 83 
o Clyde- 83 
o Payne-93. 
See paragraph 3 and Items 12, 1 4, 1 6, 1 8 and 23 of Defendants' First Record Supplement. 
While Rule 26(a) permits various methods of discovery, the frequency of use of such 
methods is subject to Court scrutiny and discretion under Rule 26(c) I.R.C.P. Specifically, Rule 
26(c) allows a court "to make any order wlic11 justice requires to protect a party.. . from 
annoyance.. . oppl-ession or undue burden or expense.. . ." Justice in this case requires 
intervention by the Court. 
A colnparisoli of Items 11 tfirough 23 above, containing those intellrogatories and 
requests for admission that Defendants have already answered or responded to, with Items 1 
through 10 above, the interrogatories and admissioli requests that have been recently served and 
~ J i c h  are the subject of this motion, demonstrates that the same questions or requests are 
addressed in great detail in botfi sets of Itexs. Plaintiffsy Requests f ~ r  Admission numbered 1 
DEFEWAWS' FIRST 3fOTfON FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR EhTA.l_RGEhl_EliiT OF 
TIhlIE ,&hi FOR ATTORYEY FEES A29 BRIEF -- 5 
through 23 of Items 6 through 9 and corresponding Interrogatory No. I in Items 2 througb 5 
(which Interrogatory No. 1 requests, as to each of 40 requests for admission, "all facts on which 
you based any part of your responses.. . all documents memorializing each such fact.. . all 
persons with knowledge of each such fact.. .." [generally the "Admission Interrogatory"]), 
address the width andlor alignment of Camps Canyon Road, subject matter that was already 
thoroughly addressed in Plaintiffs7 Responses to Defendants' Requests for Admission and 
numbered 2,3,4, 13,17,21, and 22 of Items 12, 14, 16 and 1 8 and numbered 40 through 48 of 
Item 14 and corresponding Interrogatory Items 1 1, 13, 1 5 and 1 7, the Admission Interrogatory, 
numbered 4,5,6,7,8,9, 10 and 11 of Items 19, numbered 1 through 28 of Item 21, numbered 1 
through 8 and 12 of Item 22 and numbered 1 tluough 1 5 of Item 23. See paragraph 4 and Itenis 
2 through 5,12,14,16,18, 19, a id  21 through 23 of Defendants' First Record Supplement. 
Plaintiffs' Requests for Admission numbered 24 through 40 of Items 6 through 9 address 
exclusively "standard operating procedure, the "Wagner permit7' and/or NLCHD hearing and 
meeting procedures that were already thoroughly addressed in Plaintiffs7 Responses to 
Defendants' Request for Admission and Interrogatories nuinbered 10 througli 12 and 14 through 
17 of Items 1 1,15, 19,20,23 through 28, and 30 of Items 12,14, 16 and 18,8 througli 10 and 
12 thou& 15 of Item 17,12 thou& 16 of Item 19,2 through 24 and 30 of Item 20 , l  through 
22,26,27 of Item 21,2 and 6 of Item 22 and 16 through 31 of Item 23. See paragraph 4 and 
Items 11, 12 and 14 tlxougl~ 23 of Defendants7 First Record Supple~ent. 
Moreover, in addition to being cumulative of prior discovery, the great majority of 
admission requests in Plaintiffs' Items 6 - 9 are improper, being either repetitious, 
ar,ownentative, unreasonable, confirsing or a combination thereof. In addition, even though 
Items 1 - ! 1 deal alxost entirely with XLCHD issues and ~ o t  i s s~es  pertinent to individual 
DEFEWAWS' FJRST NOTION FOR PROTECTATE ORDERS, FOR Eh'LARGElilEKT OF 
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Defendants, Plaintiffs' have caused undue burden and expense and annoyance by serving the 
identical set of forty (40) requests for admission on the four (4) individual Defendants and not on 
Defendant NLCHD. 
Despite Plaintiffs' prior discovery excesses, Defendants answered and responded to 
Plaintiffs discovery. However, in light of the circumstances of this case and the increasingly 
improper and burdensome nature of the discovery contained in Items 1 through 10, Defendants 
can refrain no longer fi-om calling Plaintiffs' improper discovery tactics to the Court's attention. 
Plaintiffs' discovery approach is repetitious, tedious, detailed and designed to suit Plaintiffs' 
confusing legal theories without concern for annoyance, repetition, irrelevancy, andlor expense. 
Plaintiffs are engaging in legal ar,ment not factual discovery. Unless restrained by Court 
Order, Plaintiffs will continue to barrage Defendants with improper, needless, time consuming, 
oppressive and costly discovery requests. 
The Court should use its discretion under Rule 26(c) to protect Defendants &on1 
LC annoyance.. . oppression or undue burden or expense." Comstock v. City of New Yovk, 437 
N.Y.S. 2d 106,107-1 08,82 A.D. 2d 805,806-807 (Sup.Ct., App. Div. 198 1) (copy attached). 
Plaintiffs' constant revisiting of the same subject matter in successive requests is improper. Id. 
at 108, 807. As stated by the New York Supreme Court in Comstock, the "combination of overly 
comprehensive questions and definitions together with questions and definitions in such refined 
detail in the second set of interrogatories is unduly burdensome and oppressive.. .." Id. The 
Comstock Court also declared inappropriate the use of successive sets of discovery requests for 
the purpose of "obtaining in exquisite detail a breakdown of the prior responses." Id. Plaintiffs 
have been provided with sufficient responses &om Defendants covering all issues of this case to 
DEFESDANTS' FEST MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
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"set the state for meaningfir1 depositions" and to warrant this Court's order that further written 
discovery not be had absent Court order for good cause shown. Id. 
It is not the duty of the Court or Defendants to ''prune" the discovery requests or to point 
out the repetition or impropriety of Plaintiffs' additional requests. It is the duty of the 
propounding party, in this case the Plaintiffs, to insure that subsequent interrogatories and 
requests for admission do not duplicate or overlap with prior discovery requests or are not 
unduly burdensolne and oppressive. Id. Because Plaintiffs have not done so and do not appear 
inclined to do so in the future, the Court should vacate the pending discovery requests, Items 1 
though 10, and, at a minimum, require Plaintiffs to show good cause why m y  additional written 
discovery is justified in this case before any hrther written discovery should be permitted of 
Plaintiffs. Id. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Rules 26(c) and (0 and 37(a)(4) provide this Court with discretion to award Defendants 
their attorney fees incurred in curbing Plaintiffs unreasonable and improper discovery efforts, 
and Defendants respectfblly request that the Court make such an award. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfillly request that Defendants' Motion for Protective Orders and 
Motion for Attorney Fees be granted as set forth above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of October, 2008. 
RONAtD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
i 
By: \ ~ Q Z ~ [ J  (.LL&L 
Ron id J. Landeck h Atto eys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON JXALVORSON [ X] U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KINDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
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Ron d J. Landeck 
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the circumstances. 
C 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First 
Department, New York. 
L. K. COMSTOCK & CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
The CITY OF NEW YORK (Bower Bay WPCP) 
Defendant-Respondent. 
March 24, 198 1. 
Electrical contractor, which filed action against city, 
appealed from order entered by the Supreme Court, 
New York County, Sherman, J., which denied 
plaintiffs motion for protective order striking 
defendant's second set of interrogatories and ordering 
that pretrial examination of plaintiff should 
commence 15 days after service of plaintiffs answers 
to the second set of interrogatories. The Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, held that combination of 
overly comprehensive questions and defmitions 
together with questions and definitions in such 
refined detail in second set of intenogatories served 
upon plaintiff, which had previously answered initial 
interrogatories and furnished city wit11 a myriad of 
detail in its responses and bill of particulars, was 
unduly burdensome and oppressive, particularly in 
IigM of fact that simultaneously with the service of 
the second set of interrogatories, the city served a 
notice of pretrial examination of the plaintiff. 
Reversed. 
Sandier, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
U Pretrial Procedure 307A -19 
a Pretrial Procedure 
307.411 Depositions and Discovery 
307AIl{A) Discovery in General 
307Ak19 k. Discretion of Court. a t  
Citzd Cases 
Although the Civil Practice Law and Rules set no 
limits on what disclosure devices may be used or how 
many times they can be used, special tern1 should 
esercise its discretion to prevent abuse in light of all 
Pretrial Procedure 307A -248.1 
=A Pretrial Procedure 
307,411 Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(D) Interrogatories to Parties 
307AIXD)l In General 
307Ak248 Number, Form, and 
Inlportance 
307Ak248.1 k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
--
(Formerly 307Ak248) 
Combination of overly co~nprehensive questions and 
definitions together with questions and definitions in 
such refined detail in second set of interrogatories 
served upon plaintiff, which had previously answered 
initial interrogatories and fiirnished city with a 
myriad of detail in its responses and bill of 
particulars, was unduly burdensome and oppressive, 
particularly in light of fact that simultaneously with 
service of second set of interrogatories, the city 
served a notice of pretrial examination of the 
plaintiff. 
J3J Pretrial Procedure 307A -248.1 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307AII Depositions and Discovery 
307AIIiD) Interrogatories to Parties 
307.411(D) 1 In General 
307Ak248 Number, Form, and 
Importance 
307Ak248.1 k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formeriy 307AiQ.ii.8 j 
Second set of interrogatories served upon electrical 
contractor in its suit against city was repetitious, 
burdensome, unreasonable and oppressive, and thus it 
was not the duty of court to prune them but, rather, to 
vacate them in their entirety. 
Pretrial Procedure 307A -95 
j07A Pretrial Procedure 
307A11 Depositions and Discovery 
307AlliC) Discovery Depositions 
6 2003 Thoxsort ReutersfiT7est. No Cisi;n to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
307AII(C) 1 In General 
307Ak95 k. Other Remedy, 
Availability or Prior Use Of; Successive 
Examinations. Most Cited Cases 
Although noticing an oral deposition simultaneously 
with the service of interrogatories was not necessarily 
improper in action brought by electrical contractor 
against city, the deposition should proceed before 
service of such additional interrogatories as may be 
deemed necessary after completion of the deposition. 
""106 F. E. Tretter, New York City, for plaintiff- 
appellant. 
A. Aiosa, New York City, for defendant-respondent. 
""107 Before SANDLER, J. P., and SULLIVAN, 
ROSS, CARRO and FEIN, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered 
October 20, 1980 which denied plaintiffs nlotion for 
a protective order striking defendant's second set of 
interrogatories and ordering that the pre-trial 
examination of plaintiff should commence 15 days 
after service of plaintiffs answers to the second set of 
interrogatories, reversed on the law and on the facts 
and in the exercise of discretion, without costs; 
motion for a protective order granted and the 
interrogatories vacated, without prejudice to service 
of appropriate interrogatories, after completion of the 
deposition of plaintiff which shall proceed at a time 
and place to be fised by the parties within 15 days 
afler service of a copy of this Court's order with 
notice of entry. 
Plaintiff, an electrical contractor, entered into a 
contract with defendant City of New York (City) to 
perform electrical work in the construction by the 
City of Bower Bay Water Pollution Control Plant in 
Queens. During construction, disputes arose between 
plaintiff and the City. plaintiff served a summons and 
con~plaint alleging in four causes of action a balance 
due under the contract, amounts due for extra and 
additional work and for damages from construction 
delays. The City served an answer and counterclaims, 
together with extensive interrogatories, in February 
1978. 
Two years later, on February 2 1, 1980, the parties 
stipulated to the service of an amended complaint in 
the fonn annexed to the stipulation and the plaintiff 
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"806 served its answers to the interrogatories. The 
amended complaint alleged three causes of action 
instead of four. The claims for the contract balance 
and extra work were reduced. The damages sought in 
the cause of action for delay were increased. The 
exhibits attached to the answers to the interrogatories 
included schedules of the amounts of contract monies 
paid and due, and a detailed evaluation of pending 
change orders, disputed change orders and delays. 
Included was a 15-page bill of particulars detailing 
the circumstances giving rise to the suit and various 
letters respecting time extensions for completion of 
plaintiffs work. Although the amended complaint 
alleging these three causes of action was not served 
until June 13, 1980, it was in the form annexed to the 
February 2 1 stipulation. Plaintiffs responses to the 
interrogatories were geared to the amended complaint 
and in accordance with the relief reauested in the 
amended complaint rather than the original 
complaint. The City did not move to compel fhrther 
disclosure with respect to the interrogatories (CPLR 
2124). Instead the City served its answer to the 
amended complaint and a second set of 
intei~ogatories, 32 pages long, containing 104 main 
questions, further subdivided into sub-parts and 
subdivisions of those sub-parts, in exquisite detail, 
totalling over 250 questions. Each interrogatory 
adopted by reference ten definitions, some very broad 
and others precisely detailed. With its answer and 
interrogatories, the City served a notice to take 
deposition on plaintiff upon oral examination 
including a substantial request for the production of 
documents, many of which were also called for in the 
interrogatories. 
On plaintiffs motion to strike the second set of 
interrogatories, Special Term modified some of the 
interrogatories and directed that the remainder be 
answered prior to the pre-trial examination of 
i;!aintiff. P!aintiff appea!ed. 
Although we are loathe to interfere with Special 
Ternl's exercise of discretion in disclosure matters, it 
is plain that here the second set of interrogatories 
should be vacated and not be pruned, as Special Term 
sought to do. Special Term directed that to the extent 
that the second set of interrogatories was repetitious 
of the earlier interrogatories, plaintiff might answer 
by citing the first set of interrogatories. We disagree. 
Altkough the CPLR sets no limits on what 
disclosure devices may be used or how many times 
they can be used, Special Term should exercise its 
discretion to prevent **I08 abuse in the light of all 
the circumstar~ces ( Commissioners of the State 
Tnsurance Fund v. News World Communica~ions. 
Inc.. 74 A.D.2d 765. 425 N.Y.S.2d 595: *807Clifton 
Steel Productions Corp. v. County of Monroe Public 
VC'orks Dept., 74 A.D.2d 715.425 N.Y.S.2d 672). 
J2J ,4n examination of plaintiff's responses to the 
initial interrogatories and the exhibits annexed 
thereto establishes that plaintiff answered the 
interrogatories and furnished the City with a myriad 
of detail in its responses and bill of particulars. It has 
not been demonstrated that plaintiff's answers were 
not responsive. The second set of interrogatories 
repeats verbatim a large number of items from the 
earlier set of interrogatories. It is not the 
responsibility of plaintiff to point out where its prior 
responses answered the second set of interrogatories. 
It is the duty of the defendant to insure that its second 
set of interrogatories does not duplicate the prior 
interrogatories. Nor is it appropriate to use a second 
set of interrogatories for the purpose of obtaining in 
exquisite detail a breakdown of the prior responses. 
The combination of overly comprehensive questions 
and definitions together with questions and 
definitions in such refined detail in the second set of 
interrogatories is unduly burdensome and oppressive, 
particularly in the light of the fact that simultaneously 
with the service of the second set of interrogatories 
the City served a ilotice of pre-trial examination of 
the plaintiff. 
As noted in Commissioners of the State Insurance 
Fund v. News World Communications, Inc., supra, 
and Clifton Steel Corporation v. County of Monroe 
Public Works Dept., supra, interrogatories are 
appropriate and useful in enabling the seeking party 
to obtain lists and other detaiied information ro set 
the stage for meaningful depositions. Here, the 
responses to the original interrogatories furnished 
more than sufficient information for a fuitful 
deposition. 
a The second set of interrogatories is repetitious, 
burdensome, unreasonable and oppressive. Under the 
circumstances, it is not the duty of the court to prune 
them, but rather to vacate them in their entirety ( 
Horn Coastr!~ction Co. Lcc. v. ICOS Corn. of 
America. 63 A.D.2d 939, 406 N.Y.S.Zd 75; Churchill 
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Computer Corp. v. Haug, 70 A.D.2d 546, 416 
N.Y.S.2d 604). 
j4J Although we do not now rule that noticing an oral 
deposition simultaneously with the service of 
interrogatories is necessarily improper (see Barouh 
Eaton Allen Corp. v. IBM Cor?.. 76 A.D.2d 873.429 
N.Y.S.2d 33), we direct that under the circumstances 
of this case the deposition should proceed before 
service of such additional interrogatories as may be 
deemed necessary after completion of the deposition. 
All concur except SANDLER, J. who dissents in a 
memorandum as follows: 
I agree that the detail and structure of defendant's 
second set of interrogatories, particularly in light of 
the prior interrogatories and the bill of particulars, 
present a substantial question as to whether the 
interrogatories are unduly burdensome. On balance, I 
have concluded that Special Term's exercise of 
discretion was appropriate. 
The detailed nature of the interrogatories must be 
ineasured against the reality that this is an action 
against the City of New York for over $5 million, and 
that the resolution of the litigation is likely to turn 
upon a complex interaction of developnlents that took 
place over a period of time. In addition, I do not 
agree with the court that the answers to the 
defendant's first set of interrogatories were 
satisfactoly. Many of those answers seem to me 
obviously vague, general and incomplete. 
The nature of the litigation inakes it peculiarly 
appropriate for the use of interrogatories to be 
followed by an oral deposition. Many of the 
questions are particularly suited to the interrogato~-y 
device since the answers will frequently require an 
examination of records and documents and some 
consultation ~ i t h  others. Although answering the 
interrogatories ~vill impose some preliminary burden 
upon the plaintiff, it seems likely that the ultimate 
result will be to reduce significantly the time required 
""109 in the contemplated deposition. Conceivably, 
full responses to the questions propounded may 
ultimately obviate the need for a deposition. In short, 
this does not seem to me an appropriate case to 
depart from the strong policy in favor of non- 
interference with Special Term's exercise of 
discretion in disclosure mattsrs. 
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Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New 
York County, entered October 20, 1980, denying 
plaintiff? motion for a protective order and ordering 
pretrial examination to commence fifteen days after 
service of plaintiff's answers to the second set of 
interrogatories, should be affirmed. 
N.Y .A.D., 198 1. 
L. K. Comstock & Co., Inc. v. City of New York 
80 A.D.2d 805,437 N.Y.S.2d 106 
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